Institutionalized Tyranny

The Character & Color of Authority

(Revision 4 -- Oct. 20, 1998)

By Dan Meador

[To obtain a video presentation click here.]


This work documents elements of a scheme known as Cooperative Federalism that for the last half century has placed the American people under edict of private courts and has compromised virtually all State and Federal enforcement authority. Sections of the work demonstrate proper application of Federal drug and tax laws.


The Avenger Comes

I


 

Table of Contents

Introduction
The Scheme & Its Effect
The Least Common Denominators
The Codes Are Unraveled
Basic & Essential Authorities
Breakdown of Drug & Internal Revenue Laws
I. Application of Federal Drug Control Laws
II. Application of Internal Revenue Code Taxing Authority
Underlying Compromise of the U.S. Marshal
Territorial Jurisdiction of Federal Law Enforcement Community
End Game Alternatives

Introduction

In the last decade, increasing numbers have joined the effort to unravel how Federal, State, and local governments make what amount to end runs around constitutional limitations. The purpose of this composition is to bring the fruit of the best research into focus, and construct a reasonably comprehensive picture of the macabre scheme that undermines sovereignty and solvency of the nation.

As the original and first revision of this discourse circulated, other people began responding with additional research and constructive criticism, making expansion and more authoritative detail possible. Particular thanks go to Paul Mitchell, Timothy McCrory, and J. Halsbrook. Those who made factual and conceptual breakthroughs that contributed to the original composition are too numerous to name.

Dale Pond of Tulsa, Oklahoma edited the original and has continued to review each revision with the objective of helping frame technical material dredged from tens of thousands of pages of historical documents and government legalese so most any literate person can read and grasp both substance and implications of possibly the most diabolical scheme ever perpetrated against a developed nation.

A mere "thank you" is inadequate for my wife, Gail, who has endured humiliation and hardship since approximately 1995, and the many generous, patriotic people who have made the continuing effort to unearth and expose truth possible.

Gail and I share a life calling -- Christian ministry. We believe our nation was established in a unique historical moment, and that the Constitution of the United States emerged as a divinely inspired compact to serve widely divergent interests. It was not something fabricated out of thin air. Massachusetts Bay Colony established the first American constitution for civil government in 1636, basing it on precepts set out in the Mayflower Compact, signed by Pilgrims when they first arrived at Plymouth Colony in 1620, so the fledgling nation had over a century and a half of experience with written constitutions before the Constitution of the United States was drafted in 1787. While the Constitution does not specifically credit God as ultimate authority, many of the men who participated in the Constitutional Convention were also delegates to the Second Continental Congress, and had signed the Declaration of Independence, pledging lives, fortunes, and sacred honor to the cause of liberty.

The Declaration of Independence justified severance from British rule by the "Laws of Nature and Nature's God" -- physical and moral law man can neither author nor amend. These are the two great branches of natural law, acknowledged since time memorial even in civilizations that did not worship the Creator God acknowledged by Christian and Jewish religions. The Constitution preserves these principles by recognizing sovereignty of the people and preserving unalienable rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution must be understood in this context, the lineage being approximately six prior centuries in which principles of English-American common law were time-tested, proven, and articulated.

Central to this understanding is that nobody is above the law, and no manmade law contrary to the Laws of Nature and Nature's God is or can be legitimate as it is destructive to the body politic and the cultural fabric. Those who usurp power not enumerated in and specifically delegated by the Constitution are in rebellion against man, nature and God -- they are reprobate. As they pursue self-serving ends, they breach public trust, threaten peace and domestic tranquillity, and cause injury to countryman and kin. In the end, they bring destruction on themselves as history has proven time and again that tyranny has no friends.

While this effort addresses details of the scheme that undermines and compromises the sovereign American people, Gail and I stand firm in the belief that God blessed America from the beginning, and in the latter Twentieth Century, is exposing the fraud through people prepared for and appointed to the task. The means of peaceful correction can and should be primarily through exposure -- documentation and disclosure of truth. Truth will ultimately prevail.

Ponca City, Oklahoma

The Scheme & Its Effect

Governments of the United States, the Union of several States, and possessions of the United States are embroiled in a scheme known as Cooperative Federalism, sometimes identified simply as Federalism. The nonconstitutional scheme presumes that each of the several States is an instrumentality of the United States on a par with insular possessions of the United States1, rather than semi-independent State republics, (1) restricted only by constitutional prohibitions and mandates, and (2) subject only to constitutionally-enumerated powers of the United States.

This scheme was made possible by emergence of a second government. Yet even today, those not familiar with the two capacities of United States government find it difficult to grasp implications. However, some who held responsible positions when the second or shadow government emerged saw the danger. Justice Harlan, a justice on the Supreme Court of the United States, was among them. One of his more lucid criticisms was written in his dissenting opinion in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), the first of four insular tax cases that provided a conceptual platform for the current de facto (authority in fact, but without law) system that engulfs not only insular possessions of the United States, but State republics party to the Constitution:

The United States, via constitutionally-delegated powers which are statutorily activated by Congress, carries out certain responsibilities in relation to the several States party to the Constitution and the people of the several States, but Congress has what is described as plenary or near-absolute power in territory belonging to the United States. The insular tax cases addressed a unique situation: Insular possessions ceded by Spain in 1898 following the Spanish-American War were the first territories acquired by the United States where the cession treaty did not incorporate the territory and people in the constitutional scheme. Consequently, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other provinces ceded by Spain were to become more like British Crown colonies than territory previously acquired by the United States. Other insular possessions acquired since have not been incorporated in the constitutional scheme, either.

This division, and limited application of the Constitution, was what alarmed Justice Harlan and others who clearly understood that a house divided cannot stand -- that the "permissive" would eventually overcome the "restrictive" government. They were correct. Cooperative Federalism, known as Corporatism into the 1930s, evolved to crowd out legitimate government required to operate within the confines of constitutionally-enumerated powers. An idyllic view of the scheme was articulated by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969):

Since the 1930s great depression and World War II, fraudulent economic policy, and mathematically impossible credit and monetary systems, have undermined American sovereignty and solvency, resulting in agonizing rural poverty and cancerous growth of the urban ghetto. The effect of wealth transfer since the early 1970s has all but destroyed the nation's middle and upper-middle income classes. Benefits flow to only about twenty percent of the population, while windfalls funnel to the wealthiest quarter of one percent. By the end of the 1980s, the Cooperative Federalism system of frauds had ripened to such decadence that it criminalizes tens of thousands without lawful, constitutionally delegated authority, and otherwise engages in thinly disguised piracy perpetrated against many thousands more. Absolutely nobody is safe -- government seeks to control life of virtually all Americans from cradle to grave. Aside from specific industries, the economic assault has been particularly injurious to two broad classes, children and subsequent lineage of the Post War Boomers, and minorities of color.

Distress from the increasingly confrontational system is sufficient that every legitimate key-question survey since 1990 has reflected that sixty percent or more of the nation's eligible voters distrusts politicians and political institutions down to and including local school boards. By September 1995, the distrust level topped 72%, and by May 1996, went over 80%; in November 1996, only 49% of the nation's registered voters bothered to vote, which was a distressing number due largely to only 35-40% of those eligible to vote having even registered. Consequently, few politicians elected in November 1996, including the President of the United States, represent much more than 10% of the eligible voters in their respective districts. As the last decade of the Twentieth Century draws to an end, national, state, and local governments are probably less representative of the people than at any time since Congress convened under the Constitution in 1789.4

In a more pointed survey, approximately 35% of those interviewed expressed manifest and rising anger toward Federal government. The summer 1998 survey abated some from a year earlier, but politicians such as Vice President Al Gore are concerned that what was previously articulated as anger has simply turned to cynicism, in many ways a more dangerous and enduring mindset. Those cynical and angry toward Federal government constitute a significant force approaching half the nation's adult population.

These surveys contradict pomp and circumstance proclaiming all is well. Americans aren't indifferent to personal and national welfare, generation of wealth, and sovereignty. The vast majority knows something is desperately wrong, but has been mystified and immobilized by the de facto scheme woven in the craft of wordsmiths and other means of deception which has evolved since approximately the Civil War, with what amounted to a constitutional coup de grace in the 1930s.

Encroachment has continued at a steady to accelerating pace since, hitting high gear in 1966 and after. By 1990, State and Federal governments incarcerated more people in total numbers and on a per-capita basis than any other nation in the world other than South Africa and the old Soviet Union -- prison industries had become the nation's fifth largest industry. The Department of Justice, to say nothing of corresponding State agencies, the Internal Revenue Service, and other Federal agencies, routinely seizes and/or confiscates in excess of $50 billion per year in privately-owned American assets.5 This frenzy has gone so overboard that by late 1997 and early 1998, even The Wall Street Journal, Forbes Magazine, and other influential mainline magazines and newspapers were publishing critical articles. In 1998, American incarceration numbers, now at 1.2 million nationally, and in excess of 113,000 in the Federal system, rank second in the world, with the former Soviet Union having the dubious honor of ranking first.

The combined force of adverse economic policy, and abusive administrative, and civil and criminal prosecution initiatives, is rapidly reaching critical mass -- a point where general civil disobedience, and eventually revolution, is inevitable unless something happens to alleviate mounting conflict. Common people feel alienated from and defenseless against their government, symptoms which characteristically lead to backlash and violent confrontation. This is the course of nations and empires throughout history, with nineteen of twenty-one known empires prior to 1935 having fallen from within due to economic collapse and destruction of key social institutions.6

Proper enforcement of law has the potential of averting disaster. Cooperative Federalism is imposed through fraud and illusion -- perpetrators operate in a de facto manner without lawful authority, so they are subject to criminal prosecution and civil remedies in lawful State and Federal courts. The problem is forcing those appointed or elected to judicial offices to convene constitutionally-authorized courts, or removing them from office so successors will.

Thanks to work of patriotic researchers across the nation, keys to unraveling convoluted State and Federal Codes are soundly in place. With solid conceptual footing, energy can be focused on untangling the maze, then deploying strategies to peacefully and lawfully correct the system. Scripture speaks to the matter in two contexts which are fundamental to the effort: The reprobate will be caught in his own snare, and in his second letter to Timothy, the Apostle Paul foretold that the reprobate would proceed no further as he would be exposed for all the world to see. These two approaches are fundamental to peacefully restoring constitutional rule.7

The Least Common Denominators

Virtually every Federal initiative in the Union of several States in both civil and criminal actions is defective by virtue of being without lawful authority. All cases are prosecuted in United States District Courts8 in the name and by authority of the United States of America. At first blush, these facts seem legitimate and innocent enough, but the underlying difficulty is akin to remembering if the order of stripes on the deadly coral snake is red then black, or red then yellow. The "United States District Court" isn't what it seems; the "United States of America" isn't what it seems, either.

These are fatal flaws. Only district courts of the United States, as defined at 28 U.S.C. § 4519 (Section 451 of Title 28 of the United States Code), and three remaining territorial courts10, are courts of the United States. United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States are private courts; they do not exercise Article III or Article I (legislative-territorial) judicial authority of the United States.

The Article III district court was defined in a 1938 Supreme Court decision styled Mookini v. United States, as follows:

The legitimate territorial court, designated as a United States District Court, was defined by the Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico in 1922: One of the better listings of "courts of the United States" is the definition of courts which the Administrative Office of United States Courts has jurisdiction over, at 28 U.S.C. § 610. However, this list is dated. Since the definition was last amended, the United States District Court for the Canal Zone has been abolished, and the territorial court (United States District Court) for the Northern Mariana Islands has been added: Validity of this definition of courts of the United States is reinforced by regulations generated for the General Accounting Office in the definition of "agency" at 4 CFR § 91.2: The General Accounting Office is general agent of the Treasury of the United States, responsible for settling all claims of or against the United States, so reiteration of 28 U.S.C. § 610 as authoritative with respect to identifying lawful courts of the United States conclusively demonstrates that United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States are not lawful courts of the United States. Implications of the GAO adopting this definition as identifying lawful courts of the United States are more than interesting and at some point in the future should be useful in securing redress of grievance in administrative and judicial forums.

A somewhat different but maybe clearer approach is used in the definition at 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f). This subsection "defines" what courts of the United States are authorized by statute to convene grand and petit (trial) juries, and effectively bridges civil and criminal so far as lawful courts of the United States are concerned:

Criminal jurisdiction of the United States, found at 18 U.S.C. § 3231, is vested in "district courts of the United States", not "United States District Courts", and the same is true in civil forums in title 28 of the United States Code.13 Sections of the Code which reflect jurisdiction similar to district courts of the United States in territorial courts are found for the most part in title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions. The Virgin Islands territorial court is unique in that it is vested with concurrent maritime jurisdiction at 18 U.S.C. § 3241. However, the "territorial" jurisdiction can and does extend only to the insular possession itself, along with territorial waters. The Canal Zone territorial court had concurrent admiralty and maritime jurisdiction until it was abolished, and prior to admission as States of the Union, concurrent maritime jurisdiction was vested in various of the territorial courts.

No Article III or Article I jurisdiction of the United States is vested in United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. They are not courts created by Congress -- they are private courts created by a judicial consortium. These folks garbed in black were for the most part appointed under authority of Article III § 1 of the Constitution to preside in lawful courts of the United States, but without constitutional or statutory authority, elected to set up a system of private courts which operates under the territorial illusion.

Whenever territories of the United States were admitted to the Union, Article I territorial courts were replaced by Article III district courts of the United States. Prior to the 1920s, however, there doesn't seem to have been any real distinction in text so far as the district court of the United States v. the United States District Court is concerned. The problem was resolved via Supreme Court definition in Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922). However, in at least some legislation, court nomenclature was avoided, as was the case in the judiciary act of March 3, 1911 in statutory language governing transition from territorial to Article III courts. The fact that the territorial courts were abolished with admittance of a territory to the Union of several States is verified in §§ 62-64 of the act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1104:

The sections above were derived from §§ 567-568 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, page 97, so they weren't new in 1911 or even 1878, but originated a considerable time before. They clearly demonstrate that the nature of courts of the United States is an either/or proposition: Either they must be district courts of the United States, vested with judicial power of the United States via Article III § 1 of the Constitution, or they must be Article I legislative courts, with territorial courts having jurisdiction limited to territory subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative authority. There is no statutory provision or justification for maintaining territorial courts once a territory of the United States is admitted to the Union of several States. When a territory is admitted to the Union, only Article III courts of the United States may make determinations that deprive the sovereign people of life, liberty, or property. The Fifth Article of Amendment, as well as the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 of the Constitution, cannot be abridged by Congress or the judicial branch of government.

The means by which Congress vests territorial courts with judicial authority similar to that of Article III district courts of the United States is demonstrated in language employed to establish jurisdiction of the District Court of Guam, at 48 U.S.C. § 1424:

Restating the obvious, United States District Courts situated in the several States are not Article III district courts of the United States, and they are not Article I territorial courts, known as United States District Courts. It is technically accurate to say that they are "outlaw" courts -- courts which do not exist by laws of the United States promulgated by Congress, and do not exercise judicial authority of the United States.14

This is not conjecture. Judges and the court clerk in the Eastern District of Kentucky have effectively confessed this conclusion in administrative and judicial forums. Law of the United States speaks clearly to the matter. Litigation is already filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky with the mandate to convene the Article III district court of the United States, with an affidavit of bias and prejudice that disqualifies all judges appointed to the district, the object being to force the Chief Judge of the 6th Circuit to convene the constitutionally-authorized and statutorily-established district court. The contention is supported by a letter from the office of the General Counsel for the Administrative Office of United States Courts.15 As of this writing, these initiatives are stalemated by inaction, but there has been no rebuttal to the obvious conclusions and legitimacy of the initiatives.

The character of the United States District Court is addressed several times in the body of this discourse, so we will rest the subject for now.

Next, it is particularly important to understand that the "United States of America" responsible for civil and criminal initiatives in United States District Courts is a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. Where United States government has two capacities or characters, there are two distinct political alliances or coalitions named the "United States of America".

The original United States of America, spelled with capital first letters, was comprised of the thirteen original States joined to fight the American war of independence, and was formally established in Article I of the Articles of Confederation (1777). This same "United States of America" appears in the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States: "We the People of the United States..," established the Constitution, "... for the United States of America." The United States of America also has a function in Article II of the Constitution: By way of electoral college, the President is elected President of the United States of America, then at his inauguration is sworn in by oath as President of the United States.

