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Civil Status (Important!) (OFFSITE LINK)-SEDM

Your Exclusive Right to Declare and Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008 (OFFSITE LINK)-SEDM

Why Domicile and Becoming a "Taxpayer" Require Your Consent, Form #05.002 (OFFSITE LINK)-civil domicile is the origin of civil status

Capitis Diminutio

CAPITIS DIMINUTIO. In Roman law. A dimin ishing or abridgment of personality; a loss or curtailment of a man's status or aggregate of legal attributes and qualifications.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 264]

Capitis Diminutio Maxim

CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MAXIMA. The highest or most comprehensive loss of status. This occurred when a man's condition was changed from one of freedom to one of bondage, when he became a slave. It swept away with it all rights of citizenship and all family rights.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 264]

Capitis Diminutio Media

CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MEDIA. A lesser or medi um loss of status. This occurred where a man lost his rights of citizenship, but without losing his liberty. It carried away also the family rights.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 264]

Capitis Diminutio Minima

CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MINIMA. The lowest or least comprehensive degree of loss of status. This occurred where a man's family relations alone were changed. It happened upon the arrogation of a person who had been his own master, (sui juris,) or upon the emancipation of one who had been under the patria potestas. It left the rights
of liberty and citizenship unaltered. See Inst. 1, 16, pr.; 1, 2, 3; Dig. 4, 5, 11; Mackeld.Rom.Law, 3 144.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp. 264-265]

Bailey v. Pointexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. 132 (1858)

"By the constitution of Virginia slaves are expressly recognized as property, and not at all as persons having civil rights in any respect whatever. Art. iv, 22, 23.

And now, looking to the statute [**12] law of the state, we find that from the earliest period, so far as their civil status is concerned, slaves are always spoken of and treated, in the numerous acts of the house of burgesses and the general assembly, as mere property. It is a curious fact, that there is no statute directly reducing negroes into slavery. "In 1620 (says Captain Smith) a Dutch ship of ware brought us 20 niggers" for sale; they were bought by the colonists; and that was the origin of African slavery in Virginia. They were first regarded as personal chattels, were bought and sold, and held like any other personal estate; were subject to the payment of debts, and went to the executor or administrator like any other personalty. Then, for a long time, in particular cases, such as descents, &c., they were made real estate, and passed to the heir at law. 3 Hen. Stat. 333, Oct. 1705; 4 *Hen. Stat. 222, Feb. 1727; 2 Va. 1, 7, Ibid. 68-70; 2 Hen. & M. 69; 6 Munf. 191, 200. They continued to be such real estate during the whole period of the revolution, and down to 1792, when, by Rev. Code, ch. 103, it was enacted, that "all negro and mulatto slaves, in all courts of judicature in this commonwealth, shall be held, taken [**13] and adjudged to be personal estate." This was re-enacted by 1 Rev. Code, p. 431, 1819; and by Code of Va. p. 458, 1849, it is summarily said, "Slaves shall be deemed personal estate."

Looking at these acts, it is safe to say that the law regards a negro slave, so far as his civil status is concerned, as purely and absolutely mere property, to be bought and sold, and pass and descend as a tract of land, a horse or an ox. From this it necessarily follows, that the condition of the negro in slavery is that of absolute civil incapacity, or rather that of an absolute negation of civil existence. Being but mere property himself, he is incapable of owning property of any kind, or of making any legal contract by which property of any kind can be acquired or held. Nor can he do any civil legal act by which the property of others can be lawfully divested or alienated, or the relations of property be in any wise legally changed or affected. In regard to property, and the legal relations of property, he is emphatically and absolutely unknown to the law, except as the subject of property owned by another. And so the courts have uniformly held. The Supreme court of North Carolina, in a recent [**14] case, has well expressed the law, in the southern states, upon this point: "Under our system of law, a slave can make no contract. In the nature of things he cannot. He is, in contemplation of law, not a person for that purpose. He has no legal capacity to make a contract; he has no legal mind. He is the property of his master, and all the proceeds of his labor *belong to his owner. If property is devised or given to him, the devise or bequest is void, and the personalty given either belongs to the giver or becomes the property of the owner. A slave has no legal status in our courts, except as a criminal or as a witness in certain cases. In the southern states the policy of our laws in keeping slaves within their proper sphere, has run through all the legislation of which their acts are the subject matter." And the court then decided, that "Contracts made by slaves are void; and if a slave executes his note or bond, and a free man is the security upon it, the note or bond is void, and the security is not liable." Batten v. Faulk, 49 N.C. 233.

In Virginia the statutes are numerous in which the legal incapacity of slaves to make contracts is clearly declared or implied, [**15] and the policy of keeping them in their "proper sphere" of absolute civil non-entity, distinctly enforced by various penalties inflicted upon all persons trading or dealing with them. Oct. 1705, ch. 39, 15, 3 Hen. Stat. 450; Nov. 1753, ch. 7, 6 Hen. Stat. 359; 1785, 12 Hen. Stat. 183; 1792, Rev. Code, ch. 103; 1819, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 111; 1849, Code of Va. p. 460. And this court has expressly decided, in the case of an executory contract of emancipation, that even upon the full payment by the slave to the master of the contract price for his freedom, the slave cannot enforce a specific execution of the contract. Sawney v. Carter, 6 Rand. 173.

