The Good Citizen (OFFSITE LINK) -Michael Sandel, Harvard University
Citizenship and Sovereignty, Form #12.001 (OFFSITE LINKS)
-basics of citizenship and sovereignty
U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588
“We have in our political system a Government of the United States
and a government of each of the several states. Each
is distinct from the other and each has citizens of its own...”
[U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588]
Baldwin v. Franks, 120
U.S. 678, 30 L.Ed. 766, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763
" In the Constitution and laws of the United States the word "citizen" is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States. It is so used in section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments of the Constitution, which provides that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside," and that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." But it is also sometimes used in popular language to indicate the same thing as resident, inhabitant, or person. That it is not so used in § 5508 in the Revised Statutes is quite 691*691 clear, if we revert to the original statute from which this section was taken. That statute was the act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 140, "to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other purposes." It is the statute which was under consideration as to some of its sections in United States v. Reese, supra, and from its title, as well as its text, it is apparent that the great purpose of Congress in its enactment was to enforce the political rights of citizens of the United States in the several states. Under these circumstances there cannot be a doubt that originally the word "citizen" was used in its political sense, and as the Revised Statutes are but a revision and consolidation of the statutes in force December 1, 1873, the presumption is that the word has the same meaning there that it had originally."
[Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 30 L.Ed. 766, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763]
[EDITORIAL: When they say "political sense", they mean CONSTITUTIONAL and "nationality", when they say "resident, inhabitant, or person", they mean STATUTORY and domicile.]
McDonel v. The State,
90 Ind. 320 (1883)
“...he was not a citizen of the United States, he was a citizen
and voter of the State,...” “One may be a citizen of a State
an yet not a citizen of the United States”.
[McDonel v. The State, 90 Ind. 320 (1883)]
Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935)
“The governments of the United States and of each state of the
several states are distinct from one another. The rights of
a citizen under one may be quite different from those which he has
under the other”.
[Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935) ]
Gardina v. Board of Registrars
of Jefferson County, 160 Ala. 155; 48 So. 788 (1909)
“There are, then, under our republican form of government, two
classes of citizens, one of the United States and one of the state”.
[Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County, 160 Ala. 155;
48 So. 788 (1909)]
IMPORTANT!: Read Great
IRS Hoax, Sections 4.11 through 4.11.11: Citizenship
19 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations §886
"A corporation is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the state or country by or under
the laws of which it was created, and of that state or country only."
[19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, §886]
Butler v. Farnsworth,
4 Fed.Cas. 902 (1821)
"A citizen of one state is to be considered as a citizen of every
other state in the union. "
[Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Fed.Cas. 902 (1821)]
Annotated Fourteenth Amendment, Congressional Research Service
“Citizens of the United States within the meaning of this Amendment must be natural and not artificial persons; a corporate body is not a citizen of the United States.14
14 Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 Fed.Cas. 67 (C.C.D.La. 1870). Not being citizens of the United States, corporations accordingly have been declared unable "to claim the protection of that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which secures the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment or impairment by the law of a State." Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1869) . This conclusion was in harmony with the earlier holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), to the effect that corporations were not within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of state citizenship set out in Article IV, Sect. 2. See also Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912) ; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers, 276 U.S. 71, 89 (1928) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) .
[Annotated Fourteenth Amendment, Congressional Research Service.
(b)…The term 'citizen of the United States' includes a citizen
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective
January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa.
26 U.S. Code § 2208.Certain residents of possessions considered citizens of the United States
A decedent who was a citizen of the United States and a resident of a possession thereof at the time of his death shall, for purposes of the tax imposed by this chapter, be considered a “citizen” of the United States within the meaning of that term wherever used in this title unless he acquired his United States citizenship solely by reason of (1) his being a citizen of such possession of the United States, or (2) his birth or residence within such possession of the United States.
(Added Pub. L. 85–866, title I, § 102(a), Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1674.)
26 U.S. Code § 2209.Certain residents of possessions considered nonresidents not citizens of the United States
A decedent who was a citizen of the United States and a resident of a possession thereof at the time of his death shall, for purposes of the tax imposed by this chapter, be considered a “nonresident not a citizen of the United States” within the meaning of that term wherever used in this title, but only if such person acquired his United States citizenship solely by reason of (1) his being a citizen of such possession of the United States, or (2) his birth or residence within such possession of the United States.
(Added Pub. L. 86–779, § 4(b)(1), Sept. 14, 1960, 74 Stat. 999.)
26 U.S.C. §2501 Imposition of Tax
(b)Certain residents of possessions considered citizens of the United States
A donor who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of a possession thereof shall, for purposes of the tax imposed by this chapter, be considered a “citizen” of the United States within the meaning of that term wherever used in this title unless he acquired his United States citizenship solely by reason of (1) his being a citizen of such possession of the United States, or (2) his birth or residence within such possession of the United States.
(c) Who is a citizen.
