Philip Freneau:
Rules for Changing a Republic
[into a Democracy and then]
into a Monarchy
from:
Organizing the New Nation
THE ANNALS OF AMERICA
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
1784-1796
Those who had opposed the constitution thought their fears
justified by the conduct of the government that began to function
in 1789. Under the aggressive leadership of Alexander Hamilton,
the Secretary of the Treasury, economic measures were taken that
favored the few, while a effective party machine was organized
and the army strengthened in such a way as to suggest an intent
to control rather than to represent the many. The whole tone of
Washington's administration was aristocratic, favoring as it did
the educated, the wealthy, the clergy and the press, who were
fearful of "mob rule" and preferred to see what Hamilton called
"gentlemen of principle and property" in command. As Hamilton
had at his service a newspaper -- John Fenno's Gazette of the
United States -- to support his policies, his opponents, led by
Jefferson and Madison, decided to establish a rival newspaper,
the National Gazette. Philip Freneau, an experienced journalist
of known democratic leanings, was chosen to edit the paper. The
editorial, reprinted here, is typical of those in which Freneau
criticized the Hamiltonian program from 1791 to 1793.
Source: American Museum, July 1792: "Rules for Changing a Limited
Republican Government into an Unlimited Hereditary One."
[Read aloud with heavy British accent.]
Rules for changing a limited republican government into an
unlimited hereditary one:
1. It being necessary in order to effect the change, to
get rid of constitutional shackles and popular prejudices, all
possible means and occasions are to be used for both these
purposes.
2. Nothing being more likely to prepare the vulgar mind
for aristocratical ranks and hereditary powers than titles,
endeavor in the offset of the government to confer these on its
most dignified officers. If the principal magistrate should
happen to be particularly venerable in the eyes of the people,
take advantage of that fortunate circumstance in setting the
example.
3. Should the attempt fail through his republican aversion
to it, or from the danger of alarming the people, do not abandon
the enterprise altogether, but lay up the proposition in the
record. Time may gain it respect, and it will be there always
ready, cut and dried, for any favorable conjuncture that may
offer.
4. In drawing all bills, resolutions and reports, keep
constantly in view that the limitations in the Constitution are
ultimately to be explained away. Precedents and phrases may thus
be shuffled in, without being adverted to by candid or weak
people, of which good use may afterward be made.
5. As the novelty and bustle of inaugurating the
government will for some time keep the public mind in a heedless
and unsettled state, let the press during this period be busy in
propagating the doctrines of monarchy and aristocracy. For this
purpose, it will be particularly useful to confound a mobbish
democracy with a representative republic, that by exhibiting all
the turbulent examples and enormities of the former, an odium may
be thrown on the character of the latter. Review all the civil
contests, convulsions, factions, broils, squabbles, bickering,
black eyes and bloody noses of ancient, middle and modern ages;
caricature them into the most frightful forms and colors that can
be imagined, and unfold one scene of horrible tragedy after
another till the people be made, if possible, to tremble at their
own shadows. Let the discourses on Davila then contrast with
these pictures of terror the quiet hereditary succession, the
reverence claimed by birth and nobility, and the fascinating
influence of stars, and ribbons and garters, cautiously
suppressing all the bloody tragedies and unceasing oppressions
which form the history of this species of government. No pains
should be spared in this part of the undertaking, for the
greatest will be wanted, it being extremely difficult, especially
when a people have been taught to reason and feel their rights,
to convince them that a king, who is always an enemy to the
people, and a nobility, who are perhaps still more so, will take
better care of the people than the people will take of
themselves.
6. But the grand nostrum will be a public debt, provided
enough of it can be got and it be medicated with the proper
ingredients. If by good fortune a debt be ready at hand, the
most is to be made of it. Stretch it and swell it to the utmost
the items will bear. Allow as many extra claims as decency will
permit. Assume all the debts of your neighbors -- in a word, get
as much debt as can be raked and scraped together, and when you
have got all you can, "advertise" for more, and have the debt
made as big as possible. This object being accomplished, the
next will be to make it as perpetual as possible; and the next
to that, to get it into as few hands as possible. The more
effectually to bring this about, modify the debt, complicate it,
divide it, subdivide it, subtract it, postpone it, let there be
one-third of two-thirds, and two-thirds of one-third, and two-
thirds of two-thirds; let there be 3 percents, and 4 percents,
and 6 percents, and present 6 percents, and future 6 percents.
To be brief, let the whole be such a mystery that a few only can
understand it; and let all possible opportunities and
informations fall in the way of these few to cinch their
advantages over the many.
7. It must not be forgotten that the members of the
legislative body are to have a deep stake in the game. This is
an essential point, and happily is attended with no difficulty.