An application of the foregoing principles and decisions ought, as it seems to me, to settle this case. In a bequest to slaves of a mere election [**20] between freedom and slavery, we have seen that there is no absolute, but only a conditional emancipation; that the election of the slaves to become free, is a necessary condition precedent to the accruing of their freedom; and therefore, that on their will and pleasure, on their choice or volition, is made to depend their future legal status. Recurring then to the direct question to be decided -- Are slaves endowed with the civil right or legal capacity to choose between freedom and slavery? Can they emancipate themselves by their own volition? Can they divest the property of others in themselves, by any legal act of their own? But if it has been shown that the slave has no civil rights whatever; that he has no civil status; that he can do no legal, civil act; that he has no legal mind, will or discretion; that he has absolutely no existence in the eye of the civil jurisprudence, except as a chattel, the subject of property, and *the object of the civil rights of others; with what reason can it be contended that he has the civil right and legal capacity to divest the property of others in himself; or to do that great, transcendent act of supreme civil dignity and sovereign power, the [**21] transformation of himself from a thing into a person, from a chattel to a man, clothed with all the high attributes of a citizen, which attach to his race? And if his master, the maker of the laws, endowed with all civil rights and plenary civil capacity, cannot emancipate him except by deed or will, executed in solemn form, can he emancipate himself by the simple expression of his pleasure to be free? Or, on the other hand, if the law requires (Sess. Acts 1855-6, p. 37) that in order to enslave himself, if free, a negro must go through regular prescribed forms in a high court of justice, with all the safeguards of judicial protection around him, shall it be said that he can enslave himself forever, perchance by the mere light volition of a moment, the utterance of a word, or the nodding of his head? Where is the legal consistency in such anomalies and contradictions as these? How can they be reconciled with the established legal incapacity of the slave, or with either the spirit or the letter, or the purposes and policy of the emancipation laws?

Nor is it possible to escape the force of these views, by saying that in electing to become free, there is no exercise on the part of [**22] the slave of any civil right or capacity, but the mere performance of a condition, which, however unwise or absurd, the testator had a right to impose as a condition precedent to the emancipation; for this is but to change the form, without affecting the substance of the difficulty; which then only resolves itself into the identical original enquiry, What civil right or legal capacity has the slave to perform, or claim to perform, a condition, the performance of which is to operate his enfranchisement? *The answer is, that he has no civil rights or legal capacity at all, and therefore none to perform the required condition. Change or turn the question as you may, this fundamental and impregnable obstacle arises, which no ingenuity can evade, and no fertility of hypothesis alter or affect. The act of election involves the exercise of civil rights and legal capacity; and an emancipation made dependent upon the exercise of civil rights or legal capacity by the slave, is necessarily void ab ovo. The event can never happen upon which the freedom is to accrue; and the case comes clearly within the principle of the decisions cited and approved in Taylor v. Cullins, 12 Gratt. 394; which decisions [**23] themselves are but illustrations of the ancient, general and cardinal rule in respect to grants or bequests upon conditions precedent, that, until the condition is performed, the estate or right cannot vest, and if impossible to be performed at the time of its creation, the estate or right can never vest at all, but is originally void. Co. Litt. 206; 2 Bl. Comm. 157; 1 Lom. Dig. 273, 16.

Nor has the master any just ground of complaint against this result, as tending to abridge his rights in respect to his slaves. The power to emancipate is not unlimited. Before the act of 1787, emancipation was absolutely prohibited, except by consent of the governor and council first had and obtained. That act authorized and permitted emancipation in the mode thereby prescribed, to wit: by deed or will. That act is the law of this case. It empowers the master to manumit his slave by deed or will; but it must be his own complete act; he cannot authorize and empower the slave to manumit himself or not, according to his will and pleasure. And so, in principle and substance, this court has decided; for it has held that "emancipation is the conjoint act of the master and the law, with which the [**24] slave has nothing to do." * Wood v. Humphreys, 12 Gratt. 333. And as on the one hand, "he cannot refuse freedom when conferred upon him" -- (ibid.) -- e converso, he cannot elect to take or decline it, when it is left to his option.