The relationship of the Union of several States party to the Constitution, designated as the United States of America in the Articles of Confederation, is somewhat on the order of member nations who participate in the United Nations. By way of charter, signatory nations established the United Nations, but the charter does not vest unilateral authority in any of the participating nations; all actions of the United Nations, regardless of what nations participate, are engaged in the name and by authority of the United Nations. The Constitution of the United States enumerates certain powers vested in the governmental entity known and designated as the United States, not the United States of America.

Analogously, suppose several people decide to undertake an enterprise of some sort. Maybe they want to build cars. They might create a corporation, which is a legal fiction, and might name the legal fiction "agent" responsible for carrying out the enterprise the Ford Motor Corporation, General Motors, Chrysler, or anything else. Likewise, delegates of the United States of America compact could have named the confederation agent anything they wanted to. Rather than the "United States", they might have named the designated governmental entity the "Confederated Authority". The sense of what they did is related in the first three articles of the Articles of Confederation:

Essentially the same limitations on United States authority is articulated in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution: Obviously, even the original United States of America had no significant constitutionally delegated powers -- the Constitution was "for" the United States of America, its primary function was to delegate authority to the United States as the general government agent, and therefore, the Constitution is the Constitution of the United States. The original draft of the Constitution made at the Constitutional Convention actually didn't have a title. The title was added for classification and other purposes, but the intent is clear even without the title. But substituting the "United States of America" for the "United States" as the principal of interest in Federal civil and criminal initiatives is only the beginning of fraud.

The United States of America currently responsible for Federal civil and criminal initiatives is not the original. It is a political coalition, compact or alliance of insular possessions of the United States subject to sovereignty of the United States via Congress' plenary power (near-absolute) in territory belonging to the United States under authority of Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution.16 By way of various sections of the United States Code, delegations of authority, treaties, etc., we know the substitute "United States of America" is territorial, it is a jurisdiction foreign to the United States, and it is defined as an agency of the United States (see notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 18 U.S.C. § 6, 1994 edition, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 edition). The entity is very probably classified or designated as a municipal corporation.

By putting the "United States" and the "United States of America" in the same statute or regulation, the two entities are distinguished as being unique and separate -- the "this is not that" test applies. The following is reproduction of 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 ed., and it does precisely what is required to distinguish the "United States" from the "United States of America":

The general fraud is made possible by the likeness of the two names where the second is a familiar name. For example, years ago when I lived in Oklahoma City, I was listed in the telephone directory as "Dan L. Meador," and there was also a Daniel Meador who was listed as "Dan'l Meador." I occasionally received mail and telephone calls intended for Daniel, and he sometimes received mail and telephone calls intended for me.

One of the better high school athletes I've ever known was a sophomore when I was a senior. But I could never get his name straight -- he was either George Dennis or Dennis George. I still have to occasionally look in my old high school year book to recall which way it is. I can envision that if I didn't have the year book, I might find it difficult to locate him as most metropolitan telephone directories list people named George Dennis and Dennis George. If I wanted to locate the old high school friend, I would simply have to call those listed under both names until finding the right one. This is more or less the process required to determine the constitutionally-authorized governmental entity and the lawful Article III district court of the United States. Each has been isolated through the process of elimination.

Then there is a similar kind of confusion: When I was attending a university with over ten thousand students, I kept running into what I thought was the same guy. It was disconcerting because he would show up in places that didn't make sense. I might see him somewhere, then see him a second place and wonder how he managed to get from one place to the other ahead of me. Confusion was resolved when I saw look-alikes together -- they were identical twins.

The examples aren't precisely the same as the "United States" not being the "United States of America," but knowing there are two entities identified as the "United States of America" helps, then seeing the "United States" and the "United States of America" clearly set out in the same section of the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations provides the means for conceptual clarification and orientation. We can demonstrate that, "The United States is not the United States of America," then demonstrate by way of the Constitution and laws of the United States that the United States, not the United States of America, has lawful authority in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Ironically, proper principal and judicial authority are tied together in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 7402. This section, in subsection (a), is specific with respect to the "United States" being the lawful principal of interest, and the "district court of the United States" being the court where government may secure lawful remedies:

The "United States" must bring the action -- "... at the instance of the United States..." -- in a "district court of the United States," in all "civil actions."

Making a non-criminal claim or complaint in a court is a "civil action," and it may be in two different forms. It may proceed "in the course of the common law," or "in the course of the civil law." The terminology of law is at best confusing for most people even where there is no deceptive intent, so there is an inherent problem of explaining the meaning of words and phrases even for many people who practice law. The problem is even worse where there is intentional deception, which is the case for the Internal Revenue Code and other titles of the United States Code.

The Internal Revenue Code is full of deception. One example relates to forfeitures. In the Internal Revenue Code, forfeitures are designated as "in rem" actions, and are to be executed in United States District Courts, this stipulation at 26 U.S.C. § 7323:

The United States District Court is a territorial court, and the in rem action is an admiralty/maritime action, which proceeds "in the course of the civil law," contrary to due process in the course of the common law secured by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment, and presumed by the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 of the Constitution. Again it is necessary to understand terminology and implications of terminology to grasp meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7323. However, with what has already been addressed, we can conclude that the current Internal Revenue Code does not authorize seizures and forfeitures in the Union of several States party to the Constitution -- these portions of the Internal Revenue Code are limited to territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Thus, "venue" for forfeitures, venue meaning territorial jurisdiction, is determined in the context of § 7323 by designation of the territorial court rather than the Article III district court of the United States as the court with authority to effect seizures and forfeitures. Only three legitimate territorial courts remain, designated via 1994 legislation at 18 U.S.C. § 23 -- United States District Courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Therefore, per 26 U.S.C. § 7323, all suits for seizure and forfeiture must be in one of the three remaining territorial courts, not in district courts of the United States situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

That the "United States", not the "United States of America", is the constitutionally and statutorily-authorized principal of interest, and must therefore be the prosecuting party via lawful courts of the United States, is reasonably easy to track through statutory authority relating to revenue laws. By going to the 1934 edition of the United States Code, authority of the "United States" is verified for actions to enforce forfeitures, etc. Authority is found at 28 U.S.C. § 732, 1934 ed., as follows:

The origin of 28 U.S.C. § 732, 1934 ed., is § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, the beginning-place for the United States Code. By going to the Revised Statutes of 1878, we can compare the section with that in the Code to see proper authority: The 1934 U.S.C. section duplicates § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, the Revised Statutes of 1878 providing the point of demarcation for current law of the United States. Annotation to § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 cite original legislation as follows: Act of 4 Aug., 1790, c. 35, s. 67, v. 1, p. 176. 31 Dec. 1792, c. 1, s. 29, v. 1, p. 298. 18 Feb., 1793, c. 8. s. 35, v. 1, p. 317. 2 Mar., 1799, c. 22, s. 89, v. 1, pp. 695, 696. 13 July, 1866, c. 184, s. 9, v. 14, pp. 111, 145. 8 June, 1872, c. 335, s. 303, v. 17, p. 323.

Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined authority of the "United States" to sue in the absence of statutory authority specifying the principal. In the absence of statutory authority, or statutes to the contrary, the Attorney General may initiate suit in the name and by authority of the United States (United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888)).

Finally, the matter is ultimately put to rest by the original judiciary act of September 24, 1789. The first section which speaks to authority of the United States is § 9, 1 Stat. 76:

Actions of a civil nature are addressed in 11, 1 Stat. 78: Duties of the United States Marshal clarify authority of the United States, with no other authority listed, at § 27, 1 Stat. 87: To close the loop, this same basic charge of responsibility for the U.S. Marshal is found in the 1994 edition of the United States Code at § 566(c): Nowhere is there constitutional or statutory authority for the "United States of America" to serve as principal of interest in civil or criminal causes in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. This might be a minor thing of no consequence if the "United States of America" wasn't a distinct, separate geographical and political entity foreign to the "United States", but the evidence clearly shows that the United States and the United States of America are distinct and different with distinct and separate geographical authority. There is no other "law or Rule of Procedure" authorizing the United States of America as prosecuting principal in civil or criminal judicial forums; all writs, process, and orders of courts of the United States which the U.S. Marshal's Service may execute must be "issued under the authority of the United States."

In sum, virtually all Federal civil and criminal initiatives against individuals and non-governmental enterprise are filed in private United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution in the name and by authority of the United States of America, a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. These are the "least common denominators" for Americans assailed in civil and criminal forums since approximately 1948.

The broader scheme will make more sense after reading the next two sections. Motives behind the Cooperative Federalism scheme are simple -- wealth and power.

The Codes Are Unraveled

Part of the problem for researchers and people who have relied on the law fraternity for assistance has been not understanding the United States Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, and corresponding Codes for the several States. As a consequence, otherwise excellent researchers, and attorneys who are loyal Americans interested in correcting the ravenous prosecution and seizure frenzy, have been led like a dog chasing his tail. However, keys to unraveling the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as State codes, have been unearthed.

At the onset, an important fact needs to be established: The United States Code and State codes are not laws of the United States and the several States. The codes are merely classification systems; in and of itself, the United States Code does not vest a franchise of authority in any officer, department or agency of the United States, and does not create a liability or benefit for anybody. The same is true for State codes. Laws of the United States are published annually in the Statutes at Large; laws enacted by State legislatures are published in State session laws following each session of the legislature. So far as the United States Code is concerned, even those titles enacted as so-called "positive law" are merely "legal evidence" of laws of the United States; titles which have not been enacted as positive law are "prima facie" (by appearance) the law.17

The United States Code was first published in 1926. It has never been more than a classification system for laws of the United States. The first edition was based on the Revised Statutes of 1878, and session laws, published in the Statutes at Large, through 1926. Each year there is a supplement to the Code with laws passed in the immediate previous session, then every six or so years, a new edition incorporates original legislation, amendments, and repeals enacted since the previous edition was published. Supplements are then added each year until the next new edition is published. The 1994 edition, with supplements, is the sixth and current edition.

The purpose of the United States Code, and its nature, were stated clearly in the Preface to the 1926 edition, the first paragraph reproduced here:

The fact that the United States Code isn't law is demonstrated by § 33 of the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 991, the act which purportedly enacted title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, into positive law: What is legislative construction? Legislative construction determines application, in some way identifies source of authority, etc. Any given section in the United States Code is separated from its title, enacting clause, and other essentials necessary to determine application. It is evidence of law, but it is not the law.

The first three editions of the Code were reasonably straightforward (1926, 1934 & 1940), then in 1948 and after, an amalgamation process began which converges and distorts sections from various titles in the 1940 edition. The current 28 U.S.C. § 132, addressed in an earlier footnote, merges sections of the 1940 edition from titles 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and 48, Territories and Insular Possessions, the latter relating principally to the territorial court of Hawaii prior to Hawaii being admitted as a State of the Union. The section is an amalgamation of two or more sections from previous editions of the United States Code and Acts of Congress, with the consequence being that people cannot simply read it and determine what portion has what application. The underlying laws were not amended, merely the amalgamated section in the Code. Therefore, sections of the Code are not law of the United States, as such. They are merely evidence that a law or several laws of that nature exist somewhere in the Statutes at Large.

Fortunately, there is a reasonably simple way to unravel the United States Code to demonstrate proper application of any given section: Following each section, there are Historical and Statutory Notes. These notes provide the history, and cites in the Statutes at Large where the original act and major amendments are located. By going to the original act citation in the Statutes at Large, the beginning cite can be secured, then that cite and/or the popular name of any given piece of legislation can be found in the Distribution Tables in the United States Code. The Distribution Tables provide a section-by-section breakdown of the bill published in the Statutes at Large, directing to where pieces of the legislation are located in the United States Code.

For example, taxing authority for Subtitles A and C and administrative and judicial sections in Subtitle F of Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code, are major sources of grief for people across the country. Subtitle A contains particulars relating to what most Americans know as the "income tax" -- technically, the "normal tax," enacted as a privilege tax against officers, employees and agents of United States Government in 1919 or before. Subtitle C includes statutory authority for Social Security tax, other social welfare taxes, and authority for payroll deductions. Today elements of the normal tax and Social Security-related legislation are scattered through titles 5, 26, 31, 42, and other titles. Generally speaking, judicial procedure for collection of these taxes, when delinquent, is in Title 5 of the United States Code, not Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code (see particularly 5 U.S.C. §§ 5512 & 5520). The General Accounting Office, as general agent for the Treasury of the United States, is responsible for initiation of judicial proceedings, not the Internal Revenue Service.18 This is but one example of the mire created by the entire United States Code, not just the Internal Revenue Code, and has been disabling for those who make sincere efforts to unravel laws of the United States. When proper use of the Code is understood, it is a handy tool, but it is not law of the United States -- it is merely evidence of law. Because of classification, merging and editing distortions, it is no longer even reliable evidence except for those willing to wade through volumes of legalese.

The Code of Federal Regulations has a corresponding finding aid called the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, authorized by the Federal Register Act at 44 U.S.C. § 1510.19 The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, along with other finding aids, is located in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations bears approximately the relationship to the Federal Register as the United States Code does to the Statutes at Large, with finding aids in the Index providing the bridge between statutes and regulations (see 44 U.S.C. § 1507).

The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules lists sections and titles of the United States Code in numerical order, with sections that have published regulations listed having general application or application limited to the regulation listed, and those not listed having limited application to (1) government of the United States (see 5 U.S.C. §§ 301 & 302), (2) territories and insular possessions of the United States, and/or (3) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

In this scheme, any statute promulgated by Congress must be wed to an administrative regulation before it has the force and effect of law.20 Via a statute promulgated by Congress in compliance with Article I § 7 of the Constitution, Congress effectively says, "This is the law," then the President or an executive officer by regulation says, "This is the application and the way the statute will be enforced." One is incomplete without the other; until a legitimate statute and general application regulation are joined, there can be no general application save as is applicable to the three limited and special jurisdictions listed above.

Another secret --the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States is responsible for publishing regulations governing conduct and operation of court officers and personnel such as clerks, probation officers and the like (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(1) & 603(f)). It does not appear that these regulations are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, but must be secured from that office. They are required to be published in the Federal Register before having force and effect. Additionally, the Director produces a manual for conduct of United States magistrate judges. This is important to know as the courts themselves, through clerks as well as judges and other officers attached to the courts, are keepers at the gate. Having regulations in hand is vital to forcing compliance or filing complaints for removal and/or prosecution.21

Nearly all States joined to the Cooperative Federalism scheme have adopted the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act which sets out regulatory requirements similar to those in the Federal Administrative Procedures Act and the Federal Register Act. Comparable finding aids and indexes should be in place. State law for the several States respectively is in State session laws, not codes such as the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, and administrative agencies are required to promulgate regulations along the same order as Federal regulations. Some States such as Kansas have compiled and organized administratively-promulgated regulations in publications similar to the Code of Federal Regulations, but others such as Oklahoma haven't. Without implementing regulations, delegations of authority, etc., both State and Federal authorities proceed without force and effect of law.

Basic & Essential Authorities

While every effort is being made to write this material so virtually any literate person can understand it, it is necessarily steeped in legal cites, court decisions, etc., which can make comprehension difficult for those not familiar with principles of law and the strange language sometimes described as legalese. This is probably the most difficult section as it deals with five essential authorities, then works through the relationship of the authorities by using examples. In order to provide orientation, the authorities are listed immediately below, ahead of the actual section narrative. Analysis follows the itemized list.
  1. The Constitution of the United States must establish authority for all statutory enactments of Congress applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and the American people at large. Further, Congress must be legislating for the Union of several States rather than exclusively for territory of the United States before even enumerated powers are applicable in or to the several States. Therefore, determination of what capacity Congress is operating in -- the root source of constitutional authority -- is an indispensable element of constitutional authority.
  2. Congress must create departments, including courts inferior to the Supreme Court, and empower the various administrative departments and courts, by way of statutes enacted in compliance with Article I § 7 of the Constitution. The following authorities establish and preserve this requirement: Art. I § 8.18 & Article III § 1 of the Constitution; 4 U.S.C. § 72.
  3. Where Congress by statute vests authority in the President, the President may delegate authority to executive officers or departments by way of Executive Order published in the Federal Register. This requirement is at 3 U.S.C. § 301.
  4. Where Congress by statute directly vests authority in an executive officer or administrative department, or authority vested in the President is delegated by Executive Order, the executive officer or department head may redelegate authority by delegation order. The requirement is in the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a). This requirement also applies to legislative and judicial officers and departments, but not necessarily in the framework of the Federal Register Act.
  5. Any given statute that prescribes a departmental function, creates an obligation, or prescribes a penalty, must be implemented by regulations published in the Federal Register. The requirement is in the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a).
A physical scientist will say, "Nothing comes from nothing." The same principle applies to governments, particularly governments established by constitutions where departments and officers have specifically enumerated powers. This is absolutely the case when it comes to governments of the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Each has its constitutionally-enumerated powers, and can do nothing which is not delegated by applicable constitutions. Sovereignty, as such, is vested and resides in the people; the people divest themselves of whatever responsibilities they want governments to tend to by way of powers enumerated in applicable constitutions.