Every person born or naturalized in the [federal] United States and subject to its [exclusive
federal jurisdiction under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution]
jurisdiction is a citizen. For other rules governing the acquisition
of citizenship, see chapters 1 and 2 of title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1401-1459). For rules governing loss of citizenship,
see sections 349 to 357, inclusive, of such Act (8
U.S.C. 1481-1489), Schneider v. Rusk, (1964) 377 U.S. 163, and Rev. Rul. 70-506, C.B. 1970-2, 1. For rules
pertaining to persons who are nationals
but not citizens at birth, e.g., a person born in American Samoa,
see section 308 of such Act (8
U.S.C. 1408). For special rules applicable to certain expatriates
who have lost citizenship with a principal purpose of avoiding certain
taxes, see section
877. A foreigner who has filed his
declaration of intention of becoming a citizen but who has not yet
been admitted to citizenship by a final order of a naturalization
court is an alien.
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11402, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 7332,
39 FR 44216, Dec. 23, 1974]
Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition, p. 244:
citizen. One who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or
of a particular state, is a member of the political community, owing
allegiance and being entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. U.S. Const., 14th Amend. See Citizenship.
"Citizens" are members of a political community who, in their
associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to
the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general
welfare and the protection of their individual as well as collective
rights. Herriott v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d 48, 500 P.2d
The term may include or apply to children of alien parents from
in United States, Von Schwerdtner v. Piper, D.C.Md., 23 F.2d 862,
863; U.S. v. Minoru Yasui, D.C.Or., 48 F.Supp. 40, 54; children
of American citizens born outside United States, Haaland v. Attorney
General of United States, D.C.Md., 42 F.Supp. 13, 22; Indians, United
States v. Hester, C.C.A.Okl., 137 F.2d 145, 147; National Banks,
Amierican Surety Co. v. Bank of California, C.C.A.Or., 133 F.2d
160, 162; nonresident who has qualified as administratrix of estate
of deceased resident, Hunt v. Noll, C.C.A.Tenn., 112 F.2d 288, 289.
However, neither the United States nor a state is a citizen for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Jizemerjian v. Dept of
Air Force, 457 F.Supp. 820. On the other hand, municipalities
and other local governments are deemed to be citizens. Rieser
v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462. A corporation is not
a citizen for purposes of privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. D.D.B. Realty Corp. v. Merrill, 232
F.Supp. 629, 637.
Under diversity statute [28
U.S.C. §1332], which mirrors U.S. Const, Article III's diversity clause, a person is a "citizen
of a state" if he or she is a citizen of the United States and a
domiciliary of a state of the United States. Gibbons v. Udaras
na Gaeltachta, D.C.N.Y., 549 F.Supp. 1094, 1116.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 244]
"There is no doubt
that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth
amendment 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' are expressly declared
to be 'citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.' But, in our opinion, it did not need this amendment to
give them that position. Before its adoption the Constitution of
the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens
of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily
such citizens without such provision. There cannot be
a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community,
such as a nation is, implies an [88 U.S. 162, 166] association
of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one
of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed
by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its
protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal
obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance
for protection and protection for allegiance.
"For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to
this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person
and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words
'subject,' 'inhabitant,' and 'citizen' have been used, and the choice
between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. Citizen is now more
commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better
suited to the description of one living under a republican government,
it was adopted by nearly all of the States upon their separation
from Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in the Articles of
Confederation and in the Constitution of the United States. When
used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership
of a nation, and nothing more."
[Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874)]
"...it is well settled that a corporation created by a state
is a citizen of the state, within the meaning of those provisions
of the constitution and statutes of the United States which define
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Railroad Co. v. Railroad
Co., 112 U.S. 414 , 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168, 178; Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518."
[State of Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888)]
'The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens,' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the
political body who, according to our republican institutions, form
the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call
the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people,
and a constituent member of this sovereignty. ..."
[Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)]
Earley v. Hershey Transit Co., 55 F.Supp.
981, D.C.PA. (1944)
"The term ‘citizen‘, as used in the Judiciary Act with reference
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, is substantially synonymous
with the term ‘domicile‘. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 2 Cir., 250 F. 554, 557."
[Earley v. Hershey Transit Co., 55 F.Supp. 981, D.C.PA. (1944)]
Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Ed., p. 310
The terms "citizen" and "citizenship" are distinguishable from
"resident" or "inhabitant." Jeffcott v. Donovan, C.C.A.Ariz., 135
F.2d 213, 214; and from "domicile," Wheeler v. Burgess, 263 Ky.
693, 93 S.W.2d 351, 354; First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of
Columbia v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., D.C.S.C., 59 F.2d 35j0,
351. The words "citizen" and citizenship," however, usually include
the idea of domicile, Delaware, L.&W.R.Co. v. Petrowsky, C.C.A.N.Y.,
250 F. 554, 557; citizen inhabitant and resident often synonymous,
Jonesboro Trust Co. v. Nutt, 118 Ark. 368, 176 S.W. 322, 324; Edgewater
Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., D.C.Md., 49 F.Supp.