A sufficient number, properly disposed, can alternately legislate
and speculate, and speculate and legislate, and buy and sell, and
sell and buy, until a due portion of the property of their
constituents has passed into their hands to give them an interest
against their constituents, and to ensure the part they are to
act. All this, however, must be carried on under the cover of
the closest secrecy; and it is particularly lucky that dealings
in paper admit of more secrecy that any other. Should a
discovery take place, the whole plan may be blown up.
8. The ways in which a great debt, so constituted and
applied, will contribute to the ultimate end in view are both
numerous and obvious:
(1) The favorite few, thus possessed of it, whether within or
without the government, will feel the staunchest fealty to
it, and will go through thick and thin to support it in all
its oppressions and usurpations.
(2) Their money will give them consequence and influence, even
among those who have been tricked out of it.
(3) They will be the readiest materials that can be found for a
hereditary aristocratic order, whenever matters are ripe for
one.
(4) A great debt will require great taxes; great taxes, many
tax gatherers and other officers; and all officers are
auxiliaries of power.
(5) Heavy taxes may produce discontents; these may threaten
resistance; and in proportion to this danger will be the
pretense for a standing army to repel it.
(6) A standing army, in its turn, will increase the moral force
of the government by means of its appointments, and give it
physical force by means of the sword, thus doubly forwarding
the main object.
9. The management of a great funded debt and a extensive
system of taxes will afford a plea, not to be neglected, for
establishment of a great incorporated bank. The use of such a
machine is well understood. If the Constitution, according to
its fair meaning, should not authorize it, so much the better.
Push it through by a forced meaning and you will get in the
bargain an admirable precedent for future misconstructions.
In fashioning the bank, remember that it is to be made
particularly instrumental in enriching and aggrandizing the elect
few, who are to be called in due season to the honors and
felicities of the kingdom preparing for them, and who are the
pillars that must support it. It will be easy to throw the
benefit entirely into their hands, and to make it a solid
addition of 50, or 60, or 70 percent to their former capitals of
800 percent, or 900 percent, without costing them a shilling;
while it will be difficult to explain to the people that this
gain of the few is at the cost of the many, that the contrary may
be boldly and safely pretended. The bank will be pregnant with
other important advantages. It will admit the same men to be, at
the same time, members of the bank and members of the government.
The two institutions will thus be soldered together, and each
made stronger. Money will be put under the direction of the
government, and government under the direction of money. To
crown the whole, the bank will have a proper interest in swelling
and perpetuating the public debt and public taxes, with all the
blessings of both, because its agency and its profits will be
extended in exact proportion.
10. "Divide and govern" is a maxim consecrated by the
experience of ages, and should be familiar in its use to every
politician as the knife he carries in his pocket. In the work
here to be executed, the best effects may be produced by this
maxim, and with peculiar facility. An extensive republic made up
of lesser republics necessarily contains various sorts of people,
distinguished by local and other interests and prejudices. Let
the whole group be well examined in all its parts and relations,
geographical and political, metaphysical and metaphorical; let
there be first a northern and a southern section, by a line
running east and west, and then an eastern and western section,
by a line running north and south. By a suitable nomenclature,
the landholders cultivating different articles can be
discriminated from one another, all from the class of merchants,
and both from that of manufacturers.
One of the subordinate republics may be represented as a
commercial state, another as a navigation state, another as a
manufacturing state, others as agricultural states; and although
the great body of people in each be really agricultural, and the
other characters be more or less common to all, still it will be
politic to take advantage of such an arrangement. Should the
members of the great republic be of different sizes, and subject
to little jealousies on that account, another important division
will be ready formed to your hand. Add again the division that
may be carved out of personal interests, political opinions, and
local parties. With so convenient an assortment of votes,
especially with the help of the marked ones, a majority may be
packed for any question with as much ease as the odd trick by an
adroit gamester, and any measure whatever carried or defeated, as
the great revolution to be brought about may require.
It is only necessary, therefore, to recommend that full use
be made of the resource; and to remark that, besides the direct
benefit to be drawn from these artificial divisions, they will
tend to smother the true and natural one, existing in all
societies, between the few who are always impatient of political
equality and the many who can never rise above it; between those
who are to mount to the prerogatives and those who are to be
saddled with the burdens of the hereditary government to be
introduced -- in one word, between the general mass of the
people, attached to their republican government and republican
interests, and the chosen band devoted to monarchy and Mammon.
It is of infinite importance that this distinction should be kept
out of sight. The success of the project absolutely requires it.