Through the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States (first Ten Articles of Amendment), and bills of rights in constitutions of the several States party to the Constitution, the American people specifically retained certain rights which were articulated in the Declaration of Independence (1776), and in the English-American heritage as early as the Magna Charta (1215). The rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, articulated in the Declaration of Independence, restated as rights to life, liberty and property in the Fifth Article of Amendment, were and are essential to freedom and prosperity. These unalienable and therefore inseparable rights, which are what American founders described as self-evident truth, are to freedom and prosperity as legs on a three-legged milking stool. To remove any of the three legs effectively destroys the stool.

The Tenth Article of Amendment is particularly important as it prohibits the government of the United States from exercising power which is not specifically delegated to it by and enumerated in the Constitution. When properly understood, the Tenth Article of Amendment works somewhat like a volley ball or tennis net, separating State and Federal authority. This frames what is called the Separation of Powers Doctrine -- State and Federal governments are postured as the antipodes or opposite ends of authority, with one operating inside the scope of its enumerated powers while the other operates in the scope of its enumerated and limited powers. Additionally, the Separation of Powers Doctrine distinguishes responsibility of the three branches of government -- executive and judicial branches do not have constitutional legislative authority, legislative and administrative branches do not exercise judicial authority, and legislative and judicial branches do not administer laws of the United States. Each branch has its role, and with few limited crossover areas that are gray in nature, one does not perform the functions of the other.

This principle is expressly articulated in Springer et al v. Government of the Philippines Islands, 48 S.Ct. 480, 277 U.S. 189, 72 L.Ed. 485 (1928), at 201 & 202:

Original authority is vested in the three branches of Federal government respectively by the Constitution of the United States. One cannot exercise constitutionally enumerated powers of another; none can exercise power not delegated by the Constitution. The Constitution simultaneously serves as an empowering instrument while articulating limitation in the "Thou shalt not..," language of the Tenth Article of Amendment.

The first essential authority where matters at hand are concerned, beyond the constitutionally-enumerated power, is statutory authority. The Constitution itself merely established the branches and authorizes authority each may exercise. At Article I § 8.18, the Constitution specifies that, "[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The means for enacting laws is prescribed in Article I § 7.

Through this lawmaking authority, Congress may activate and enact all, some or none of any given power enumerated in the Constitution. This includes creating offices and/or agencies. For example, the Attorney General has been an officer in the administration almost from the time Congress first convened under the Constitution in 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 1789). The Department of Justice wasn't legislated into existence until 1870 (Act of June 22, 1870). Since then, Congress has vested certain responsibilities in the Attorney General and/or the Department of Justice, or sometimes in departments Congress has created in the Department of Justice. By way of delegation of authority by the Attorney General, these various divisions of the Department of Justice, and departments or agencies attached to the Department of Justice, are charged with carrying out responsibilities prescribed by statute.

One of the more important statutory restrictions which secures and reinforces Congress' authority is at 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72. The first of these sections establishes territory within the current borders of the District of Columbia as the seat of government for the United States; the second prohibits any government department from operating outside the District of Columbia save as Congress authorizes by statute:

In this context, we see what should be lawful constraint on the Federal Bureau of Investigation by examining origins and statutory authority of the FBI: Read notes following 28 U.S.C. § 531 to find that Congress didn't create the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI simply appeared in the Department of Justice -- it is an administratively-created entity, so cannot exceed authority originally vested in the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. Statutory authority vested in the FBI and the Attorney General is found at 28 U.S.C. § 535: Administrative creation of the FBI is confirmed in The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, page 349: What authority does the FBI have to investigate and otherwise bother people in the several States other than Government officers and employees? De facto authority -- "I can, therefore I will." The FBI has no statutory authority to disturb anyone in the Union of several States other than government officers and employees. Therefore, 4 U.S.C. § 72, in addition to constitutional limitations, constrains FBI investigations in the Union of several States to subject matter prescribed by statute, that being 28 U.S.C. § 535, cited above.

The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, the BIR to IRS name change being effected by T.D.O. 150-29, in 1953; BATF was split from IRS in 1972 by administrative order, not by Congress' statutory authority. No new governmental entity was created. These agencies, which are not part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States or the Treasury of the United States, have legitimate authority only in insular possessions and territorial waters belonging to the United States, all of which are subject to Congress' plenary power under Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. Neither has statutory authority beyond borders of the District of Columbia save in insular possessions of the United States, per 4 U.S.C. § 72.

The same statute condemns United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States, and the "United States of America" -- civil and criminal process in the Union of several States must issue in Article III district courts of the United States in the name and by authority of the United States (judicial authority over criminal actions in district courts of the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 3231 & civil actions relating to tax cases at 26 U.S.C. § 7402, cited elsewhere).

Another example of necessary statutory authority is rules of procedure for judicial process. By way of judiciary acts of 1789 and 1792, district courts of the United States were established as common law courts. Cases and controversies "arising under" the Constitution and laws of the United States (Article III § 2.1 "arising under" clause), and treaties enacted by authority of the United States, are to proceed in the course of the common law as established in England at the time the Constitution was implemented.22

Current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, and Federal Rules of Evidence are promulgated under statutory authority evidenced at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, particularly § 2072, and are applicable only in legitimate United States district courts, not in district courts of the United States.

This is one of the major deception moves made in 1948. In the 1920s, then again in the 1930s, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for equity, admiralty and maritime cases for Article III district courts of the United States. In fact, the 1934 edition of the United States Code appears confused on the matter as "one form of action" was already in statutory language, but rules of evidence and other statutory matters relating to the course of the common law had not been repealed. Revision and historical notes, which have been the responsibility of West Publishing from the beginning, articulated the confusion -- probably the editor was being dumb like a fox. Most consternation appeared to be straightened out by the 1940 edition, then in 1948, statutory authority for the rules, and the rules themselves, were amended to apply in United States district courts rather than district courts of the United States.23 Equity, admiralty, and maritime cases proceed in the course of the civil law; cases at law proceed in the course of the common law. There is no presumption in the common law. When some matter of authority or liability is challenged, proof must be provided in an open hearing and be established by documentary evidence and testimony.

The course of the civil law operates to a great extent on presumption, even though there is no Federal Rules of Evidence rule for presumption relating to criminal cases (see notes for Rule 301, presumption in civil matters, Federal Rules of Evidence). In the course of the civil law, which presumes, "The will of the prince is law," presumption, including undisclosed presumption, may lie against the defendant, leaving the defendant to prove innocence rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove guilt or liability. Each of the several States party to the Constitution save Louisiana is a common law State; as a longtime French colony prior to United States acquisition in 1803, Louisiana was permitted to retain the Napoleonic Code, which was civil law. Read Downes v. Bidwell, 1901, cited elsewhere, for the history of how the Ordinance of 1787 for government of the Northwest Territory was extended to each new territory, assuring due process in the course of the common law, prior to the cession treaty ceding the Philippines, Puerto Rico, etc., following the Spanish-American War. The Ordinance of 1787 is part of the organic law of the United States, published in the first volume of the current United States Code.

Difference between due process in the course of the common law and due process in the course of the civil law is significant, and so long as the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment are in place, Congress has no authority to bastardize the clear and straightforward rules of common law process. There is, in fact, no statutory authority for merger of rules governing process for actions at law with actions in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction.

Next is the statute being executed and prosecuted: What is the source of authority and application for any given statute, which may be "evidenced" by a section of the United States Code?

Questions framed in Wayman v. Southard, cited earlier, a decision written by former Chief Justice John Marshall, provide an important lesson. The first question was basically, "What does the Constitution authorize Congress to do?" relative to courts, process, etc. The second was, "What has Congress done?"

Too many involved in litigation jump the gun by arguing what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do, without stepping back to examine and question what Congress has done. Since the 1920s, what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do under Article I enumerated powers has been all but irrelevant as nearly all statutory enactments since have issued under Article IV authority in territory of the United States -- precious few laws of the United States now apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Arguing about authority under the commerce clause and other broadly construed powers is a waste of time as Congress abandoned regulating commerce among the several States in favor of regulating commerce among territories and insular possessions of the United States, and foreign commerce, long ago. As another example, by way of the revenue act of November 23, 1921, Congress repealed virtually all excise taxes and other taxes applicable under Article I and Sixteenth Article of Amendment authority, the "normal" tax against officers and employees of the government of the United States being one of the few exceptions. The normal tax, patterned on the tax against Federal employees in 1862, was resurrected in 1919 or some time before. When the various taxes were reenacted at a later date, they were applicable in the District of Columbia and territories and insular possessions of the United States, or as might apply in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

It appears that governments of the several States are working through corporate structures, and via municipal corporations, are "acting" as though each is an instrumentality or political subdivision of the United States. This fraud is perpetrated by State legislatures adopting uniform acts, nearly all of which presume the adopting States are instrumentalities of the United States. However, at Article IV § 3.1, the Constitution condemns this:

Once Congress admits a new State to the Union, nobody, including Congress, has authority to create another State within jurisdiction of the existing State. Therefore, the so-called corporate State, which functions as a Federal State, exists and operates as a completely de facto entity. It has no lawful existence or authority. Governors and legislatures of the several States certainly don't have authority to create new states.

One of the grand paradoxes set up by this move to Article IV plenary power, as opposed to Article I delegated powers, is framed in the statute which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b):

The Separation of Powers Doctrine comes into focus here: Congress does not have authority to delegate legislative power to administrative and judicial branches of government. Yet with 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), Congress gave the Supreme Court repeal power, which is legislative. Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court repeal any conflicting statute. Justices Black and Douglas argued this well into the 1960s, but to no avail.

There is, however, a reasonably simple explanation for how Congress could delegate legislative authority: Congress vested repeal power in the Supreme Court under the Article IV territorial clause, not as pertains to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. This is demonstrated in Rule 54(c) application of terms, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Applications above use territorial possessions of the United States as examples. None of the examples represent the Union of several States. A statute must be interpreted within the framework of its language, and if all examples are of one class, application cannot go beyond the class. Similarly, if the wording on a can of flea spray lists only breeds of dogs, it is designed for dogs, but not cats. If the intent of Congress is manifest in the plain wording of a statute, as evidenced at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), the enactment must be taken at face value. Consequently, what the Supreme Court sets out in rules is the determining factor as statutes contrary to the rules are repealed by authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Since Congress may not delegate legislative authority in the framework of general powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, authority for rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to repeal any and all conflicting law must be exercise of Congress' Article IV legislative power over territory and other possessions of the United States. This is the only way to reconcile implications of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) with the Separation of Powers Doctrine. In fact, by referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is found that none of the sections pertaining to rules of the courts are listed (28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074), thereby indicating that there are no general application regulations save as might be promulgated by the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in his administrative capacity.

The acid test is to examine application. To do that, consider corresponding authority for the Attorney General to imprison people, set out at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a):

Since the Supreme Court has stipulated that an Act of Congress is locally applicable in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or in a territory or an insular possession, the term "Act of Congress" used in 18 U.S.C. § 4001 must comply with the application the Supreme Court prescribed in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., or it is repealed by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Therefore, current authority for the Attorney General to imprison people is applicable only in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, a territory or insular possession of the United States. Since the Separation of Powers Doctrine prohibits one branch of government from performing constitutionally delegated powers of another, thereby prohibiting the Supreme Court from enacting or repealing legislation, the repeal power of rules authorized at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) must be delegated to the Supreme Court under Congress' Article IV plenary power in territory and insular possessions of the United States. Application of the term "Act of Congress" in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., and use of the term in 18 U.S.C. § 4001, are consistent with this conclusion. The further inescapable conclusion is that title 18 of the United States Code, the criminal code, is evidence of law applicable only in territories and possessions of the United States. For all practical purposes other than as sections of the Code might apply to officers and employees of the United States, and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, the Code is municipal law in territories and insular possessions of the United States.

The next element of authority is delegation of authority: By statute, Congress vests basic authority over any given title and various administrative functions in the President, an executive officer such as the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, or in departments of the United States government.

Where authority is vested in the President, he may redelegate it to executive officers, departments, etc., via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., particularly § 1505(a)). Specific statutory authority for Presidential Executive Orders is at 3 U.S.C. § 301. Where authority is delegated from the President to an executive officer, or is vested in an executive officer by statute, the executive officer must redelegate authority down line by way of delegation orders published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)). The Federal Register serves as public notice.

It is convenient that nearly all Attorney General delegation orders are reproduced in Part 0 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR, Part 0). Reading this rather lengthy part provides an excellent outline of authority vested in the Department of Justice, the office of the United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, etc. However, the regulations can be misleading without knowing other particulars so they shouldn't be taken at what appears to be face value without considerable study. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is a corporation, it is no more a government department than the Federal Reserve System is, and no more a part of the Department of Justice than the Internal Revenue Service is part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States.

On the other hand, there are certain striking disclosures in Attorney General delegations of authority that don't require special knowledge, nor the aptitude of a rocket scientist. For example, the Attorney General delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.55 vests powers in the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice relative to those accused or convicted of crimes against the United States. Then the delegation order reproduced at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-1 authorizes the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to act as "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority" under treaties authorized by Public Law 95-144 on behalf of the United States of America. Further authority relating to the United States of America is delegated at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-2.

The picture takes even better shape via the Director of the Bureau of Prisons: The delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96 authorizes the Director to take custody of people accused or convicted of offenses against the United States; the delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b authorizes the Director to take custody of offenders from the United States of America under provisions specified in a treaty authorized by Public Law 95-144. The Director acts as agent of the United States in this transfer process. Under terms of Public Law 95-144, whoever is transferred from United States of America to United States custody must sign consent prior to transfer (see 18 U.S.C. § 4100(b)). Obviously, whenever the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or their respective delegates, including United States Attorneys, wardens, U.S. Marshals, etc., act against someone prosecuted in the name and by authority of the "United States of America" beyond provisions of Pub.L. 95-144 where there is no treaty in place, the victim has not been properly extradited from his or her home asylum State, and has not signed consent to be transferred from United States of America to United States custody, those responsible are respectively acting as de facto agents of a government foreign to the United States. Since they frequently proceed under actual or threatened force of arms, they engage in treason, as defined in Article III § 3 of the Constitution.

Since they are reasonably short, the first paragraph of the Director of the Bureau of prisons delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96, and the entire delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b are reproduced below:

The term "State" used in 28 CFR, Part 0.96b must conform to application of the term "State" prescribed in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., per authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), so these regulations are applicable to the Federal States (Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa), and are exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Use of the two terms "United States" and "United States of America" in the same regulation clearly distinguishes one from the other. This new "United States of America" is territorial; as agent of the United States, the Director is authorized to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America to United States custody; United States of America jurisdiction is foreign to United States jurisdiction; and this United States of America evidently has authority to effect treaties under Public Law 95-144, so is political in nature even though it probably operates as a municipal corporation. It is a power foreign to the Constitution of the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution that has no constitutional or statutory standing or authority whatever in the several States. If there was no other evidence, Attorney General delegation orders at 28 CFR, Parts 0.55, 0.64-1, 0.64-2, 0.96 & 0.96b prove conclusions set out in this paragraph.

The Internal Revenue Code provides another interesting trail to follow: 26 U.S.C. § 7621 authorizes the President to establish revenue districts. Under authority of 3 U.S.C. § 301, the President may redelegate authority vested in him by statute to executive officers via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)).

The search for the President's redelegation of authority would seem to be a blind trail as 26 U.S.C. § 7621 does not appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Therefore, there is no general application regulation applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution and the population at large. However, the President did delegate this responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury via E.O. #10289. The Executive Order is published in the United States Code following 3 U.S.C. § 301; the applicable portion pertains to customs laws and the Anti-Smuggling Act. By again consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules in the section on Executive Orders, it is found that application of authority conveyed by E.O. #10289 is 19 CFR, Part 101. There are no regulations pertaining to revenue districts in title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which would apply to income tax, normal tax, Social Security tax, and other taxes in Subtitles A, B & C of the Internal Revenue Code.

The easy way to determine what 19 CFR, Part 101 pertains to is to turn to the "List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts", another convenient finding aid in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. This compilation immediately follows the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules.