But it is said, that though slaves are chattels, and are incapable of forming any legal contract, or doing other legal civil act, yet that they are not mere chattels, that they are human, sentient, moral and intellectual beings; that as such, they are dealt with by the law; and therefore, that they ought to be held capable of an election between freedom and slavery. And a class of cases has been cited, at first blush giving countenance to this view. Thus, in Bean v. Summers, 13 Gratt. 404, cited by Mr. Crump, occurs this remark of Moncure, J., delivering the opinion of the court: "Slaves are not only property, but rational beings; and are generally acquired with reference to their moral and intellectual qualities." Now it is to be observed in this discussion, that the true enquiry is, not what is the moral and intellectual character or capacity of the negro race, or for what qualities or habits slaves are generally acquired or esteemed, but what is [**25] the relation they sustain to the law of the land? And by reference to the case cited, it will be seen that the remark of the judge, above quoted, had no allusion whatever to the civil relations or status of the slave, but on the contrary referred to his moral and intellectual qualities as affecting his peculiar value as an article of property. The question was, whether a court of equity will decree the specific execution of a contract for the sale or delivery of slaves at the suit of the purchaser, without any allegation or proof of peculiar value; and in dealing with this question, the court looked to the character of the slave as an article of property, and to his moral and intellectual qualities as calculated to engender sentiments of friendship, affection and esteem on the part of the master towards *the slave, which might invest the slave with such special and peculiar value, in the eye of the master, as that adequate compensation for the loss of the slave could not be had at law in an action for damages. All the South Carolina decisions cited in the opinion of the court, proceed upon the same ground. See particularly Young v. Burton, 1 McMul. Eq. 255. And they decide, as the [**26] Court of appeals decided in this case, that a master may very well attach such a special and peculiar value to his slave on account of his personal qualities, as that no jury could give adequate compensation for his loss. The court say: "Slaves are not only property, but rational beings; and are generally acquired with reference to their moral and intellectual qualities. Therefore damages at law, which are measured by the ordinary market value of the subject, will not generally afford adequate compensation for the breach of a contract for the sale of slaves. There is at least as much reason for enforcing the specific execution of such a contract as a contract for the sale of real estate. The only difference between the two cases seems to be this, that while in the latter specific execution will always be enforced if the contract be unobjectionable, and the suit be brought in due time, it will not in the former, if the slaves were purchased as merchandise, without reference to their peculiar value to the purchaser, or that the plaintiff is a mere mortgagee or other incumbrancer; in which case, as the slaves are to be sold at all events, damage at law assessed according to their market [**27] value, would be adequate compensation." The reasoning of the court plainly shows that it regarded the slave merely as an article of property, to which his qualities or habits, or to which peculiar circumstances might attach a special value, just as special value is attached to real estate from natural causes; and to argue thence that a negro slave was adjudged or recognized by that case to *be endowed with the social and civil attributes of a white man, would be about as logical as to argue that real estate was adjudged or recognized to be endowed with the same attributes, because such is its character as property, and such the peculiar associations and feelings with which it is invested and regarded by mankind, that the law will enforce the specific execution of a contract for its purchase or sale.

In Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. 150, cited by the same counsel, Judge Marshall said, "A slave has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded." But look at the case. It was an action of damages to recover the value of slaves lost by the negligence of the captain and commandants of a steam boat, as common carriers. The Supreme court held that the law regulating [**28] the responsibility of common carriers, did not apply to the case, because the carrier has not, and could not have, the same control over slaves that he has over inanimate matter; that in the nature of things a slave resembled a passenger, and not a package of goods. The same might have been said of an apprentice, or other person bound to service. And the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, referred to the fact, that though there are no slaves in England, there are persons in whose service another has a temporary interest; but that the responsibility of a carrier, for injury which such person might sustain, has never been placed on the same principle with his responsibility for a bale of goods. But surely, in deciding that point, the English courts had no reference to the civil status of the persons so held to service; nor did the Supreme court in this case have any reference to the civil status of the slave. It considered the qualities, habits and character of the slave, as affecting his character as an article of transportation. "A slave (says the judge) has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded. These *properties cannot be overlooked in [**29] conveying him from place to place. He cannot be stowed away as a common package. Not only does humanity forbid this proceeding, but it might endanger his life or health. Consequently, this rigorous mode of treatment cannot be adopted, unless stipulated for by contract. But left at liberty, he may escape. The carrier has not and cannot have the same absolute control over him that he has over a common package," &c. And therefore the carrier was not held to as high a degree of responsibility in the transportation of slaves, as in the transportation of a common package. The same principle, it is presumed, would apply, sub modo, to dogs, cattle, wild animals, &c. over which "the carrier has not and cannot have the same absolute control as over a common package." It might be good logic, but it would be bad law, to say that therefore dogs, horses, cattle and animals, ferae naturae, were recognized, as something more, in legal contemplation, than mere property. It is alike bad logic and bad law to say that, by this case, slaves are recognized as any thing more. In the discussion of legal propositions, nothing is more dangerous than to adduce the incidental remarks, dicta or allusions of judges, [**30] applicable enough, or excusable, in the cases in which they occur, to elucidate points of an utterly different character arising in an utterly different connection, and embracing relations and consequences to which the judges in the cases cited had no reference, and which they could not possibly, by any logical association of ideas, have had in mind.

But the learned counsel need not have cited these authorities to prove that negro slaves have intelligence, feelings and volition. As late indeed as 1782, a doubt was publicly expressed in the British parliament, as to whether an African negro has a soul. And many philosophic speculations have been indulged in *regard to his claim to be considered of the same origin and genus as ourselves. But common observation teaches that our slaves, in some cases, have a very high degree of intellect and moral sense, and all of them have, in these latter times, a strong enough will of their own, which needs no invigoration or activity from a bestowal upon them of civil rights and legal capacity incompatible with their condition as slaves. The moral and intellectual qualities of our slaves, in fact, as in the case of Roman and allother slaves, [**31] enter largely into the elements of their value; it is because they have intelligence, a sense of right and wrong, and volition, that they are such useful instruments, as Aristotle calls them in domestic and social life. And it is the pride and pleasure of many families in Virginia to cultivate the intellectual, moral and religious faculties and feelings of their slaves to as high a degree as circumstances will admit.

But all this has nothing to do with the question under consideration. The court is not sitting as an ethnological society, to ascertain and determine the peculiar natural or acquired characteristics of the negro race; nor as a committee to investigate the elements and extent of the value of slaves. The enquiry is, What is the legal status of the slave under our laws? Has he any legal volition, the exercise of which can change his legal condition, or affect the legal rights of the white race? If so, where is the statute which gives it? Where is the decision which defines its character and extent, or sanctions the legality, and prescribes the limits of its exercise? No statute can be found; and the absence of all authority is sufficiently illustrated by the citation [**32] of such cases as Summers v. Bean, and Boyce v. Anderson.