807, 809; and citizenship and domicile are often synonymous.
Messick v. Southern Pa. Bus Co., D.C.Pa., 59 F.Supp. 799, 800.
[Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 310]
Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Ed., p. 311
Domicile and citizen are synonymous in federal courts, Earley
v. Hershey Transit Co., D.C. Pa., 55 F.Supp. 981, 982; inhabitant,
resident and citizen are synonymous, Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower,
D.C.Md., 46 F.2d 678, 683.
[Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 311]
Van Valkenburg v. BrownSupreme CourtJanuary 1, 187,2 43 Cal. 43 (1872)
" It will be found that from the earliest periods of our history the State laws regulated the privilege of the elective franchise within their respective limits, and that these laws were exactly such as local interests, peculiar conditions, or supposed policy dictated, and that it was never asserted that the exclusion of any class of inhabitants from the privilege of voting amounted to an interference with the privileges of the excluded class as citizens. As was well said by Judge Mills, of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky: "The mistake on the subject arises from not attending to a sensible distinction between political and civil rights. The latter constitute the citizen, while the former are not necessary ingredients. A State may deny all her political rights to an individual, and yet he may be a citizen. The rights of office and suffrage are political purely, and are denied by some or all the States to part of their population, who are still citizens. A citizen, then, is one who owes the Government allegiance, service, and money by way of taxation, and to whom the Government, in turn, grants and guarantees liberty of person and of conscience, the [**13] right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and the social relations, of suit and defense, and security of person, estate, and reputation. These, with some others which might be enumerated, being guaranteed and secured by Government, constitute a citizen. To aliens we [*52] extend these privileges by courtesy; to others we secure them--to male as well as female--to the infant as well as the person of hoary hairs." (1 Litt. R. 342.)"
[Van Valkenburg v. BrownSupreme CourtJanuary 1, 187,2 43 Cal. 43 (1872)]
In its construction it is proper to apply the rule that criminal laws
are to be construed strictly, and to bear in mind that other rule that
a construction is to be avoided, if possible, that would render the
law unconstitutional, or raise grave doubts thereabout. In view of these rules it
is held that ‘citizen‘ means ‘citizen of the United States‘, and not
person generally, nor citizen of a State; and that the ‘rights and privileges
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States‘ means those
specially and validly secured thereby. Thus limited, this section has
been enforced as constitutional. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651,4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S.
76, 5 S.Ct. 35, 28 L.Ed. 673;Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12
S.Ct. 617,36 L.Ed. 429; United States v. Moseley, supra. In the Yarbrough
case the right involved was that to vote in a Congressional election,
as it was in the Moseley case; in the Waddell case it was the right
to make a federal homestead entry; and in the Logan case it was the
right to be secure from lawless violence while a prisoner in the hands
of a United States Marshal. These matters, all within the federal power,
Congress could protect under the general authority to pass ‘all necessary
and proper laws‘, under U.S.C.A. Constitution, Art. 1, Sect. 8,Par.
18. But Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, which undertook similarly
to punish conspiracies against any person to deprive him of the equal
protection of the laws, or *150 to prevent State authorities from affording
such protection, was held unconstitutional, because neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other part of the Constitution put the matter of conspiracies
by individuals touching such matters within the power of Congress, but
only gave power to correct wrong action by the State or its officers.
It was so held in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601,27
L.Ed. 290, where the person mobbed was in the custody of a State Sheriff;
and in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763, 30 L.Ed.766,
where the rights of a Chinese under a treaty of the United States were
involved. It was again held that the power of Congress was not extended
to protect against violations by individuals of the general rights of
persons and citizens by the mention of such rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S.C.A., in the Civil Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18,
27 L.Ed. 835. The reasoning of these cases, though opposed by some dissents,
is full and convincing, and the conclusion reached as to the effect
upon federal power of the Fourteenth Amendment has stood for more than
Pursuing further the application
of the statute now before us, in Baldwin v. Franks, supra, it was held
the word ‘citizen‘ means citizen of the United States in a political
sense, and did not include a resident Chinese. Again in Hodges
v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65, the section was
invoked against conspirators who were charged with interfering with
citizens in their right or liberty of contracting to work in a lawful
occupation, but the court held that this was a common right of all persons,
and the Fourteenth Amendment
did not put it under federal protection except against State action;
and the fact that the persons there involved were negroes did not bring
the matter within the special ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment. Similarly in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65
L.Ed. 270,the right invaded by the conspirators was the citizen's right
to remain in the State of his choice, and to remove only at his own
will. The Court conceded the right to be fundamental and to belong to
the citizens of each State, and to be guarded in part against State
interference by Art. 4, Sect. 2 of the Constitution, but held that no
federal offense was involved in an abduction done by individual conspirators.
[Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d. 147 (1940)]