Not surprisingly, title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers Customs Duties, and Chapter I conveys authority to the "United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury (Parts 1-199)". 26 CFR, Part 101 is the regulation styled "General provisions." By going to actual regulations at 19 CFR, Part 101, it is found that this is the authority to establish customs districts, and since the authority is vested in the United States Customs Service rather than the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, etc., one might be curious enough to write to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service Arkansas-Oklahoma District, or some other district in one of the several States party to the Constitution, to ask what lawful authority he has for maintaining an internal revenue district in the Union of several States. Certainly it isn't 26 U.S.C. § 7621, E.O. #10289, or 19 CFR, Part 101 -- that authority is vested exclusively in the United States Customs Service. Unless an IRS or BATF district director, or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has a rabbit hidden in a hat, these agencies, both successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, are exercising de facto authority -- authority in fact, but not in law. They are in defiance of the prohibition at 4 U.S.C. § 72, as well as sundry constitutional limitations.24

It so happens that there is another authority: In 1956, via Treasury Delegation Order #150-42, the Secretary of the Treasury delegated authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the areas of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Simultaneously, authority over these areas was removed from district and regional customs offices in Florida, Georgia, and New York. The delegation order was slightly amended in 1986 by T.D.O. #150-01. The 1986 order eliminated specific mention of the Canal Zone, which is no longer subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, and extended authority of the Commissioner to other areas of the world subject to jurisdiction of the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands have been added to the flock of insular possessions since 1956 (1976), and Guam and American Samoa were brought under internal revenue laws of the United States since 1960. The original Treasury Delegation Order 150-42, published on page 5852 of the 1956 Federal Register, is as follows:

Office of the Secretary
[Treasury Dept. Order 150-42]
Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and
The Virgin Islands
Administration of Internal Revenue
Laws
Where no other authority exists, no other authority exists. "Nothing comes from nothing," is the governing principle -- lawful authority must have lawful origin. T.D.O. 150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. 150-01 (1986), is the end of the road for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. When and if officers or agents in this line act beyond properly delegated authority, their actions are "outlaw" -- they act under private and therefore "outlaw" motive.

Finally, any given statute which creates an obligation, prescribes a penalty, etc., must have an implementing regulation. This is required by the Federal Register Act, the applicable section at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a), the same subsection that establishes the mandate for delegations of authority to be published in the Federal Register:

If "... every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect," then every document or order which prescribes a penalty must be published in the Federal Register. The last sentence of § 1505(a) is inclusive: Every document or order which prescribes a penalty means all documents and orders which prescribe penalties must be published in the Federal Register. This is a precaution that avoids imposition of secret or private law, with the precedent dating to God's mandate that Israel post His statutes and regulations at the borders of the covenant nation. Consequently, if an implementing regulation for any given statute is not published in the Federal Register, penalties authorized by the statute may not be imposed. When regulations are published in the Federal Register, penalties may be imposed only as the published regulation specifies. The regulation may not exceed or depart from statutory intent.

With this mandate soundly in place, we can do what amounts to a frontal attack: Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations is "Conservation of Power and Water Resources". There is no title in the Code of Federal Regulations for the Criminal Code, which is Title 18 of the United States Code. Each title 18 U.S.C. criminal statute listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and most aren't, relies on regulations promulgated under authority of some other United States Code title.

In order to document regulatory application, alleged offenses of nineteen people incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center-Lexington at Lexington, Kentucky were listed in order by U.S.C. title and section number, then checked against the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Very few of the alleged crimes appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and the few that do have regulations promulgated under titles 19, 26 & 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Title 19 is Customs Duties, under jurisdiction of the United States Customs Service; title 26 is Internal Revenue, in part at least under jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service; and title 27 is Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms, under jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Customs, IRS, and BATF are listed as agencies of the Department of the Treasury. However, by consulting title 31 of the United States Code, it is found that IRS and BATF are not agencies in the Department of the Treasury of the United States. IRS and BATF are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico; IRS and BATF are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, not the Department of the Treasury of the United States. This is generally confirmed by definitions in title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, aside from other evidence (see definitions in 27 CFR, Part 250.11). The list of Department of the Treasury of the United States bureaus and agencies is reflected in the table of contents for Chapter 3, Subchapter I of Title 31, U.S.C.:

We have already disproved authority of IRS & BATF, by way of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for operating revenue districts in the Union of several States under authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7621. Per E.O. # 10289, the Secretary has merely established customs districts applicable to sections in title 19 of the United States Code under authority of the United States Customs Service. Therefore, it isn't necessary to establish concrete proof of IRS and BATF origins -- they do not have authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7621 to establish revenue districts in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Their jurisdiction lies in insular possessions and territorial waters of the United States, the delegation of authority being T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. #150-01 (1986). Consequently, regulations 26 CFR, Parts 1-799 and 27 CFR, Parts 1-299 are applicable in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and possibly the District of Columbia. Only the United States Customs Service, under applicable regulations in title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations, has delegated authority to establish revenue districts in the several States, and even that is dubious as the current United States Customs Service is the product of a Presidential reorganization plan, it is not the original customs service established by Congress.

To further solidify where IRS & BATF have jurisdiction, and to establish where taxes in the Internal Revenue Code apply when there is geographical application, Consider definitions of the terms "United States", "State", and "Citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1. These definitions apply to Social Security, unemployment tax, etc., with the original enactment in 1935. These definitions are possibly the clearest relating to administration of the Internal Revenue Code, and are particularly important as they demonstrate application to Alaska and Hawaii before 1960 but not after, and application to Guam and American Samoa after January 1, 1961:

The transition involving Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and American Samoa in the above regulation definitions is reinforced by the current statutory definitions at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e): The allegation that most Federal laws presently on the books, other than as pertains to officers and employees of the United States, are applicable only in territory belonging to the United States might seem far-fetched even with proofs already established in this discourse, but consider the definitions at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2), which are applicable for Chapter 44 -- Firearms, in the current edition of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930): Application of the term "State" above is exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution -- all examples of the class are territories and possessions of the United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction.

This conclusion is supported by the Constitution: The Second Article of Amendment secures the right to own and bear arms for the sovereign people of the several States party to the Constitution. The Fifth Article of Amendment also secures the absolute right of the people to life, liberty, and property except when taken in lawful courts by due process of law in the course of the common law. An absolute right includes the right to defend that which falls within the right -- life, liberty and property. And since there is no constitutional amendment which alters or limits the Second and Fifth Articles of Amendment, or lists firearms and related commodities as commodities Congress may regulate, it follows that the bevy of firearms laws in Chapter 44 of title 18 and related laws in title 26 of the United States Code were promulgated under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power in territory belonging to the United States. The cumulative evidence is sufficient to leave even the worst cynic with nothing more than shifting sand beneath his feet. Congress may tax something, but has no regulatory power unless the power is specifically enumerated.

Definitions above are also governed by long-standing principles of law thoroughly treated in The Federal Zone by Mitch Modeleski. The two principles, articulated long ago in Latin, are, "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,", and "Noscitur a sociis." Both are found in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, as follows:

The principles are clearly enough stated that they shouldn't need elaboration. Definitions reproduced in this discourse include only territories and insular possessions of the United States, there are no examples of the several States or other verbiage suggesting than any or all of the several States party to the Constitution are included. Therefore, "The certain designation of one [territory] is an absolute exclusion of all others..," and "... the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it." Where only the District of Columbia and/or insular possessions of the United States are listed in definitions, application may extend only to possessions of the United States, whether territories incorporated in the constitutional scheme, or insular possessions not incorporated in the constitutional scheme.

The definition of "includes" and "including" at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) is clumsy, but basically restates the two Latin principles:

Where definition is by example, the example represents the class. If examples are Thoroughbred, Morgan, and Clydesdale, the class is horses, exclusive of cats and dogs. To test the principles with relation to statutory authority, we'll examine what Congress has done with relation to Guam and the Virgin Islands, the two controlling statutes, reproduced in relevant part, evidenced at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421a & 1541: The District of Columbia, ceded as the seat of government of the United States by Virginia and Maryland, is a unique case as the Constitution of the United States was extended to the territory as the law of the land prior to cession under authority of Article I § 8.17. The Supreme Court has wrestled the matter of how the Constitution applies to the District of Columbia almost since United States acquisition, but has generally followed the rule that once the Constitution has been extended to territory, Congress does not have authority to withdraw it. Where the territory now designated as the District of Columbia was in Virginia and Maryland when they respectively joined the Union under the Constitution, the Constitution theoretically remains in full force and effect. However, when the District municipal corporation was revised following the Civil War, Congress adopted the "Constitution of the United States of America" for the District municipal corporation. This distortion aside, the District of Columbia is actually a class of one as it does not have standing as a State of the Union and it isn't an unincorporated insular possession of the United States, so is usually named in definitions when statutory application is intended to apply within the District.

Suppose we're playing a football game: We're going to dress the Union team in blue, and the unincorporated insular possession team in red. For convenience, we're going to put the District of Columbia team in black and white striped shirts -- D.C. will be the referee. The blue team is subject only to general powers of the United States enumerated in the Constitution; the red team is subject to whatever powers Congress wants to exercise; and those in black-and-white striped shirts occupy what must sometimes seem like no-man's-land.

Where a statutory definition employs examples to establish territorial application, designation of players in red shirts is exclusive of those in black-and-white, and those in blue; designation of players in red and black-and-white shirts is exclusive of those in blue. Until a statutory definition explicitly extends to players in blue shirts, being the Union of several States party to the Constitution, the blue team isn't authorized or required to play.

Another politically sensitive subject needs to be addressed. We will come at it through example: The Eighteenth Article of Amendment was ratified in 1919. It implemented national prohibition against intoxicating distilled spirits, with Section 2 establishing concurrent State and Federal enforcement authority. Ratification of the Twenty-first Article of Amendment in 1933 repealed the Eighteenth, thereby ending national prohibition, effecting what is described as State's choice, and terminating concurrent State and Federal enforcement authority -- enforcement of State liquor laws lies beyond Federal enforcement authority. This matter was determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1935.25

Given this example, it stands to reason that it would require a constitutional amendment to implement national prohibition against any other commodity, whether arms, drugs, or anything else. There is no such amendment authorizing prohibition against arms, drugs or any other commodity. Congress may have Article I and/or Sixteenth Article of Amendment taxing authority relative to these things, but has no authority to institute prohibition or otherwise limit sale and distribution. The Constitution does not confer regulatory authority. Therefore, assumed authority, which amounts to usurpation of power, has simply been used as an excuse and means to field the equivalent of a private army that daily subjects people throughout the nation, and elsewhere around the world, to "nonconstitutional", de facto rule.

Prohibition against alcohol was the greatest boon ever for organized crime. When government imposes prohibition against anything, it creates black market demand. Continuing demand for distilled spirits created the environment for Al Capone and other organized crime figures to put financial legs under national and international operations capable of challenging and doing open battle with government enforcement agencies. Crime organizations and government enforcement agencies grew at unprecedented rates during prohibition years. The same has been true for drug prohibition imposed without constitutional authority: Drug cartels grew up on inflated revenue generated from consumer demand -- an estimated 35 million Americans use what are classified as illegal drugs. Presently 60% of the people incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons were convicted on drug-related charges, and depending on the State, 30 to 40% of the people in State prisons are incarcerated for drug-related offenses. The underground market continues to flourish, drug cartels and independents continue to prosper, and the American people are saddled with outrageous costs for enforcement, prosecution, incarceration, etc., when in reality, there are no Federal or State drug laws applicable in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Drug laws are predicated on revenue laws -- customs duties. They originated in commercial trade treaties in the early part of the Twentieth Century, particularly after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Congress promulgated the China Trade Act in 1904, which regulated trade in opium, cocaine, and citric wines, then step-by-step moved by illusion into efforts to regulate sale and distribution of these commodities. The Labeling Act of 1906 appears to be the first significant domestic step, then the Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, as amended, was used as the vehicle for perpetrating the illusion of legitimate prohibition against these commodities in the environment of national alcohol prohibition. International agreements which provide the foundation for what appears to be domestic law were effected in 1912. This matter is taken up in a subsequent section.

Leaving the drug subject, we will consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules for regulations pertaining to firearms laws in title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930). Of necessity, tracking these authorities gets pretty bogged down in "legalese", so forgive complicated sentence structure and what amount to lists of authorities: Regulations for 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 are at 27 CFR, Part 178; an additional regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 921 (definition) is at 27 CFR, Part 72; and an additional regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 926 (rules and regulations), is at 27 CFR, Part 200.

The general application regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 921-930 is 27 CFR, Part 178, located in Subchapter M -- Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Excise Taxes, Part 178 pertaining to commerce in firearms and ammunition. Part 72 is in Subchapter F -- Procedures and Practices, and relates to disposition of seized personal property; Part 200 is in Subchapter M -- Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Excise Taxes, and pertains to rules of practice in permit proceedings. The definition of "State" at 18 U.S.C. § 921 narrows the geographical application to territories and insular possessions of the United States, as does the lack of IRS/BATF authority to establish revenue districts under authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7621, and the fact that these are excise taxes rather than import duties further verifies that application is in insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia, exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution. There is no constitutional provision whatever vesting Congress with authority to regulate production, distribution and sale of firearms and ammunition within the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Under Article I authority, Congress could legitimately impose an excise tax on production and distribution of firearms, but the legislation would have to be for taxing purposes only, not regulation of who can or cannot purchase firearms and ammunition.

At this juncture it would be useful to reiterate that in June 1921, Congress effectively hid the Treasury of the United States by creating the General Accounting Office, under direction of the Comptroller General, then moved Treasury employees to GAO. GAO is an independent agency or department, and serves as general agent of the Treasury of the United States, in charge of determining legitimacy of all claims of or against the United States. A claim against the United States cannot be adjudicated in courts of the United States unless it has first been submitted to, and rejected by GAO. This is the reason so many cases against the Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, IRS revenue agents, the "United States", etc., are dismissed as stating claims on which relief cannot be granted -- whoever initiates these cases doesn't know the claim must first be submitted to GAO.26

The Department of the Treasury is an administrative agency, it is not the Treasury of the United States -- the Treasury of the United States, established while Congress was still convened under the Articles of Confederation, predates the Constitution, but was reestablished by Congress under the Constitution via the act of September 2, 1789. It has always been under congressional supervision. The Department of the Treasury of the United States has precious little authority in the Union of several States.

We will conclude this section with rationale behind Cooperative Federalism: Probably the most important legislation in 1913 was the Federal Reserve Act. The nation had two national or central banks in the early going, but the charters of both were terminated and the banks abolished. In 1836, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill Congress intended to renew the charter of the second, his rationale simple and to the point: The Constitution does not delegate authority for Congress to establish a national bank. It still doesn't. Yet in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act created a more ominous entity than a national bank as the Federal Reserve System literally has power to expand or contract the entire economy by regulation of key interest rates and bank reserves. None of these powers are delegated by the Constitution, so creation of the Federal Reserve System had to be under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power in territory belonging to the United States. With and subsequent to the Federal Reserve Act came fraudulent, nonconstitutional credit and monetary systems.

Once fraudulent credit and monetary systems, and economic controls were in place, the balance of Federal government had to be moved under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative authority in territory belonging to the United States. In this section, we have demonstrated the move by examining five essential authorities. Laws of the United States evidenced in the United States Code nearly all apply (1) to officers and employees of the United States, (2) to territories and insular possessions of the United States, and/or (3) to maritime and admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and do not have general application in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Breakdown of Drug & Internal Revenue Laws

Proof of the pudding is in the tasting. If historical evidence and authorities addressed thus far hold true, it should be reasonably easy to demonstrate that Federal drug laws, which account for about 60% of the cases prosecuted in United States District Courts, and internal revenue laws categorized in the Internal Revenue Code, are applicable only in the three jurisdictions excluded from the Federal Register Act: Application of these two categories of laws should apply solely to (1) officers and employees of United States government and governments of political subdivisions of the United States, (2) in United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and (3) in territories and insular possessions of the United States.