A much more plausible argument or illustration might have been drawn from a more direct and practical source. It might be said that the criminal code of *Virginia recognizes slaves as responsible beings, and affixes penalties to the commission of crime by them; and that therefore the law of the land thus admits them to be endowed with intelligence, free will, and a moral sense -- the same qualities or capacities which are requisite for rational choice between freedom and slavery. But even this will not bear examination. For, by recurring to the true issue, we see that the enquiry is, not as to whether a negro slave can commit a crime and will be punished for it, but what is his civil status. A married woman may commit a crime and will be punished for it, though she has no power to make a contract, and her civil being is absolutely merged in that of her husband. Her civil relations are very different things from the relation she sustains to the criminal law. The commission of a crime implies intelligence, free will, and a moral sense; but these do not fix the civil status, or necessarily affect it in any manner. Idiots, lunatics [**33] and infants of tender years have all a fixed civil status, and fixed civil relations to property. They may inherit or be inherited from. They may be the objects of devises or bequests, though they cannot devise and bequeath. They may and do hold thousands of slaves, who, considered as natural persons, are endowed with some sort of intelligence, free will and moral sense; yet the slaves, though thus endowed, cannot inherit or be inherited from; they cannot be the objects of devises or bequests, nor can they devise or bequeath, nor can they hold or acquire property in any manner of any kind. The civil status, therefore, is one thing; the criminal status is another and very different thing. The civil status has reference to property and all its relations; the power of holding it, using it, controlling it, acquiring it, and parting with it. The criminal status has reference to the moral relations between man and man. An individual may have a very high *position in the one scale, and none at all in the other. An idiot may hold property, but is incapable of committing crime. A slave may commit crime, but is incapable of holding property. The two things are distinct and different, and have [**34] no necessary legal or logical connection the one with the other. In ascertaining the criminal status or capacity of a party charged with crime, no reference need be had to his civil abilities or disabilities. In ascertaining the civil status or capacity of a party who attempts to do a legal civil act, no reference need be had to his responsibilities at the bar of the criminal courts. We must, therefore, look to the civil jurisprudence for the civil status of the slave, and to the criminal jurisprudence for his criminal status. And in looking to the civil jurisprudence for the civil status of the slave, we have seen that the slave, as such, has no civil capacity or existence whatever.

[Bailey v. Pointexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. 132 (1858)]

[EDITORIAL:  Note from the above that those WITHOUT a civil status have no STATUTORY property rights, but they still have constitutional or common law property rights.  Note also that there is NO difference between the SLAVE described above and the MAN who has no CONSTITUTIONAL or NATURAL rights.  They are one in the same.  If you can only receive or transfer property by accepting a CIVIL statutory status or worst yet, a Government ID and Social Security Number, then you are a SLAVE to the Master who granted those things with legal strings attached to the grant.]

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)

In Udny v. Udny, (1869) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicile of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: "The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicil." p. 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: "The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another, by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status." And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicil, domicilium, the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which "the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy, 657*657 must depend;" he yet distinctly recognized that a man's political status, his country, patria, and his "nationality, that is, natural allegiance," "may depend on different laws in different countries." pp. 457, 460. He evidently used the word "citizen," not as equivalent to "subject," but rather to "inhabitant;" and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)]

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 ( 1878)

The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit," says Story, "is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding 723*723 such persons or property in any other tribunals." Story, Confl. Laws, sect. 539.

But as contracts made in one State may be enforceable only in another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of the jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it. To any influence exerted in this way by a State affecting persons resident or property situated elsewhere, no objection can be justly taken; whilst any direct exertion of authority upon them, in an attempt to give ex-territorial operation to its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as usurpation.

Thus the State, through its tribunals, may compel persons domiciled within its limits to execute, in pursuance of their contracts respecting property elsewhere situated, instruments in such form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title, so far as such formalities can be complied with; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.

So the State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident 724*724 have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate.

[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 ( 1878)]

Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1025

"Nationality. That quality or character which arises from the fact of a person's belonging to a nation or state. Nationality determines the political status of the individual, especially with reference to allegiance; while domicile determines his civil status. Nationality arises either by birth or by naturalization. See also Naturalization."
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1025]

The Urantia Book, Paper 81:  Development of Modern Civilization

81:5.5 (906.3) Society thus becomes a co-operative scheme for securing civil freedom through institutions, economic freedom through capital and invention, social liberty through culture, and freedom from violence through police regulation.

81:5.6 (906.4) Might does not make right, but it does enforce the commonly recognized rights of each succeeding generation. The prime mission of government is the definition of the right, the just and fair regulation of class differences, and the enforcement of equality of opportunity under the rules of law. Every human right is associated with a social duty; group privilege is an insurance mechanism which unfailingly demands the full payment of the exacting premiums of group service. And group rights, as well as those of the individual, must be protected, including the regulation of the sex propensity.

81:5.7 (906.5) Liberty subject to group regulation is the legitimate goal of social evolution. Liberty without restrictions is the vain and fanciful dream of unstable and flighty human minds.

81:6.1 (906.6) While biologic evolution has proceeded ever upward, much of cultural evolution went out from the Euphrates valley in waves, which successively weakened as time passed until finally the whole of the pure-line Adamic posterity had gone forth to enrich the civilizations of Asia and Europe. The races did not fully blend, but their civilizations did to a considerable extent mix. Culture did slowly spread throughout the world. And this civilization must be maintained and fostered, for there exist today no new sources of culture, no Andites to invigorate and stimulate the slow progress of the evolution of civilization.