11. As soon as sufficient progress in the intended change
shall have been made, and the public mind duly prepared according
to the rules already laid down, it will be proper to venture on
another and a bolder step toward a removal of the constitutional
landmarks. Here the aid of the former encroachments and all the
other precedents and way-paving maneuvers will be called in of
course. But, in order to render the success more certain, it
will be of special moment to give the most plausible and popular
name that can be found to the power that is to be usurped. It
may be called, for example, a power for the common safety or the
public good, or, "the general welfare." If the people should not
be too much enlightened, the name will have a most imposing
effect. It will escape attention that it means, in fact, the
same thing with a power to do anything the government pleases "in
all cases whatsoever." To oppose the power may consequently seem
to the ignorant, and be called by artful, opposing the "general
welfare", and may be cried down under that deception.
As the people, however, may not run so readily into the
snare as might be wished, it will be prudent to bait it well with
some specious popular interest, such as the encouragement of
manufactures, or even of agriculture, taking due care not even to
mention any unpopular object to which the power is equally
applicable, such as religion, etc. By this contrivance,
particular classes of people may possibly be taken in who will be
a valuable reinforcement.
With respect to the patronage of agriculture there is not
indeed much to be expected from it. It will be too quickly seen
through by the owners and tillers of the soil, that to tax them
with one hand and pay back a part only with the other is a losing
game on their side. From the power over manufactures more is to
be hoped. It will not be so easily perceived that the premium
bestowed may not be equal to the circuitous tax on consumption
which pays it. There are particular reasons, too, for pushing
the experiment on this class of citizens:
(1) As they live in towns and can act together, it is of vast
consequence to gain them over to the interest of monarchy.
(2) If the power over them be once established, the government
can grant favors or monopolies, as it pleases; can raise or
depress this or that place, as it pleases; in a word, by
creating a dependence in so numerous and important a class
of citizens, it will increase its own independence of every
class and be more free to pursue the grand object in
contemplation.
(3) The expense of this operation will not in the end cost the
government a shilling, for the moment any branch of
manufacture has been brought to a state of tolerable
maturity, the excise man will be ready with his constable
and his search warrant to demand a reimbursement, and as
much more as can be squeezed out of the article. All this,
it is to be remembered, supposes that the manufacturers will
be weak enough to be cheated, in some respects, out of their
own interests, and wicked enough, in others, to betray those
of their fellow citizens; a supposition that, if known,
would totally mar the experiment. Great care, therefore,
must be taken to prevent it from leaking out.
12. The expediency of seizing every occasion of external
danger for augmenting and perpetuating the standing military
force is too obvious to escape. So important is this matter that
for any loss or disaster whatever attending the national arms,
there will be ample consolation and compensation in the
opportunity for enlarging the establishment. A military defeat
will become a political victory, and the loss of a little vulgar
blood contribute to ennoble that which flows in the veins of our
future dukes and marquesses.
13. The same prudence will improve the opportunity afforded
by an increase of military expenditures for perpetuating the
taxes required for them. If the inconsistency and absurdity of
establishing a perpetual tax for a temporary service should
produce any difficulty in the business, Rule 10 must be resorted
to. Throw in as many extraneous motives as will make up a
majority, and the thing is effected in an instant. What was
before evil would become good as easily as black could be made
white by the same magical operation.
14. Throughout this great undertaking it will be wise to
have some particular model constantly in view. The work can then
be carried on more systematically, and every measure be
fortified, in the progress, by apt illustrations and authorities.
Should there exist a particular monarchy against which there are
fewer prejudices than against any other, should it contain a
mixture of the representative principle so as to present on one
side the semblance of a republican aspect, should it, moreover,
have a great, funded, complicated, irredeemable debt, with all
the apparatus and appurtenances of excises, banks, etc., upon
that a steady eye is to be kept. In all cases it will assist,
and in most its statute books will furnish a precise pattern by
which there may be cut out any moneyed or monarchical project
that may be wanted.
15. As it is not to be expected that the change of a
republic into a monarchy, with the rapidity desired, can be
carried through without occasional suspicions and alarms, it will
be necessary to be prepared for such events. The best general
rule on the subject is to be taken from the example of crying
"Stop thief" first -- neither lungs nor pens must be spared in
charging every man who whispers, or even thinks, that the
revolution on foot is meditated, with being himself an enemy to
the established government and meaning to overturn it. Let the
charge be reiterated and reverberated till at last such confusion
and uncertainty be produced that the people, being not able to
find out where the truth lies, withdraw their attention from the
contest.
Many other rules of great wisdom and efficacy might be
added; but it is conceived that the above will be abundantly
enough for the purpose. This will certainly be the case if the
people can be either kept asleep so as not to discover, or be
thrown into artificial divisions so as not to resist, what is
silently going forward. Should it be found impossible, however,
to prevent the people from awaking and uniting; should all
artificial distinctions give way to the natural divisions between
the lordly minded few and the well disposed many; should all who
have common interest make a common cause and show a inflexible
attachment to republicanism in opposition to a government of
monarchy and or money, why then ....
# # #
Return to Table of Contents