I. Application of Federal Drug Control Laws

Probably the place to begin on the subject of controlled substances is with Congressional findings and declarations relating to controlled substances, framed in Public Law 91-513, title II, Sec. 101, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, the statement classified at 21 U.S.C. § 801: The Congress makes the following findings and declarations: I have never advocated use of nonprescription drugs, and through the years have seen negative and disastrous effects from abuse of both prescription and street drugs. On the other hand, many of my contemporaries, particularly in the university setting, used various so-called illegal substances in the way social drinkers drink, with most leading productive lives in school and work environments. Casual, social, or recreational use, whatever the descriptive terminology should be, did not seem to adversely affect whatever pursuits they were involved in. With my commitment to ministry, I find it impossible to tell people that use of drugs or alcohol to the point judgment is impaired is proper. But I also recognize that freedom of choice is indispensable to liberty. God put the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden, then told Adam and Eve not to eat the fruit, but he didn't put a fence around it. They were free to exercise choice -- they could be obedient or disobedient. That's one context the entire faith community must consider when tackling the problem of drug laws. From experience and observation, I'm increasingly convinced that government cannot function as moral custodian. This is particularly the case when politicians responsible for legislation, and those responsible for enforcement, are morally derelict to begin with. In light of what has already been addressed, it's difficult to claim that any branch of government is morally motivated. At the same time there is increasing prosecution of so-called vice, there is increasing regulation of family an community in all other aspects of life, with the church being one of the targets of ever-tighter regulation.

The second context is this: Sometimes a cure is worse than the disease. Surgery can be successful, but the patient still die. That is certainly the case for Federal and State drug laws. If production and distribution of what are now controlled substances were regulated in somewhat the fashion State governments regulate production and sale of alcoholic beverages, freedom of choice for adults would be preserved, the cost of enforcement, prosecution, and correction would be greatly reduced, and inflated street prices would be undermined sufficiently that coffers of organized crime wouldn't be nearly as enriched.

The third context is most important: If and when government exceeds constitutionally delegated powers, those responsible, regardless of how righteous-sounding the cause, are engaged in rebellion against the sovereign people, disdaining the constitutional republic. The first transgression is worst as if successful, it invariably leads to further encroachment and eventually to institutionalized tyranny. That's precisely what we're addressing -- government out of control. So far as the essence of authority and the necessity of preserving constitutional integrity are concerned, former Chief Justice John Marshall addressed the matter as eloquently as anyone in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60:

On the surface, Congressional findings and declarations in 21 U.S.C. § 801 are high-sounding and even have a righteous ring. However, the first defect on the face of the statement is in subsection (7): "The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in controlled substances."

Condemnation doesn't have to be elaborate. "So what?" is sufficient. If the Constitution doesn't delegate authority via an enumerated power, it makes no difference how many conventions, treaties, accords or whatever Congress and/or the President enters, application cannot be to the Union of several States. Congress and the Administration cannot use treaties and other forms of foreign agreements to enlarge constitutionally delegated powers. Unless or until there is a constitutional amendment delegating regulatory authority pertaining to some commodity, Federal regulatory authority doesn't exist in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Per Chief Justice Marshall, the enactment is not and cannot be law of the land as there is no constitutional authority to make such a law. The enactment might be popular in some quarters, but that is precisely what the Constitution is designed to guard against -- imposition of the politically popular and expedient that encroaches on unalienable rights of those who don't happen to be in vogue and in tune with bandwagon politics. The enactment, if not within the scope of powers enumerated in the Constitution can have no lawful effect.

The next flaw in the proclamation is the string of presumptions concerning interstate and foreign commerce. They wipe out State and local sovereignty, setting the stage for what amount to bills of attainder, prohibited at Article I § 9.3 for government of the United States, and Article I § 10.1 for governments of the several States. These kinds of presumption, prosecuted in the course of the civil law, constituted major grievances American founders addressed to King George III and the British Parliament in the Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of Independence -- they were plagued by vice-admiralty courts in which presumption, contrary to the course of the common law, played a significant role. "The will of the prince is law," -- in this case, Congress --, is foreign and repugnant to eight centuries of English-American juris prudence. In street language, whoever manufactured the Congressional findings and declarations statement in § 801 was a sick puppy -- the rationalization is thin veneer for institutionalizing tyranny which by way of what amounts to a private army daily plunders and imprisons sovereign American people.

However, as is the case with other elements of law we've treated, we can examine application of this general statement to the Union of several States via the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and demonstrate that the law does not and never has applied to the several States party to the Constitution. The only regulation listed for 21 U.S.C. § 801 is 21 CFR § 5, which relates to delegation of authority and organization of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Human Services. The underlying authority, Pub. L. 91-513, has an additional regulation at 42 CFR § 2a, which prescribes regulations for protection of the identity of research subjects. This regulation is the only one for surviving portions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. However, as other core legislation relating to other matters, Pub. L. 91-513 has been amended several times, so all the amendments should be examined in light of implementing regulations. The list follows:

Since most of the public laws pertaining to drugs enacted since 1970 are cited in notes following 21 U.S.C. § 801, they can be listed in chronological order with authorities attributed to them in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. The Public Law is listed on the left, with applicable regulations on the right. Where more than one regulation is listed for any given title of the Code of Federal Regulations, the double "§§" indicates that more than one regulation is accounted for: It shouldn't be surprising that the Coast Guard, under 33 CFR § 1, promulgated under authority of Pub. L. 100-690, has the only delegated criminal enforcement authority with teeth. The authority relates to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and insular possessions of the United States. No enforcement authority under any of the laws above apply in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

It will be useful to reproduce 21 U.S.C. § 953(a) as this section lists the various "conventions" that allegedly provide authority relating to drug trade and distribution. Title 21 pertains to Food and Drugs, the section is in Chapter 13 -- Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, Subchapter II -- Import and export:

Regulations for 21 U.S.C. § 953 are listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules as being 19 CFR § 162 and 21 CFR § 1312. They are as follows: The companion import section is at 21 U.S.C. § 952, reproduced below in its entirety: Regulations for 21 U.S.C. § 952 are listed as 19 CFR § 162, and 21 CFR §§ 1311 & 1312. Two of the three are set out above, so only 21 CFR § 1311 needs to be accounted for: We will continue with statutory and regulatory examination, but at this juncture, certain things are already obvious. Through analysis of the three Title 21 United States Code sections, and the various public laws listed above, none of the licensing, regulation, and civil and criminal enforcement authority pertaining to controlled substances reaches into the Union of several States save as they might pertain to someone involved in importing or exporting the substances. Next, regulations vest authority in the Coast Guard, which in times of war is under authority of the Navy and in peacetime is under authority of the Department of Transportation, in the United States Customs Service, which is a bureau in the Department of Treasury, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is a department or bureau in the Department of Justice. Licensing and regulation of import and export is left to discretion of the Attorney General. Yet statutory authority of the Attorney General for enforcement at 28 U.S.C. § 535, treated earlier, is limited to investigation of officers and employees of United States government. It is also important that the Drug Enforcement Administration was created by a Presidential reorganization plan, not by Congress, the current Coast Guard is something other than what it originally was, and United States Customs Service is an administrative creation distinct from the original created by Congress. These factors all support the notion that even export and import regulation applies only to the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, not the Union of several States party to the Constitution. In other words, export and import licensing requirements apply only in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, and conceivably in the District of Columbia. If this is the case, we should be able to verify application.

Sections relating to drug abuse prevention and control are contained in Chapter 13 of Title 21. What we're looking for is the section with definitions, located at 21 U.S.C. § 802, in Subchapter I -- Control and Enforcement, Part A -- Introductory Provisions. The critical definitions are at 21 U.S.C. § 802(26) & (28):

Are Oklahoma, Texas, Minnesota, California, and New York, States of the United States? Hardly. They are States of the Union. They are semi-independent States that have legislative autonomy within the framework of constitutional mandates and prohibitions, and as the Constitution vests authority in United States Government. States of the United States, in the geographical sense, include territories and insular possessions subject to Congress' legislative jurisdiction under territorial clause authority. All examples in the list of States of the United States in the definition of "State" at 21 U.S.C. § 802(26) are territories and possessions of the United States. Collectively, these States of the United States constitute the "geographical United States." Where general powers of the United States relating to the Union of several States are concerned, geography, so far as it pertains to land owned and occupied by the United States, is irrelevant. The United States technically has subject matter jurisdiction, not geographical or territorial jurisdiction in the several States. Since there is no constitutionally enumerated power for the United States to regulate drugs and other commodities in the several States, legislation evidenced in Chapter 13 of Title 21 of the United States Code must of necessity be promulgated under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction in the geographical United States. If not, it is patently unconstitutional and of no lawful effect, per Marbury v. Madison.

To continue the analysis: Chapter 13 of Title 21 is divided into two subchapters: Subchapter I -- Control and Enforcement, includes §§ 801-904; Subchapter II -- Import and Export, includes 951-958. Definitions at 21 § 802(26) & (28), apply to Subchapter I. For obvious reasons, enforcement statutes in Subchapter I are of primary concern as (1) territorial civil and criminal prosecution is the primary concern, and (2) import and export requirements in Subchapter II of necessity rely on territorial application in Subchapter I.

At the onset, it is useful to establish that the Attorney General must promulgate regulations for statutory authority evidenced in Subchapter I. This requirement is set out at 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a) § 721:

This laborious task might not make the Attorney General a happy camper, but by employing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules and the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts, we will examine what rules and regulations the Attorney General has promulgated for key sections in Subchapter I. Per 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a), reproduced earlier, each document or order that imposes a penalty is construed as having general application, so all penalty statutes must have properly promulgated regulations. Additionally, regulations for the Federal Register Act require that the Attorney General keep the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules current (44 U.S.C. § 1510; 1 CFR § 8.5 & elsewhere), so if there is error, fault lies with the Attorney General, nobody else. However, I have every confidence that the current Attorney General and her predecessors have all been virtuous, competent people dedicated to upholding and defending the Constitution and laws of the United States, as respectively required to pledge by oath, so we can rely on truth being revealed via this analysis.

Code sections will be listed on the left, with section nomenclature on the right, then regulatory application will follow in the right column with a paragraph for each CFR title; multiple regulations in any given CFR title will be listed in the same paragraph sequentially. The double "§§" will denote two or more parts in the same CFR title. Because of the way regulations are listed in the Table, precise application in some instances is difficult to determine, so to give the Attorney General every benefit of the doubt, where there is question, a regulation that might apply to any given U.S.C. section will be listed for the questionable section.

It appears that there may be a potential for civil penalties for inappropriate drug-related behavior on postal property, but other than that, there are no implementing regulations for any penalty section in Subchapter I of Chapter 13, of Title 21 of the United States Code. Continuing criminal enterprise is addressed by the Bureau of Prisons through transfer, classification, etc., but as previously demonstrated, the Attorney General may not imprison anyone who isn't charged with or convicted of an offense prescribed by "Act of Congress", such Act, per Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, applicable in, "... the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession."

There might be regulations of sorts pertaining to registration, reporting requirements, etc., but there is no need to pursue the matter as there is no civil or criminal enforcement authority within the several States behind any of these regulations, so even if import/export registration requirements are in place, we're left with the same question posed in the beginning: "So what?"

The more obvious default is at 21 U.S.C. § 852: There are no implementing regulations applicable to the Union of several States and the American people at large for treaties and other international agreements pertaining to regulation of controlled substances. The entire body of drug-related legislation, beginning with the Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, has been predicated on these treaties and agreements. They simply do not apply to or in the Union of several States party to the Constitution as there is no constitutionally delegated authority for Congress to regulate any of the commodities itemized in the various schedules of controlled substances.

Where do these laws apply? In insular possessions of the United States, as evidenced at 48 U.S.C. § 1494b. We'll reproduce only subsection (a), as relates to American Samoa, as there is no need to repeat the same thing for Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Paulo, all included in the section:

It is useful for orientation to reproduce a portion of one of the four opinions submitted in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), which by plurality established what is called the Downes Doctrine for insular possessions such as Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, etc. The portion below does not address unincorporated insular possessions as such, but provides a perspective of territories v. the several States in general, and the long-held doctrine that once the Constitution has been extended even in a territorial possession of the United States, it cannot be withdrawn. In Downes, the plurality opinion concluded that unincorporated insular possessions enjoy constitutional assurances, benefits, and privileges only as Congress extends them, thus removing them a step from assurances secured in the District of Columbia and former incorporated territories, but this opinion segment (1) demonstrates the distinction between territory owned by the United States and the several States party to the Constitution, and (2) articulates the prohibition against Congress infringing on the Constitution once it has been extended to any given territory, whether the territory is a State of the Union or territory of the United States. The cite is Downes v. Bidwell, 21 S.Ct. 770, 182 U.S. 244, 45 L.Ed. 1088, at 182 U.S. 269: Eliminating, then, from the opinions of this court all expressions unnecessary to the disposition of the particular case, and gleaning therefrom the exact point decided in each, the following propositions may be considered as established: The issue in Downes was whether or not the Article I tax uniformity clause applied to commodities shipped from unincorporated insular possessions to the several States party to the Constitution. After hammering at the issue from every conceivable direction, without a majority of the justices standing on any single opinion, the plurality opinion conceded that insular possessions ceded by Spain in 1898 were not incorporated in the constitutional scheme, and therefore were foreign as Congress had not formally extended the Constitution to the former Spanish provinces. That had been the case in Utah, however, as pointed out in the opinion above, but even though the Constitution might be applicable in the District of Columbia and incorporated territories, Article III judicial authority of the United States does not extend to them. They are subject to Congress' plenary power (combined power of State and national government) under the Article IV § 3.2 territorial clause to the point the territory is admitted as a State of the Union.

Point 6 above is particularly important: "That where the Constitution has been once formally extended by Congress to territories, neither Congress nor the territorial legislature can enact laws inconsistent therewith."

If that's the case for territories, it's doubly the case for Congress and legislatures of the several States party to the Constitution: The Constitution of the United States is the law of the land in each of the several States, per mandate of the Constitution and constitutions of each of the several States. The Constitution of the State of Oklahoma sets this proclamation out in Article I, Section 1 -- not part of it, but all of it, with the Tenth Article of Amendment prohibition against government of the United States exercising power not delegated by the Constitution fully intact.

The circle is closed: The Constitution does not delegate authority for Congress to regulate drugs or any other commodity. Regulations applicable to drug laws demonstrate that where "domestic" application of these laws is concerned, they amount to municipal law in insular possessions of the United States, with possible application in the District of Columbia. They do not apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

II. Application of Internal Revenue Code Taxing Authority

Application of Federal tax laws, authority of the Internal Revenue Service, and various matters relating to the Internal Revenue Code have been addressed throughout this effort, so there is no need to reproduce every detail covered to this point. However, one of the more important points that needs to be emphasized is that Title 26 of the United States Code, as other titles of the Code, is not law -- it is merely evidence of law. Where the Internal Revenue Code is concerned, it has not been enacted as positive law so doesn't even qualify as "legal evidence". It is merely "prima facie" the law.

Without hairsplitting, it is probably fair to say the Internal Revenue Code is law by appearance. In order to unravel the Code so each tax accounted for in it, and application of administrative and judicial sections in Subtitle F could be properly interpreted, it would probably be necessary to track United States tax and judicial legislation to the time Congress convened under the Constitution in 1789, which would require pouring over the complete Statutes at Large (they take about 200 feet of shelf space), Treasury orders, treaties, reorganization plans, and volumes of court decisions. In fact, the Code has been defaulted as void for vagueness as it is impossible for most so-called experts to understand -- mere mortals get impossibly lost in it. The only real favor in the thing is the general disclaimer at 26 U.S.C. § 7806:

The fact that Title 26 has never been enacted as positive law, which would make it "legal evidence" of laws of the United States, is verified in the Preface to the 1994 edition of the United States Code, produced in the first volume of the complete Code. Therefore, it remains prima facie evidence of law, but legislative construction cannot be assumed even where one section follows another in numerical sequence, classification by subtitle, chapter, subchapter, or whatever. Each section must be tracked to its original source or sources in the Statutes at Large in order to determine legitimate application, the section must be wed to one or more general application regulations, proper lines of authority must be established, etc., before a section can be said to have "legislative construction."

Since this effort isn't intended to provide thorough treatment and a complete history of United States tax law, I've limited focus to underlying authorities and the legitimacy of agencies involved in the collection process and enforcement of the Federal taxing system. That will generally be the case in this section, although we will investigate some of the historical evolution of the current system.

One of the key questions is, "Where did the Internal Revenue Code come from?"