[The Urantia Book, Paper 81:  Development of Modern Civilization]

A Treatise on the Law of Domicil, National, Quasi-National, and Municipal, M.W. Jacobs, Little, Brown, and Company, 1887, p. 89

29. Status

It may be laid down that the ,statuts- or, as it is sometimes called, civil status, in contradistinction to political status - of a person depends largely, although not universally, upon domicil. The older jurists, whose opinions are fully collected by Story I and Burge, maintained, with few exceptions, the principle of the ubiquity of status, conferred by the lex domicilii with little qualification. Lord Westbury, in Udny v. Udny, thus states the doctrine broadly: "The civil status is governed by one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party - that is to say, the law which determines his majority and minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy-must depend." Gray, C. J., in the late Massachusetts case of Ross v. Ross, speaking with special reference to capacity to inherit, says: "It is a general principle that the status or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other's property, is fixed by the law of the domicil; and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other State, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy."
[A Treatise on the Law of Domicil, National, Quasi-National, and Municipal, M.W. Jacobs, Little, Brown, and Company, 1887, p. 89]

Woodward v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 892, 87 Tenn. 644 (Tenn., 1889)

“There are certain general principles which control the disposition of this case. They are, in the main, well settled; the difficulty lies in their application to the particular facts of the case in hand. It is elementary that "every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory, except in so far as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the constitution of the United States." Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93. Again, the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining the civil status; for it is on this basis that the personal rights of a party, — that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy, — must depend. Udny v. Udny, L. R., 1 H. L. Sc. 457.
[Woodward v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 892, 87 Tenn. 644 (Tenn., 1889)]

United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The States Parties to the present Covenant,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,

Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,

Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,

Agree upon the following articles:

Article 1, item 1

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 2, Item 1

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

[United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

People ex rel. Campbell v. Dwey, 23 Misc. 267, 50 N.Y.S. 1013, N.Y.Sup. (1898)

At the time, then, of the Texas proceeding, both mother and child were domiciled in the state of New York, and it was beyond the power of the Texas court to regulate the relations between them. The relation of parent and child is a civil status. 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. 16 . “It is plain that every state has the right to determine the status or domestic or social condition of persons domiciled within its territory.” Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217, 227 ; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82.  “Every nation may determine the status of its own domiciled subjects, and any interference by foreign tribunals would be an officious intermeddling with a matter in which they have no concern. The parties cannot consent to the change of status, and the judgment is not binding in a third country.” Black, Jur. 77. When the Texas proceeding was instituted the respondent and her child were transiently in that state, upon a temporary occasion, and with the intention of returning to their domicile in New York. “Though a state may have a right to declare the condition of all persons within her limits, the right only exists while that person remains there. She has not the power of giving a condition or status that will adhere to the person everywhere, but upon his return to his place of domicile he will occupy his former position.Maria v. Kirby, 12 B.Mon. 542, 545,- a case in which the decision is an adjudication of the precise point in controversy.

It results, therefore, that the Texas decree is of no effect in this state upon the right of the respondent to the custody of the child. The validity of that decree is further impugned for fatal irregularities in the proceeding, but, its futility as an estoppel being already apparent, the discussion need not be prolonged.

The writ is dismissed, and, as the respondent's fitness for the care and control of the child is not questioned, it is remanded to her custody.
[People ex rel. Campbell v. Dewey, 23 Misc. 267, 50 N.Y.S. 1013, N.Y.Sup. (1898)]