The first true "Internal Revenue Code" was the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. It seems that the 1939 Code was the point of demarcation for the Code we presently have as it was effected after the "Normal Tax" in the present Subtitle A, and Social Security and related taxes enacted in 1935 were on line. To that point, there was no effort to extend normal tax obligations to the general population -- the normal tax was simply a tax on officers and employees of United States government, governments of United States political subdivisions, and officers of corporations in which United States government has a proprietary interest. That remains the case today, the term "employee" defined at 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c), and "employer" at § 3401(d):

These definitions are applicable to Subtitle C, Chapter 24 -- Collection of Income Tax At Source. The requirement for withholding is at § 3402: Liability is prescribed at §§ 3403 & 3404: Liability for collection, and payment, ultimately falls to withholding agents, or in the event of a third-party payee, the third party. Liability is established in Chapter 25 -- General Provisions Relating to Employment Taxes and Collection of Income Taxes at Source, §§ 3504 & 3505: At no point is the "employee" made liable for these taxes. The lot falls to the officer or employee designated to withhold directly from wages, or to the lender, surety, or other person who supplies funds for whatever enterprise the tax is imposed against. We could chase this in a circle, but will simply cite the definition of "withholding agent" at § 7701(a)((16) to put other statutes into play: Before addressing the withholding agent further, we'll cite other definitions in § 7701(a) as useful keys to unraveling the Code. Of particular import, the definitions of "United States", "State", and "Trade or business". The latter opens the door to taxes prescribed in Subtitles A & C, so it will be cited first: By employing the two limiting principles cited earlier, the above general definition applicable to the Internal Revenue Code limits consideration to the class of "trade or business" defined by example. Private enterprise is excluded from "trade or business" where the Internal Revenue Code is concerned. The field is thus narrowed to definitions of "employee" and "employer" at §§ 3401(c) & (d). The range of applicability is further narrowed by definitions of "United States" and "State": We previously saw from the Downes decision that the District of Columbia, and territories and insular possessions of the United States, are not States of the Union where the Constitution is concerned. Therefore, the exclusionary language in the two definitions above, when reliant on use "in a geographical sense," must be exclusive of the several States party to the Constitution. This reinforces Paul Mitchell's contention that the Internal Revenue Code is for all practical purposes municipal law applicable in territory subject to sovereignty of the United States under Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. With the possible exception of the "normal tax" prescribed in Chapter 1, Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, the rest of the taxes in Title 26 are applicable only in the States of the United States, which include insular possessions of the United States, except where the District of Columbia is specifically incorporated, as is the case in the definitions of "United States" and "State" at §§ 7701(a)(9) & (10). Definitions at § 3102(e), relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, will be reproduced here again for comparative expediency as they are more explicit: Given these definitions, a "United States trade or business" can at best be expanded to an officer or employee of United States government, and a "State trade or business" to an officer or employee of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and governments of other insular possessions of the United States. Application of these taxes is therefore exclusive of (1) private enterprise, and (2) public office in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. The bridge the several States have used has generally been the Buck Act, located in Title 4 of the United States Code. There are no implementing regulations for Title 4 (Title 4 of the Code of Federal Regulations pertains to Accounts, and is under administration of the General Accounting Office in conjunction with the Department of Justice), so the bridge is as much illusion as other elements of Cooperative Federalism. Definitions in the Buck Act reinforce this conclusion.

The liability issue is clarified in regulations for §§ 1441, 1442, 1443 & 1446, with applicable regulations in 26 CFR §§ 1, 31 & 301; i.e., 26 CFR § 1.1441, 31.1441 & 301.1441, etc. Consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules to determine which are general application regulations, but study all regulations pertaining to these sections whether they are listed as having general application or not.

In a previous section, I made two assertions that may have seemed outrageous: First, Congress effectively hid the Treasury of the United States in June 1921 by creating the General Accounting Office and moving former Treasury personnel to the office under supervision of the Comptroller General, then via the act of Nov. 23, 1921, repealed virtually all taxes authorized by Article I and the Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, with the various taxes, when reenacted, applicable exclusively within territory of the United States. The revenue act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, is at 42 Stat. 227; creation of the General Accounting Office and transfer of Treasury employees is at 42 Stat. 23. For purposes here, Historical and Revision Notes following 5 U.S.C. § 5512 follow:

Responsibility of the Comptroller General, as head of the General Accounting Office, is preserved in the current United States Code at 31 U.S.C. § 3702, Title 31 relating to Money and Finance: Unless or until a claim is submitted to the Comptroller General, in his capacity as head of the General Accounting Office, courts of the United States may not adjudicate it -- suit for a claim which has not been denied by the General Accounting Office presents a claim for which relief may not be granted. Consequently, a suit against the United States, the Internal Revenue Service, or any other governmental entity will go nowhere until such time as the General Accounting Office makes a determination.

When the government makes a claim, the head of an executive or legislative agency has first responsibility for the attempted collection, as specified at 31 U.S.C. § 3711:

The portion of Subsection (f)(1) was included simply to demonstrate that collection of taxes prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code is included in the collection and compromise process prescribed in 31 U.S.C. § 3711. The initial collection effort, or negotiation on a claim, begins with the agency head, then goes to the Comptroller General or his delegate in the General Accounting Office if collection isn't successful or a claim against an agency isn't paid (compromised). If the Comptroller General determines that collection should be effected where a claim isn't paid, he is then responsible, via the Attorney General in his capacity as Solicitor of the Treasury, for initiating litigation. Where officers and employees of the United States subject to normal tax withholding are concerned, the necessity of this process is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5512: Section 5512 tacitly provides the avenue for litigating contested assessments. Administrative withholding to satisfy a claim of the United States may be accomplished in only one of two ways: (1) consent on the part of the party withholding is from, or (2) litigation in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the "individual" the assessment is against contests and rejects whatever assessment lies against him, he "requests" that the General Accounting Office, via the Attorney General, initiate suit for collection -- he does not consent to administrative collection without proper judicial process. This is verified in the section on garnishment at 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(b): There is a small encumbrance to administrative seizure and admiralty/maritime seizure (in rem and in personam) actions employed by the Internal Revenue Service. The Fifth Article of Amendment due process clause is an absolute barrier -- "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." Per Wayman v. Southard (1825), cited earlier, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment assure due process in the course of the common law. Even United States government is obligated by contract to pay wages for work performed, so in the event an alleged liability is contested, the matter must be litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of the common law. Although linguistically tortured, 5 U.S.C. § 5512 preserves this constitutionally-secured right even for officers and employees of United States government.

Now back to the Internal Revenue Code, at § 7805:

Never-ending word games -- the Treasury Department is not the Department of the Treasury. The reference above is to the Treasury of the United States, which has always been under congressional supervision. The General Accounting Office, via the June 1921 act cited above, became general agent of the Treasury of the United States, under supervision of the Comptroller General -- due to recent legislation, GAO is now under a Director rather than the Comptroller General so titles are about to change again. Oh, what tangled webs they weave. At any rate, the Secretary isn't responsible for promulgating regulations for GAO -- consult Title 4 of the Code of Federal Regulations for most of those regulations -- but he is responsible for regulations pertaining to all other agencies that enforce Internal Revenue Code provisions.

In order to come to terms with this hocus-pocus, we're going back to definitions (11) & (12) in § 7701(a):

The Treasury Department still isn't the Department of the Treasury. The delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury in the United States is, "any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department..." The General Accounting Office is general agent of the Treasury of the United States; the Director, formerly the Comptroller General, is head of the General Accounting Office.

The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, both in the lineage of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, created by the provisional government of Puerto Rico in approximately 1900. These agencies are delegates of the Secretary in insular possessions of the United States, Guam and American Samoa evidently included. They operate in the framework of authority delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury via E.O. # 10289, and redelegated to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue via T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. #150-01 (1986). They have absolutely no constitutional or statutory authority in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Our focus is on Chapter 80 -- General Rules, Subchapter A. -- Application of Internal Revenue Laws. The subchapter includes §§ 7801-7811. Via § 7806, we established that the Internal Revenue Code is merely prima facie the law, no inference of legislative construction can be given to any section in the Code, and under stipulation of whatever legislation lies behind § 7805(a), the General Accounting Office is the delegate of the Secretary as general agent of the Treasury of the United States. Granted, we've gone around Robin Hood's barn to get where we're headed, but we've finally arrived at what may be the most critical and pivotal section in the Code, § 7804, which is in Chapter 80, Subchapter A:

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large), as amended in 1986, is evidenced in Title 26 of the United States Code. But even Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large is simply an amalgamation of the various Federal tax laws enacted through the years. It is not the original acts themselves, and it is in many respects incomplete. Examining historical transition of the Internal Revenue Code is important to help grasp implications of § 7804.

The biggest departure from the 1939 Code to the 1954 Code was administrative in nature, effected by the two reorganization plans listed in § 7804. Most of the administrative changes involved transfer of collection responsibilities from directly appointed revenue agents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, a "professional" service. President Harry S. Truman's January 14, 1952 letter to Congress, which accompanied Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1952, explains rationale and the process, reproduced below in relative part (full text follows § 7804 in Title 26 U.S.C.):

Mr. Truman's rationale had the ring of sincerity, and no doubt there is some merit in what he presented. But the letter also makes important disclosures: The "archaic statutory office of collector of internal revenue," which was administratively abolished by Reorganization Plan 1 of 1952, was not attached to the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department of the Treasury. The collector of internal revenue was attached to the Treasury Department, a/k/a Treasury of the United States, the Treasury being under congressional rather than executive control. The position was appointed, and as the U.S. Marshal, district judges, court clerks, United States Attorneys, etc., the collector of internal revenue was required to live in whatever district he was appointed to. He was accountable to the community in the same way local public servants are.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt used somewhat the same rationale to extend Bureau of Internal Revenue authority over the Federal Alcohol Administration Act via Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940. In relative part, Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Congress of April 2, 1940 is reproduced below:

Succession of administration of Federal law relating to distilled spirits is reflected in a note on page 762 of The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition: Per Mr. Roosevelt's letter of April 2, 1940, it appears that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, moved into the breach prior to Reorganization Plan III of 1940 -- his letter discloses that BIR, with no statutory authority, was already performing many of the functions of the Federal Alcohol Administration, which was to have replaced the Federal Alcohol Control Administration in August 1935. A director for the Federal Alcohol Administration was appointed, but the Administration itself was never activated as the Constantine case was pending, and it appeared that repeal of the Eighteenth Article of Amendment in December 1933 was finally going to end concurrent State and Federal jurisdiction relating to regulation of production and distribution of alcoholic beverages. The Twenty-first Article of Amendment placed production and distribution of drinking alcohol under State option; concurrent State and Federal jurisdiction was secured in Section 2 of the Eighteenth Article of Amendment, had not been preserved with ratification of the Twenty-first. Therefore, Federal enforcement relating to alcohol, tobacco and firearms, now under jurisdiction of BATF, had to be limited to territory and other property of the United States, and United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Reorganization Plan III of 1940 came nearly five years after the Constantine decision, long enough for Federal encroachment into certain areas to be under the cloak of forgetfulness, and for the general environment of the New Deal, launched in March 1933, to condition people to more direct involvement in everyday life. The illusion, however, didn't change the reality of law any more then than now -- Congress didn't create the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and has never implemented anything resembling statutory authority for IRS and BATF to establish revenue districts of any sort in the several States.

Both Roosevelt and Truman abolished statutory offices and agencies, replacing them with administratively-created offices, and sometimes agencies, and where the Federal tax system is concerned, progressively moved collection and enforcement activity under administration of the Puerto Rican Bureau of Internal Revenue. For about a year in the 1930s, a Bureau of Internal Revenue had been incorporated as a private enterprise in a Northeastern State, but the corporation was abolished. The Puerto Rico link was evidently sufficient, particularly since the Social Security Act of 1935 had specified administration by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with definitions at 26 U.S.C. § 3121 & 26 CFR § 31.3121 verifying exclusive United States territorial application. Origins are also verified by definitions at 27 CFR § 250.11:

In order not to leave a stone unturned, we will go as far as possible to unearth sources, the first source being presidential authority for reorganization plans. President Roosevelt enacted reorganization plans under the act under an older reorganization plan statute, where Mr. Truman issued reorganization plans under the act of June 20, 1949, ch. 226, Sec. 3, 63 Stat. 203, which is no longer listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, replaced by Pub. L. 89-554 of Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 394, and amended several times since. Application of current public laws will be examined momentarily, but first, the Code section evidencing authority for the President to implement reorganization plans should be considered, 5 U.S.C. § 903: Criteria in § 901 requires justification of reorganization plans according to standards of economy and efficiency -- there is no need to reproduce the section here. We'll simply examine authority of 5 U.S.C. § 9, and existing public laws which provide underlying authority for reorganization plans.

In the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, the general application regulation for 5 U.S.C. § 903 is listed as 28 CFR § 45:

As in similar analysis, the public law is listed on the left, with regulations on the right: The underlying authority for presidents to promulgate reorganization plans is consistent with previous analysis relating to other subjects: The reorganization may apply solely to (1) government of the United States and political subdivisions of the United States, (2) United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and (3) territories and insular possessions of the United States. There is no application to the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

We can now address the three reorganization plans: Section 2 of Reorganization Plan III of 1940, which placed administration of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act under administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue was repealed by Pub. L. 95-258, Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085. Possibly it is a relief to some that Congress finally did something decisive, but as it turns out, there are no general application regulations listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules for Pub. L. 95-258, either. Consequently, the original transfer of authority for administration of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico still doesn't apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. In light of what has already been proven, the conclusion shouldn't be overly surprising.

Next, Reorganization Plan 26 of 1950, cited in 26 U.S.C. § 7804: The four sections in this reorganization plan were repealed by 1972 & 1982 legislation, again demonstrating that Congress has a will of its own. Section 1 was repealed by Pub. L. 97-258, Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat 1068, 1085, "see" references as 31 U.S.C. § 321 & 49 U.S.C. § 108; Section 2 was repealed by Pub. L. 97-258, Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085, "see" reference as 31 U.S.C. § 321; Section 3 was repealed by Pub. L. 92-302, Sec. 1(d), May 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 149, "see" reference at 31 U.S.C. § 301; Section 4 was repealed by Pub. L. 97-258, Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085, "see" reference at 31 U.S.C. § 321.

No general application regulations for the two public laws are listed, so it will be useful to examine the United States Code sections listed as "see" references: 31 U.S.C. §§ 301 & 321, and 49 U.S.C. § 108. There are no general application regulations listed for 31 U.S.C. § 301, Title 31 being Money and Finance, § 301 pertaining to organization of the Department of the Treasury, or 49 U.S.C. § 49, Title 49 being Transportation, and § 108 establishing the Coast Guard as a department or agency in the Department of Transportation during peacetime. There are, however, a crop of regulations for 31 U.S.C. § 321, which prescribes general authority of the Secretary of the Treasury. All the general applications regulations listed are in Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Money and Finance: Treasury, with none pertaining to Title 26. The listed regulations are as follows: 31 CFR §§ 1, 2, 10, 19, 21, 25, 26, 205, 206, 210, 337, 413 & 601. It's obvious that few if any of these regulations have much to do with the Internal Revenue Code and regulations promulgated thereunder, but true to resolve to look under every rock, each of these regulations will be accounted for:

It's nice to see that the Secret Service has regulatory authority to close streets near the White House, which is incidentally located in the District of Columbia (this is another Department of the Treasury agency or Bureau that has little or no legitimate authority in the several States), and that the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is required to use distinctive paper for United States currency and other securities. However, none of the regulations above directly mandate filing tax returns, etc., as might be expected from regulations promulgated under authority of Reorganization Plan 26 of 1950 and Public Laws that replaced the four sections of the plan.

Next we turn to Reorganization Plan 1 of 1952. Except for repeal of Section 2(b) via Pub. L. 97-258, Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1068, 1085, this plan has been left intact. Subsection 2(b) established the office of Assistant General Counsel, 31 U.S.C. § 301. Section 3, which relates to appointment and compensation of Assistant Commissioners and district commissioners, now probably district directors, and the Assistant General Counsel, was amended via act of June 28, 1955, ch. 189, Sec. 12(c)(19), 69 Stat. 182. By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, it is found that there are no general application regulations promulgated for Reorganization Plan 1 of 1952, the act that repealed Section 2, the act that amended Section 3, or 31 U.S.C. § 301.

It would appear that authorities have been exhausted, but thanks to an IRS Internet reply to Alan Tenore (Oct. 12, 1998; IDENTIFIER: irsnash5 #83778; http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/help/email-survey.html for a survey exercise, or http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/help/newmail/user.html for questions), we need to address original enactments of the Internal Revenue Code.

Per the prepared response, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted August 16, 1954, Pub. Law 591, then amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514. Although neither of these cites is complete, the act of 1954 is Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, and the 1968 Public Law number can be referenced in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules.

In the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, Public Law cites begin with the 80th Congress, numbering being changed to reflect the Congress and the number of the law enacted in that particular session. The first Public Law listing using this numbering system is Public Law 80-806. Prior to that, the listing is by location in the Statutes at Large. For example, the 98th volume of the Statutes at Large, page 42 = 98 Stat. 42.

By turning to page 810 of the 1996 Code of Federal Regulations Index volume, it is found that Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large is not listed. However, sections in Volumes 68 and 69 are. Consequently, the conclusion must be that there are no implementing regulations for Volume 68A of the Statutes at Large, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, or successive Secretaries of the Treasury have been derelict in their respective duties over a period spanning approximately 44 years. However, there are regulations listed for the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, so there must be an explanation for oversight of some kind relating to Vol. 68A. Regulations listed for Pub. L. 99-514 go a ways toward explaining the defect.

Pub. L. 99-514 appears on page 821 of the 1996 CFR Index volume. Listed regulations are 19 CFR § 354 and 26 CFR § 31.

The first regulation is reasonably easy to dispose of: Title 19 -- Customs Duties; Chapter III -- International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce (Parts 300-399); § 354, Procedures for imposing sanctions for violation of an antidumping or countervailing duty protective order.

The regulation which on the surface appears to be problematic is 26 CFR § 31: Title 26 -- Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury (Parts 1-799); Subchapter C -- Employment Taxes and Collection of Income Tax at Source; § 31, Employment taxes and collection of income tax at source.

The first clue to 26 CFR § 31 application is the fact that all Chapter I regulations in Title 26 of the CFR are promulgated for Internal Revenue Service administration. They must be applicable in United States territorial, and conceivably in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and as applicable to officers and employees of the United States and it's political subdivisions. However, because we have the cited regulation as applicable under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, we should investigate further to see if 26 CFR § 31 complies with authorities thus far established.

A cursory survey of authorities listed under "Authority 26 U.S.C. 7805", which requires the Secretary to promulgate regulations (Title 26 -- Internal Revenue, volume containing parts 30-39, April 1, 1998 Edition, pages 10 & 11), fails to list Pub. L. 99-514 as any unique authority for § 31. Authority appears to emerge almost exclusively from Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large, with the exception of § 31.6053-3(b)(5), (h) and (j)(9), § 31.6053-4, § 31.6053-3T, and § 31.6053-4T (T = temporary regulations; have no binding effect). In addition to the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1052, is listed as an authority. General application regulations for Pub. L. 98-369 are listed as 49 CFR § 89, which is Transportation, in Subtitle A -- Office of the Secretary of Transportation, § 89, Implementation of Federal Claims Collection Act.

Since Pub. L. 99-514 isn't specifically listed as authority in headnotes for 26 CFR § 31, there would appear to be inconsistency unless it can be internally demonstrated that the Tax Reform Act did not do anything significant to expand or alter application of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Researchers and others interested in details of how administrative process relative to Subtitle A & C taxes is supposed to work, even for Federal employees subject to administration of the General Accounting Office, should read 26 CFR § 31, particularly Subpart G, as a multitude of procedural sins are exposed in these regulations.

Subpart A -- Introduction, §§ 31.0-1 - 31.0-4, begins on page 11, of the April 1, 1998 edition of this volume. In order to secure subject matter, the introduction is as follows:

Those wishing to track the Social Security act and related legislation would be well served to read § 31.0-2, General definitions and use of terms, as cites for the original Social Security Act of 1935 and major amendments through 1972 are listed in the definitions. The definition at § 31.0-2(e) is the only one that will be reproduced here: The withholding at 26 U.S.C. § 3402 relates to the so-called "income" tax, a/k/a "normal" tax. Therefore, 26 CFR § 31 relates to Social Security and related taxes, and income tax prescribed in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. Administrative procedure addressed in Subpart G therefore relates to both Social Security and income tax, where applicable, railroad retirement tax, unemployment tax, etc.

Although the subpart is reasonably long, I'm going to reproduce § 31.0-3, Scope of regulations, nearly in its entirety as there are important elements in it which I will underscore as a means of emphasis. Of particular note, definitions are applicable for determining liability:

Reproduction of § 31.0-3 was primarily to demonstrate that regulations in this part (1) apply to the group of taxes that issue under or in connection with the Social Security tax system, inclusive of unemployment tax, etc., and income tax prescribed in Subtitle A, and (2) definitions in 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121 & 3401 determine application of the tax.

We can dispose of whatever questions there might be concerning application of these regulations in reasonably short order by beginning with the definition of "American employer" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(g)-1:

We're back to definitions reproduced earlier, but the definitions of "State", "United States", and "citizen" at § 31.3121(e)-1 simply cannot be resisted: Application of the definitions above have already been determined to be limited to territory of the United States, so we don't have to engage in speculation. The regulation, and the corresponding definition at 26 U.S.C. § 3121, say what they say. Social Security and kindred taxes have always been applicable only in territory of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii prior to admission as States of the Union. There is and never has been a constitutionally enumerated power authorizing Congress to institutionalize socialistic government policy throughout the nation. This is one of the more sinister elements of Cooperative Federalism that travels hand-in-hand with the entire social welfare system -- a mathematically impossible scheme that of necessity will bankrupt the American people.

The first exclusionary provision in § 31.3121(h)-1 for "American employer" is § 31.3121(b)-3(c)(3):

The second exclusionary cite is § 31.3121(e)-1, and applies to "Services performed on or in connection with a non-American vessel or aircraft." It's remote enough that it won't be reproduced here.

The definition of "citizen of the United States" has been problematic for many people. "Am I a citizen of the United States?" The definition above provides clarification: Even if the Fourteenth Article of Amendment extended "citizen of the United States" status to people throughout the several States party to the Union, which it didn't, the "citizen of the United States" the Internal Revenue Code addresses is geographically determined. The Fourteenth Article of Amendment was promulgated, never properly ratified, in order to extend citizenship status to African Americans liberated following the Civil War, and might be broadly construed to include other minorities of color who didn't enjoy the status of State citizens prior to the Civil War. Governments of the several States extended universal State citizenship without regard to race, color or creed, so as those the Fourteenth Article of Amendment directly affected died, their lineage enjoyed the status of State citizen in their respective States, and were not "citizens of the United States" where the Fourteenth Article of Amendment is concerned unless they went through the prescribed process necessary to become citizens of the United States.

However, Congress employed this mechanism beginning in 1917 to confer "citizen of the United States" status on people indigenous to insular possessions. The first act of this nature conferred "citizen of the United States" status on the people of Puerto Rico, then in the next decade, citizen of the United States status was conferred on people of the Virgin Islands. Dates when the indigenous people of American Samoa and Guam became "citizens of the United States" are referenced in the "citizen" definition above.

The effect is this: While the "People of the United States" (Constitution, Preamble) think of themselves as "citizens of the United States," a rhetorical claim that had no substantive existence prior to 1868, the vast majority are not "citizens of the geographical United States," as defined in § 3121(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. General application definitions of "United States" and "State" at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(9) & (10) have the same effect as they include only insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia. In other words, being a "citizen of the United States," as created in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment, and a "citizen of Oklahoma" or any other State of the Union, is irrelevant where the Internal Revenue Code is concerned. In order for "citizen of the United States" status to make any difference, the status must be determined by the "citizen of the United States" being so by virtue of citizenship in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam or American Samoa. It is a municipal or geographically specific citizenship, not a citizenship universal throughout the several States and possessions of the United States. Consequently, even if I as a citizen of Oklahoma am also a citizen of the United States, my United States citizenship is of no consequence where the Internal Revenue Code is concerned as I am not a citizen of the United States of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, etc. Application of the Internal Revenue Code is geographically specific, limited to territory and insular possessions of the United States subject to the Article IV § 3.2 territorial clause.

Evidence to this effect was already established when we tracked the President's authority to establish revenue districts (26 U.S.C. § 7621) through Executive Order #10289 and Treasury Delegation Order #150-42 (1956). The only revenue districts applicable to the several States are customs districts, administered by the United States Customs Service. There is absolutely no authority, whether statutory or regulatory, for the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to establish revenue districts in the several States party to the Constitution.

Possibly a comment concerning the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is in order: In the past a few critics have attempted to discredit the Table. However, Congress mandated construction of reliable finding aids in the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1510), and via a court order cited earlier, the Director of the Federal Register was ordered to compile and publish the prescribed finding aids. The purpose, as articulated by the court, is to avert imposition of secret law. In other words, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules is a disclosure mechanism intended for use by those who need to know what application Code sections and regulations have. And as is the case for the United States Code relative to the Statutes at Large, that which is published in the Code of Federal Regulations is prima facie evidence of publication in the Federal Register. Further, responsibility for accuracy rests on the officer or agency responsible for maintaining the Table, per requirements set out at 1 CFR § 8.5:

Responsibility of the various government agencies is at § 8.7: The Director and staff of the Federal Register set standards and provide support for agencies responsible for publishing documents in the various Federal Register publications (1 CFR, § 15), but responsibility for accuracy lies with the agencies respectively. Each agency has stiff requirements set out in 1 CFR, § 16, reproduced in applicable part below: The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules takes up 108 pages in the 1996 Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, which I've used for desktop convenience in construction of this discourse rather than constantly calling up the 1998 edition on computer CD. It isn't there for nothing. Congress mandated it by law, a court ordered it, the Director of the Federal Register set out requirements by regulation, and the agency responsible for maintaining any given section is required to certify authenticity. The Table must therefore be given the same credibility as other documents reproduced in the Code of Federal Regulations -- it is prima facie evidence of publication in the Federal Register, or in this case, application of documents published in the Federal Register. If it isn't, it's a waste of time and a tremendous amount of public money.

Even at that, we haven't relied exclusively on the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Instead, we've gone to the United States Code, tracked authority to original sources in the Statutes at Large, reproduced relative portions of Executive Orders, reorganization plans and presidential letters, examined regulations reproduced in the Code of Federal Regulations, reproduced original delegations of authority directly from the Federal Register, and otherwise filled gaps with principles of law and precedent court decisions.

The test is this: Is evidence of law, regulations, Executive Orders, executive delegations of authority, reorganization plans, statutory authority, et al, consistent with what the Parallel Table of Authority and Rules reflects? We've merely used the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules as a navigation tool. Authorities it cites have proven to be authentic. By examining 26 CFR § 31, we demonstrated that the tax reform act of 1986 did not expand application of the Internal Revenue Code -- IRS jurisdiction is limited to insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia.

In order to demonstrate accuracy of the Table, we'll go through one more exercise that will be of considerable interest to people plagued by notices of lien and levy issued under signature of Internal Revenue Service revenue offices. To do that, we'll track 26 U.S.C. § 6331 and related sections of the Internal Revenue Code, the core section headed, "Levy and distraint". In the course of the general analysis, we'll rely to a certain extent on research pertaining to seizures and levies by John J. Schlabach, an Internal Revenue Service-enrolled agent (tax accounting, etc., certified by IRS) from Colbert, Washington. Mr. Schlabach's research reinforces conclusions we'll demonstrate when finally returning to address implications of 26 U.S.C. § 7804: That is, administrative seizures via "notice of levy", without orders of a court of competent jurisdiction, are patently illegal. We will see when returning to § 7804 that the Internal Revenue Code preserves the right to due process of law, as contemplated by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment, and remedies for "redress of grievance" against those responsible for fraudulently seizing assets without properly executed court orders.

We'll begin the analysis by reproduction of 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a), the general authority subsection of the levy and distraint section. This should be of interest particularly to people who have had the unfortunate experience of receiving notices of lien and levy from IRS revenue officers and the like as alleged statutory authority is reproduced on the backs of most of these instruments, but § 6331(a) isn't cited. This omission roughly falls under the axiom, "Figures don't lie, but liars figure." The subsection is as follows:

The first obvious difficulty with this section is that it is an amalgamation or composite, as is the case for 28 U.S.C. § 132 relating to United States District Courts. At this juncture, I haven't had time to track down exactly when the amalgamation was effected, but suspect it was via the act for enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or the act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-719, title I, Sec. 104(a), 85 Stat. 520. The latter made significant changes in the entire lien and levy process as it came at approximately the time legislatures of all fifty States of the Union had fraudulently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. The 1966 act was effected to reconcile Federal lien and levy process with the UCC. In the 1934 edition of the United States Code, the section appeared approximately as follows (portion added is left in strike-through text): This portion was added, possibly as early as 1939, but more probably in 1954 or 1966: The employer definition at 26 U.S.C. § 3401(d) has already been cited; the employer employs officers and employees of the United States, United States political subdivisions, and officers of corporations where the United States has a proprietary interest, as defined at 3401(c). The person made liable for tax withheld at the source is the withholding agent. The balance of § 6331(a) is applicable to excise taxes in Subtitle E, most of these taxes pertaining to alcohol, tobacco and firearms.

Here we'll pick up Mr. Schlabach's line: Whatever authority the Secretary of the Treasury and/or his delegates have is prescribed by statute. The Secretary's seizure authority is at 26 U.S.C. § 7321:

We're going to pick this up again, so remember the phrase, "Any property subject to forfeiture..," as it is key to understanding § 6331 and other sections that address lien, levy, and seizure. We will now consider authority of internal revenue enforcement officers, at § 7608: We find authority to "make seizures of property subject to forfeiture" at §§ 7321 & 7608(a)(4) & (b)(2)(C). The language is explicit -- the Secretary and properly designated revenue officers may make all seizure of property subject to forfeiture. Statutory language does not go beyond that point. And as it so happens, the Internal Revenue Code is very explicit when it comes to what property is subject to forfeiture, specific statutory provisions in Chapter 75, Subchapter C -- Forfeitures. By appearance, the list is limited to Part I, Property subject to forfeiture, but there is a hidden gem in Part II that is the IRS back door out of the Internal Revenue Code. The escape hatch will be addressed in due course. The main list of property subject to forfeiture is at § 7301: Property described in § 7301 is obviously related to production and distribution of distilled spirits subject to licensing under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. It might be construed as being applicable to production of tobacco products and conceivably even firearms, but we know application is to insular possessions of the United States, not the several States. Even at that, we are narrowing the range of forfeiture by listing those things the Internal Revenue Code itemizes as subject to forfeiture.

The next section identifying property subject to forfeiture provides the approach ramp for IRS' leap from the Internal Revenue Code:

Implications of § 7302 will become evident momentarily. In the meantime, the balance of property subject to forfeiture listed in §§ 7303 & 7304 needs to be accounted for to complete the survey: When we consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, we find that §§ 7301 & 7302 aren't listed, regulations for § 7302 are 27 CFR §§ 24 & 252, and regulations for § 7304 are 27 CFR § 70. Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations includes the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, and is under Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms administrative jurisdiction. No general application regulations under these sections issue from Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Remember, all judicial action to enforce forfeiture is supposed to issue as an in rem action in a United States District Court, per 26 U.S.C. § 7323, so we know that "venue" established by § 7323 is in one of the three remaining territorial courts, defined as courts of the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 23 -- the United States District Courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Therefore, we know that all forfeitures must be in insular possessions of the United States, or territorial waters. This conclusion reinforces the allegation that IRS and BATF, both successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, have absolutely no legitimate jurisdiction in the Union of several States. The legitimate United States District Court is a territorial court that does not exercise Article III judicial authority of the United States -- it is an Article I legislative court. And beyond that, the in rem forfeiture action is admiralty-maritime in nature, proceeding in the course of the civil law, contrary to due process in the course of the common law assured by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment.

How is the IRS leap from the Internal Revenue Code accomplished? Via 26 U.S.C. § 7327:

The exit begins with § 7302, property used in violation of internal revenue laws, then the exit from the Internal Revenue Code is via § 7327, customs laws applicable. Seizures, including garnishment, are predicated on the notion of property used in violation of internal revenue laws. We know that this is the case as for the last several years, researchers across the country have decoded classification documents for literally hundreds of people subjected to IRS seizure and forfeiture. They are invariable red flagged as "illegal tax protesters", which is a trigger label, and are classified as high level and illegal drug dealers out of the Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, etc. This is the underlying presumption IRS uses as justification for administrative seizures and/or criminal and civil prosecution in private United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States. These courts, without notice, presume to accommodate a change of venue from the District Court of the Virgin Islands under that court's concurrent maritime jurisdiction with district courts of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3241. The victim simply isn't informed that even if he is being prosecuted in a civil case, he is presumed to have committed an offense against customs laws of the United States in territorial waters of the Virgin Islands.

Those who haven't been exposed to the institutionalized criminal element of government have to be saying, "This can't be true! This is the most outrageous account imaginable!"