U. S. v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 S.Ct. 54, U.S. (1890)

This case involves a matter of contractual relation between the parties; and the law of contracts, as applicable thereto, is worthy of notice. The government, as contracting party, offers contract and service. Grimley accepts such contract, declaring that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in the government's offer. The contract is duly signed. Grimley has made an untrue statement in regard to his qualifications.*151 The government makes no objection because of the untruth. The qualification is one for the benefit of the government, one of the contracting parties. Who can take advantage of Grimley's lack of qualification? Obviously only the party for whose benefit it was inserted. Such is the ordinary law of contracts. Suppose A., an individual, were to offer to enter into contract with persons of Anglo-Saxon descent, and B., representing that he is such descent, accepts the offer and enters into contract; can he thereafter, A. making no objection, repudiate the contract on the ground that he is not of Anglo-Saxon descent? A. has prescribed the terms. He contracts with B. upon the strength of his representations that he comes within those terms. Can B. thereafter plead his disability in avoidance of the contract? On the other hand, suppose for any reason it could be contended that the proviso as to age was for the benefit of the party enlisting, is Grimley in any better position? The matter of age is merely incidental, and not of the substance of the contract. And can a party by false representations as to such incidental matter obtain a contract, and thereafter disown and repudiate its obligations **55 on the simple ground that the fact in reference to this incidental matter was contrary to his representations? May he utter a falsehood to acquire a contract, and plead the truth to avoid it, when the matter in respect to which the falsehood is stated is for his benefit? It must be noted here that in the present contract is involved no matter of duress, imposition, ignorance, or intoxication. Grimley was sober, and of his own volition went to the recruiting office and enlisted. There was no compulsion, no solicitation, no misrepresentation. A man of mature years, he entered freely into the contract. But in this transaction something more is involved than the making of a contract, whose breach exposes to an action for damages. Enlistment is a contract, but it is one of those contracts which changes the status, and where that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its existence imposes. Marriage is a contract; but it is one which creates a status. Its contract *152 obligations are mutual faithfulness; but a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status or change the relation of the parties to each other. The parties remain husband and wife no matter what their conduct to each other,-no matter how great their disregard of marital obligations. It is true that courts have power, under the statutes of most states, to terminate those contract obligations, and put an end to the marital relations. But this is never done at the instance of the wrong-door. The injured party, and the injured party alone, can obtain relief and a change of status by judicial action. So, also, a foreigner by naturalization enters into new obligations. More than that, he thereby changes his status; he ceases to be an alien, and becomes a citizen, and, when that change is once accomplished, no disloyalty on his part, no breach of the obligations of citizenship, of itself, destroys his citizenship. In other words, it is a general rule accompanying a change of status, that when once accomplished it is not destroyed by the mere misconduct of one of the parties, and the guilty party cannot plead his own wrong as working a termination and destruction thereof. Especially is he debarred from pleading the existence of facts personal to himself, existing before the change of status , the entrance into new relations, which would have excused him from entering into those relations and making the change, or, if disclosed to the other party, would have led it to decline admission into the relation, or consent to the change. By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His relations to the state and the public are changed. He acquires a new status, with correlative rights and duties; and although he may violate his contract obligations, his status as a soldier is unchanged. He cannot of his own volition throw off the garments he has once put on, nor can he, the state not objecting, renounce his relations and destroy his status on the plea that, if he had disclosed truthfully the facts, the other party, the state, would not have entered into the new relations with him, or permitted him to change his status. Of course these considerations may not apply where there is insanity, idiocy, infancy, or any other disability which, in its nature, disables a *153 party from changing his status or entering into new relations. But where a party is sui juris, without any disability to enter into the new relations, the rule generally applies as stated. A naturalized citizen would not be permitted, as a defense to a charge of treason, to say that he had acquired his citizenship through perjury, that he had not been a resident of the United States for five years, or within the state or territory where he was naturalized one year, or that he was not a man of good moral character, or that he was not attached to the constitution. No more can an enlisted soldier avoid a charge of desertion, and escape the consequences of such act, by proof that he was over age at the time of enlistment, or that he was not able-bodied, or that he had been convicted of a felony, or that before his enlistment he had been a deserter from the military service of the United States. These are matters which do not inhere in the substance of the contract, do not prevent a change of status, do not render the new relations assumed absolutely void; and in the case of a soldier, these considerations become of vast public importance. While our regular army is small compared with those of European nations, yet its vigor and efficiency are equally important. An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier. Vigor and efficiency on the part of the officer, and confidence among the soldiers in one another, are impaired if any question be left open as to their attitude to each other. So, unless there be in the nature of things some inherent vice in the existence of the relation, or natural wrong in the manner in which it was established, public policy requires that it should not be disturbed. Now, there is no inherent vice in the military service of a man 40 years of age. The age of 35, as prescribed in the statute, is one of convenience merely. The government has the right to the military service of all its able-bodied citizens; and may, when emergency arises, justly exact that service from all. And if, for its own convenience, and with a view to the selection of the best material, it has fixed the age at 35, it is a matter *154 which in any given case it may waive; and it does not lie in the mouth of any one above that age on that account alone, to demand release from an obligation voluntarily assumed, and discharge from a service voluntarily entered into. The government, and the government alone, is the party to the transaction that can raise objections on that ground. We conclude, therefore, that the age of the petitioner was no ground for his discharge.
[U. S. v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 S.Ct. 54, U.S. (1890)]

In re Meador, 1 Abb.U.S. 317, 16 F.Cas. 1294, D.C.Ga. (1869)

“And here a thought suggests itself. As the Meadors, subsequently to the passage of this act of July 20, 1868, applied for and obtained from the government a license or permit to deal in manufactured tobacco, snuff and cigars, I am inclined to be of the opinion that they are, by this their own voluntary act, precluded from assailing the constitutionality of this law, or otherwise controverting it. For the granting of a license or permit-the yielding of a particular privilege-and its acceptance by the Meadors, was a contract, in which it was implied that the provisions of the statute which governed, or in any way affected their business, and all other statutes previously passed, which were in pari materia with those provisions, should be recognized and obeyed by them. When the Meadors sought and accepted the privilege, the law was before them. And can they now impugn its constitutionality or refuse to obey its provisions and stipulations, and so exempt themselves from the consequences of their own acts?
[In re Meador, 1 Abb.U.S. 317, 16 F.Cas. 1294, D.C.Ga. (1869)]

Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.2d. 871 [Civ. No. 15818. Second Dist., Div. Two. Oct. 17] 1947

 [4] In all domestic concerns each state of the Union is to be deemed an independent sovereignty.  As such, it is its province and its duty to forbid interference by another state as well as by any foreign power with the status of its own citizens. Unless at least one of the spouses is a resident thereof in good faith, the courts of such sister state or of such foreign power cannot acquire jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of those who have an established domicile in the state which resents such interference with matters which disturb its social serenity or affect the morals of its inhabitants. [5] Jurisdiction over divorce proceedings of residents of California by the courts of a sister state cannot be conferred by agreement of the litigants. [6] As protector of the morals of her people it is the duty of a court of this commonwealth to prevent the dissolution of a marriage by the decree of a court of another jurisdiction pursuant to the collusion of the spouses. If by surrendering its power it evades the performance of such duty, marriage will ultimately be considered as a formal device and its dissolution freed from legal inhibitions. [7] Not only is a divorce of California [81 Cal.App.2d 880] residents by a court of another state void because of the plaintiff's lack of bona fide residence in the foreign state, but it is void also for lack of the court's jurisdiction over the State of California. [8] This state is a party to every marriage contract of its own residents as well as the guardian of their morals. Not only can the litigants by their collusion not confer jurisdiction upon Nevada courts over themselves but neither can they confer such jurisdiction over this state.
[9] It therefore follows that a judgment of divorce by a court of Nevada without first having pursuant to its own laws acquired...
[Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.2d 871 [Civ. No. 15818. Second Dist., Div. Two. Oct. 17, 1947]

Corrigan v. Secretary of the Army, 211 F.2d. 293 (1954)

Laughlin E. Waters, U.S. Atty., Max F. Deutz, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Clyde C. Downing, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Before STEPHENS, BONE, and POPE, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

Ronald J. Corrigan, Hereinafter called ‘petitioner’, upon relation of his mother, through a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, seeks his release from restraint of the United States Army officers who hold him as a member of the United States Armed Services. A hearing was had on the petition, the return thereto and an order to show cause pursuant to stipulation that the return should be considered as a traverse and that the proceedings should have the same force and effect that the issuance of the writ would have had, had it issued and had the hearing been held thereon. However, petitioner was present throughout the proceedings. The court declined to order petitioner's release and instead dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed.

The issue of fact is whether petitioner was ever inducted into the Service.

On the 15th day of April, 1953, petitioner, having been regularly processed through the Selective Service law, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 451 et seq., and declared a Selectee with the A-1 classification, was, with about fifty Selectees, taken to a room around 9:00 A.M. where he was given physical and psychological examinations and near the middle of the day, the fifty Selectees were directed to take places in folding chairs which had been placed out in the room. The chairs occupied a space about twelve by eighteen feet in rows twelve inches apart with a center aisle the width of a chair.  Petitioner was in the rear row.

Captain Earl S. Beydler entered the room and gave them a short orientation talk and then addressed them as follows: ‘You are about to be inducted into the Armed Services of the United States. In just a moment I will ask you to stand and I will call off each of your names. As I call you name I want you to answer ‘present’ and to take one step forward. The step forward will constitute your induction into the Armed Services *295 of the United States-into the Army.'FN1 The call was completed and the men were given the accustomed oath. Petitioner claims that he did not take a step forward nor did he raise his hand and take the oath. However, he made no protest at the time of the ceremony.

It is not contended that either the step forward or the taking or giving of the oath is required by the Selective Service Act as necessary to induction. As said in Billings v. Truesdell, 1944, 321 U.S. 542, 559, 64 S.Ct. 737, 746, 88 L.Ed. 917; ‘a selectee becomes ‘actually inducted’ within the meaning of 11 of the Act FN2 when in obedience to the order of his board and after the Army has found him acceptable for service he undergoes whatever ceremony or requirements of admission the War Department has prescribed.' Therefore, since the selectee is subject to civil authority until the moment of completion of the induction, at which moment he becomes subject to military authority, it is highly important that such moment should be marked with certainty. See Billings v. Truesdell, 1944, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737, 88 L.Ed. 917.

For a time the [voluntary] oath marked the dividing line between the civilian and military status, but difficulties and uncertainties arose as to whether, in fact, the selectee had taken the oath. See our opinion in Lawrence v. Yost, 9 Cir., 1946, en banc, 157 F.2d. 44. Thereafter, the regulation (Army Special Regulation No. 615-180-1, paragraph 23), providing for the step forward, was promulgated.
[1] However, one may emerge from a selectee to a soldier without taking the step forward; that is, by conduct consistent with the soldier status;FN3 but the fact of the step forward, whether or not it was taken, is of high importance in this case. As to that issue of fact, it is claimed by petitioner that it was impossible for the men, other than those in the front row, to step forward and the physical set-up and the testimony practically demonstrate the truth of the claim. The inducting Captain testified in answer to a question as to space, ‘There is space, not much.’ ‘Q. You mean he could shuffle? A. Correct.’

At no time does the inducting Captain claim that he saw petitioner take the step forward. As to the procedure, he testified on direct examination that when he calls a name at induction ceremonies, ‘I wait for a response, * * * or if they are near the front of the room where I can see them, I see if they step forward.’ Afterward, he would call the next name. ‘Q. Did you at any time look to see if a man had taken a step forward? A. I look up each time I call a name. Q. What do you look for when you look up? A. For movement, for a man stepping forward. * * * Q. On that day did you see any man fail to step forward after his name was called by you? A. No.’ On re-cross-examination, Captain Beydler was asked, ‘Can you tell us that you recall whether or not you saw this petitioner move forward on April 15- after you called his name?’ The Captain answered, ‘No, I cannot.’

Petitioner testified that his mother and grandmother belonged to Jehovah's Witnesses; on re-cross-examination petitioner was asked, ‘Were you a member of the enlisted reserves in the Army of the United States?’ To which he replied in the affirmative. The record does not reveal how long or under what circumstances he was in such service. On *296 cross-examination, petitioner was asked, ‘When did you become a conscientious objector?’ Petitioner answered, ‘While sitting in the room. I just thought. The material together, I would say, filled my mind, and this is one thing I wanted to do. * * * Q. When your name was called did you take a step forward? A. No.’ He also testified that some of the selectees shuffled their feet or didn't move when their names were called.

Petitioner on cross-examination was asked, ‘When was the first time that you advised anybody in the Army that you were a conscientious objector? * * * A. After the ceremony. The Court: What do you mean ‘after the ceremony’? The Witness: Well, after the ceremony was over, I thought- well, there isn't much use in making a scene, and I just walked outside and told the Captain in charge. * * * I told him I did not take (the) oath or step forward. * * * He says, ‘No. You are in the Army.’ * * * Q. Isn't it a fact that when you saw Captain Beydler, after leaving the induction room that you told him you had changed your mind, that you were now a conscientious objector? A. I didn't say ‘I changed my mind’, No, sir. * * * I said ‘I am’.'

Sergeant Frias, the chief coordinator at the induction station, testified that petitioner approached him on the floor of the induction room saying he was a conscientious objector. The Sergeant asked him if he had just been inducted and he answered ‘Yes', to which the Sergeant responded, ‘I said, ‘It is too late. I can't do anything for you’.'

After that, according to petitioner's testimony, he made three telephone calls and then told a Sergeant, ‘I am going home’. Petitioner further testified, ‘I had some friends and I went over to see and talked with them. * * * I went over to another friend's and stayed all night. * * * I stayed another day and then I went on home.’

Petitioner did not respond to the call to board the bus for the railroad station the next morning, whereupon he was noted as an ‘absentee’. Petitioner was forceably taken from his home by military personnel, put in the Post stockade at Camp Irwin, and then transported to Camp Roberts a few weeks thereafter. The court asked the witness, ‘Have you been with that training company (at Camp Roberts) since? The Witness: No. That was a Thursday, and then Friday morning they took me to the orderly room and to the company commander and I refused the company commander(‘s suggestion that I submit to training). * * * That was about 5:10. I went back to the M.P. lock-up at Camp Roberts. I stayed there until Sunday morning. Sunday morning- The Court: Yesterday? The Witness: Yes, yesterday at 10:45. And then I stayed at this M.P. lock-up Sunday and then here today. * * * The Court: Did you ever tell the Colonel that, as long as you did not have to bear arms, you would be willing to undergo training? A. I told him I would not accept any training.’

[2] [3] We are of the opinion that the unnecessarily crowded set-up in the induction room made it physically impossible for the inducting officer to have seen whether petitioner took the step forward and that it was in fact impossible for petitioner to take a step forward. Therefore, we think, the court's finding on this factual issue was in error. The evidence reveals no act after the induction ceremonies from which it could be found that petitioner had in fact acquiesced in induction,FN4 but on the contrary his conduct is entirely consistent with his claim that he did not submit to induction, and is not consistent with any theory of acquiescence. However, the court made no finding on the subject of acquiescence.

[4] We hold that the evidence does not support the conclusion of the trial court that petitioner was inducted into the Armed Services of the United States. *297 The judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions to order petitioner's release from the custody of the Army officers.

Reversed and remanded.

FN1. The quotation is from the affidavit of Captain Earl S. Beydler which was attached to the return and made a part thereof. The affidavit was stipulated as the Captain's evidence in chief. The procedure followed by the Captain was exactly in accord with Army Special Regulations 615-180-1, paragraph 23, issued by the Department of the Army April 10, 1953.

FN2. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 894, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 311; now 50 U.S.C.A.App. 462, Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 622.

FN3. Mayborn v. Heflebower, 5 Cir., 1945, 145 F.2d. 864; Sanford v. Callan, 5 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d. 376; cf. Cox v. Wedemeyer, 9 Cir., 1951, 192 F.2d. 920, 923-924.

FN4. See footnote 3, supra.
[Corrigan v. Secretary of the Army, 211 F.2d. 293 (1954)]

Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a)

United States Code

Sec. 2201. Creation of remedy

(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)

Specifically, Rowen seeks a declaratory judgment against the United States of America with respect to "whether or not the plaintiff is a taxpayer pursuant to, and/or under 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(14) ." (See Compl. at 2.) This Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment "with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986," a code section that is not at issue in the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. 2201; see also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d. 531, 536-537 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of claim for declaratory relief under 2201 where claim concerned question of tax liability). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action is hereby DISMISSED.
[Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)]

Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d. 585 (1972)

“Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers [instrumentalities, officers, employees, and elected officials of the national Government] and not to non-taxpayers [non-citizen nationals domiciled within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state of the Union and not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national Government].  The latter are without their scope.  No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their Rights or Remedies in due course of law.”
[Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d. 585 (1972)]

Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp 1123-1124

MARRIAGE. Marriage, as distinguished from the agreement to marry and from the act of becoming married, is the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on
those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex. 1 Bish.Mar. & Div. 1 3; Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 121 Neb. 716, 238 N.W. 351, 355;
Allen v. Allen, 73 Conn. 54, 46 A. 242, 49 L.R.A. 142.

A contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and woman, capable of entering into such contract, mutually engage with
each other to live their whole lives together in the state of union which ought to exist between a husband and wife. Shelf. Mar. & Div. 1; Seuss v.
Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668, 671, 95 A.L.R. 1461.

The word also signifies the act, ceremony, or formal proceeding by which persons take each other for husband and wife. Davis v. Davis, 119
Conn. 194, 175 A. 574, 575. In old English law, marriage is used in the sense of "maritagium," (q. v.,) or the feudal right enjoyed by the lord or guardian in chivalry of disposing of his ward in marriage.

[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pp 1123-1124]