I hope that's the case, and I hope those who have read this far are sufficiently motivated to (1) take time to verify authorities that support conclusions presented in this discourse, and (2) demand that people who hold elected and appointed offices in United States government rebut conclusions with lawful authorities which satisfy criteria established in the section on five essential legal authorities. Most of this information is already in court pleadings around the country, it has been submitted to Federal judges in their respective administrative capacities, and has been submitted via the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts; IRS officials have failed to rebut or correct it, and various members of Congress stand mute, unwilling or unable to rebut the documented evidence. The best any of them can hope for -- that the truth doesn't reach a sufficient number of people that there is a general demand for accountability.

This is not the place for sermonizing, so we will proceed. Again consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, regulations for 26 U.S.C. § 7327 are listed as 27 CFR § 72, regulations under BATF administration. However, at this juncture we're not concerned with BATF, so there is obviously no regulation in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations with general application within the Union of several States. However, there is an unlisted regulation at 26 CFR 403 pertaining to Internal Revenue Service enforcement of customs laws. This is the Internal Revenue Code off ramp. The route is from 26 U.S.C. § 7302, property used in violation of Internal revenue laws, to § 7327, customs laws, to 26 CFR § 403, which pertains to customs laws in Title 19 of the U.S.C. The exit is predicated on classification to whoever illicit IRS actions are against, whether in civil or criminal forums, being classified as an illegal tax protestor who has drug-related operations in insular possessions and territorial waters subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction.

The scope of the regulation is set out at 26 CFR § 403.1:

The object of this seizure authority is personal property valued at $100,000 or less (26 U.S.C. § 7325), and coin-operated gaming devices (§ 7326(a)).

The delegation of authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (T.D. 7433, 41 FR 39312, Sept. 15, 1976, as amended by T.D. 7525, 42 FR 64334, Dec. 23, 1977), is reproduced at 26 CFR § 403.25:

What does 26 U.S.C. § 7321 relate to? As demonstrated, property subject to forfeiture within the covers of the Internal Revenue Code is specifically enumerated save that which is "used in violation of internal revenue laws" (§ 7302). Therefore, property which is the object of seizure must be personal property valued under $100,000 (§ 7325), or coin-operated gaming devices (§ 7326(a)), under applicable customs laws (§ 7327). This conclusion is locked down by Subpart D -- Remission or Mitigation of Forfeitures, at 26 CFR § 403.35: The customs laws at issue grow out of the Tariff Act of 1930; Subtitle III -- Administrative Provisions; Part V --Enforcement Provisions, but there have been several amendments since that cast a fog over how manipulation of administration was accomplished. We'll address some of the conspicuous incongruities, but first need to see authority of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1613 & 1618: By following references in the text of these two sections from Title 19, the link to drug-related offenses is reasonably easy to establish. However, at the moment, the link to Reorganization Plan 26 of 1950, cited in 26 U.S.C. § 7804, and subsequent authority delegated by E.O. #10289, and T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), is probably more important. The reorganization plan, and another plan promulgated in 1946, are cited as authorities in historical and revision notes following § 1613: Aside from connecting these customs duties-related sections to the 1950 reorganization plan that restructured basic administration authority by way of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the above note reflects some of the difficulty behind determining who has what authority, where it came from, where it might be applicable, and how legitimate it is. It's like playing, "Button, button, who has the button?"

Here is an example: During war, the Coast Guard operates under direction of the Navy; in peacetime, the Coast Guard operates under direction of the Director of the Department of Transportation, but at all times the Coast Guard is a military department subject to direct orders of the President. In other words, whether operating under military or civilian direction, the Coast Guard is a military organization. Consequently, the Coast Guard has absolutely no civil enforcement authority in the Union of several States save possibly during times of invasion or rebellion (Art. IV § 4, Constitution).

The above sections, when understood properly, demonstrate three jurisdictions or areas of responsibility: The Coast Guard has primary responsibility over navigation laws on the high seas; the United States Customs Service has primary responsibility relating to customs districts in the Union of several States, as demonstrated earlier; and the Secretary of the Treasury, via his delegate, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has primary responsibility in insular possessions of the United States and their respective territorial waters. Delegation of territorial jurisdiction or venue authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and subsequently to IRS and BATF, was via T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. #150-1 (1986), under authority of E.O. #10289 and 26 U.S.C. § 7621.

We found in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules that authority for 26 U.S.C. § 7327 is listed as 27 CFR § 72. This corresponding regulation is acknowledged and specifically cited at 26 CFR § 403.2:

Those interested in the pedigree of BATF can get a pretty good scope on the entity by looking up Treasury Delegation Orders listed above. BATF was split from IRS via the order of June 6, 1972, then scope of authority was fine-tuned by the other orders.

Providing there is IRS seizure under provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7327, an innocent party may petition for return of the property or proceeds from sale. There is no particular form, although 26 CFR § 403.37 specifies that the petition should be typewritten on legal size paper and must be executed under oath, prepared in triplicate, and addressed to the District Director of the internal revenue district in which the property was seized. All copies must be certified under penalties of perjury, and copies of support exhibits should be attached to each of the triplicate petitions. Contents of the petition are prescribed in § 403.38. We'll reproduce only § 403.38(d) & (e) as these paragraphs list the drug-related crimes which are prosecutable in civil and criminal forums and ultimately make the connection with Title 18, the Criminal Code:

Again, internal clues which reveal proper territorial application abound. Can IRS or any other Federal agency enforce "state and federal laws" within the several States party to the Constitution? The Constantine case, decided in December 1935, should have put that matter to rest for good. And merely reclassifying what are normally considered common law crimes subject to jurisdiction of each of the several States respectively as commercial crimes doesn't place them under Federal jurisdiction.

The revelation most people who have lost homes to IRS administrative seizure might be offended by is the notion that their respective homes were being used for prostitution or some other such offense against revenue laws of the United States. But, of course, they are never informed of what crime a home, car, occupational tools and the like have been used in, so they don't know how to defend against the in rem procedure presumed in administrative seizure. Yet, even that is fraud where a court of competent jurisdiction hasn't made a judicial award, as we shall see.

Now for the next significant clue, found at § 403.43(a):

It would appear that the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated authority that isn't his to delegate. Congress has made the General Accounting Office general agent of the Treasury of the United States, and GAO, through the Comptroller General, now the Director, has final disposition of all claims of and against the United States. Since there is absolutely no statutory authority for the Secretary to delegate authority that is not vested in him or the President, we're left with one or two conclusions: Either the Secretary of the Treasury has usurped the legislative power of Congress, or such exercise of authority is applicable only in insular possessions of the United States.

The next giggle is this: Administrative seizure even in insular possessions of the United States is limited to property valued at $2,500 or less, and a reasonably small bond will force the matter to court:

There are a few obvious problems with the regulation above, aside from it demonstrating that internal revenue laws preserve due process requirements even for seizures under $2,500. One of the conspicuous problems is that the appraisers, being "citizens of the United States," must be resident in the district where the seizure takes place. Since we know the only internal revenue districts in the several States are customs districts under administration of the United States Customs Service, the regulation must apply to a jurisdiction other than the several States. Next, the Seventh Article of Amendment secures the right to jury trial in the course of the common law for all controversies involving in excess of twenty dollars: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved..."

The Fifth Article of Amendment locks in the remedy: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," in the course of the common law.

The condemnation proceeding, in the course of the civil law, is an in rem admiralty-maritime action which is strictly prohibited by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment, per former Chief Justice John Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (1825), previously cited. Consequently, the nature of the proceeding again condemns process prescribed in 26 CFR § 403. It cannot apply to or in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. The only merit the regulation has is for people in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, etc., to know they have recourse against IRS vandals who exceed lawful authority in territory of the United States.

This is one of the major virtues of 26 U.S.C. § 7804: The section secures remedies against revenue officers, agents and employees when they exceed lawful authority. We will examine the section in more detail, but first we have other fish to fry.

At 26 U.S.C. § 7321, we found that, "Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under any provision of this title may be seized by the Secretary," then at § 7608(b)(2)(C), we found that the Internal Revenue Service has authority, "to make seizures of property subject to forfeiture under the internal revenue laws."

We have listed and examined all items made subject to forfeiture in Chapter 75, Subchapter C, including items subject to forfeiture under customs laws. The Internal Revenue Code is explicit and limited as to what is or isn't subject to forfeiture, i.e., levy, and generally speaking, wages subject to withholding at source do not fall into the category of "property" subject to forfeiture and the in rem admiralty-maritime action prescribed in territorial United States District Courts at § 7323. As demonstrated, the action prescribed at § 7323 is applicable (1) in territory of the United States where there is some licensed enterprise (alcohol, tobacco, firearms, etc.), under customs laws, and under navigation laws. The items subject to forfeiture include (1) those things subject to lien by virtue of licensing where liens are agreed to in the licensing process, (2) items subject to customs taxes, and (3) items used in the process of breaking internal revenue laws.

In the first case, the lien exists by virtue of conditions of the licensing agreement. In the latter two cases, liens arise out of judgments, with forfeitures under 26 CFR § 403 & 27 CFR § 72 arising via judgment subsequent to determination of specified criminal activity. If there is no criminal judgment, there can be no civil forfeiture judgment. The initial seizure, prior to judicial forfeiture via condemnation proceeding, must proceed on criminal probable cause. In the latter instance, if no crime has been committed, there is no basis for seizure or forfeiture, which are all part of the levy process, with judgment being antecedent to levy.

We'll address this in more detail, and demonstrate that this process is preserved in the Internal Revenue Code, but we need to return to the questionable provision in § 6331 relating to garnishment of wages for officers and employees of United States government, etc. By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, it is found that regulations prescribed for 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331-6343 are 27 CFR § 70. There is a regulation for 26 U.S.C. § 6334 at 26 CFR § 404, and for 26 U.S.C. § 6343 at 26 CFR § 301, but the basic authority for levy and distraint is in § 6331(a), and the only listed regulation is at 27 CFR § 70. This application is reinforced by the only regulation for liens (26 U.S.C. § 6321) also being 27 CFR § 70.

On the title page of Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the following is found:

Here I'm using the 1995 printed edition of Title 27 CFR distributed by the Government Printing Office rather than the electronic 1998 edition on CD as these regulations haven't changed much for several years and at the moment it is easier to use the printed copy rather than the computer-base CD. The above paragraph would suggest that all of Title 27 CFR is under administration of BATF, so at first blush it would be surprising to find regulations in Title 27 pertaining to garnishment of wages. That's a presumption I and other researchers made for several years when first discovering the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules -- I presumed that 27 CFR § 70 includes only regulations pertaining to liens and levy and distraint relating to licensing under Subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code. That was a mistake. Somehow or another, the garnishment against government employees makes a magical appearance in the title and part.

Below are relevant portions of 27 CFR § 70, beginning with § 70.161, with certain portions highlighted by my underscoring for emphasis:

Underscored portions of regulations reproduced above should provide adequate orientation for those who have read through and studied material in this discourse to this point, but a certain amount of discussion is probably warranted. Two important facts need to be set out at the onset: (1) The majority of these regulations address levy of property in possession of third parties, and (2) there are two provisions relating to wages and salaries. The first might relate to levy arising from a claim under obligations from miscellaneous excise taxes or customs duties where an employer isn't directly involved with that particular enterprise. In that event, each levy issues only against existing obligations. Only levies against wages of officers and employees of the United States and its political subdivisions have continuing effect, and the "employer" in that case is the government agency employing the officer or employee. It's exclusive of private enterprise, whether in the several States or possessions of the United States. These regulations are from Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, of course, and administration is tacitly under BATF (IRS?) rather than General Accounting Office administration, so application here is in insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia. When William Cooper and Bill Bentson published research demonstrating that IRS and BATF are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, they were somewhat amazed by a Treasury Delegation Order that names IRS as director of BATF -- these regulations appear to explain reasoning behind the strange delegation order. Litigation to determine liability would issue in the name and by authority of the United States against the alleged taxpayer with a bona fide tax liability. Once the liability was adjudicated against the taxpayer, the judgment would become a lien against him or her. The judgment would then be the basis of levy and distraint. Third parties in possession of property belonging to the taxpayer would be obligated to surrender whatever property belonging to the taxpayer they had in possession or had control of. The responsible officer, whether the General Accounting Office in the several States, or BATF or IRS in the District of Columbia or any given insular possession of the United States, would be responsible for issuing a "notice of levy", along with proof of claim, being an authentic court order, to whoever was in possession of property being seized.

IRS agents are fully aware of the due process requirement. The first rule governing administrative settlements, at 26 CFR § 601.106(f)(1), acknowledges the Fifth Article of Amendment requirement of due process of law:

In light of the due process requirement in the Union of several States and in territory and insular possessions of the United States, liability of the third party in possession of property subject to levy is clarified. Liability for surrender of property belonging to a third person is exonerated providing the levy has been judicially executed, but not if it hasn't been. Surrender of wages, bank accounts or anything else where there is no evidence of a court order to support a "notice of levy" leaves an employer, bank, or whatever in jeopardy to the proper owner. If the owner sues for recovery and damages, the third party middleman might recover loss and expense under provisions of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6343(b) & 7426, but the probability of an IRS agent volunteering to serve time if the injured party elects to seek criminal prosecution of whoever has deprived him or her of property without due process of law is pretty remote. Therefore, the middleman third party might find it prudent to demand certified court orders, as specified in the latter part of 27 CFR § 70.163(b)(2), before surrendering anything to the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco an Firearms, the United States Customs Service, or even the General Accounting Office. Unless or until the Fifth Article of Amendment is repealed or amended, the mandate for due process of law is absolute and without exception. To abridge that constitutionally-secure right is criminal, it is not simply a civil matter.

As Mr. Schlabach points out in his research, levy and distraint are elements of a process, they are not stand-alone actions. In his May 27, 1997 analysis prepared for a client, Mr. Schlabach makes the following observation:

The easy way to get through the maze is simply to go to Chapter 76, Judicial Proceedings: We've already cited original jurisdiction of the district court of the United States, "at the instance of the United States," for civil actions at 26 U.S.C. § 7402. It's a reasonably simple matter to read the next section, which clarifies the need for judicial determination of legitimacy of liens, and to bring property under control of the United States when it isn't specifically secured by a lien: Sections in the Internal Revenue Code relating to administration and administrative enforcement are simply grouped together in 6000 numbering ahead of the judicial, numbered 7401 and up, for classification convenience. Each of the sections may be prima facie the law, or evidence of law, but as stipulated at § 7806, "Construction of title," no legislative construction is implied by location of any section in the Internal Revenue Code. There obviously must be adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction before any agency that purports to represent the executive branch of government can deprive any of the sovereign American people of life, liberty, or property. This conclusion should be so obvious as not to warrant question or discussion, but bully tactics of the Federal Alphabet Brotherhood have so cowed the general population that most grow shag and play carpet rather than stand on the law either in defense or to secure redress for illegal acts which many times result in the compromise of third parties. This is the purpose of 26 U.S.C. § 7804(b), reproduced a second time below: What rights and remedies are "existing"? If the Constitution of the United States is still the law of the land, all rights secured by the Bill of Rights, and whatever other rights the Constitution secures, are "existing rights." In the Union of several States, due process in the course of the common law is among the existing rights, and in insular possessions of the United States, due process in the course of the civil law. Through legislation and court rulings, people indigenous to insular possessions have for the most part secured the right to jury trial, even if under quasi-admiralty rules, so application of § 7804(b) is universal within the "American empire."

With that in mind, we'll examine the first sentence of § 7804(b) with editorial modification that clarifies what it means: "Nothing in [the Internal Revenue Code] shall be considered to impair any right [including trial by jury], or remedy, including trial by jury, to recover any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws."

A basic concept needs to be emphasized: He who has no rights has no remedies. Since the Constitution secures rights of the People via the Bill of Rights, appropriate remedies are assumed. So far as the people of the Union of several States are concerned, both rights an remedies secured by eight centuries of British-American common law heritage are assumed, so the right to trial by jury is preserved for both defendant and plaintiff.

Further, the first sentence of § 7804(b) throws the door wide open so far as causes are concerned. An action may proceed on the allegation of "erroneously or illegally assessed or collected" tax. And, of course, if an assessment or collection action was patently illegal, an affidavit of criminal complaint should naturally proceed against whoever was responsible for assessment and/or collection proceedings. In the event a properly constructed affidavit of criminal complaint is filed in the appropriate district court of the United States, the district judge is obligated to hold a probable cause hearing. Whoever files the affidavit of criminal complaint may support the complaint with personal testimony, documentary evidence, and witnesses, even if hostile. They simply have to be subpoenaed, and some documents might have to be secured by subpoena duces tecum.

The second sentence of § 7804(b) is just as important: "For purposes of any action to recover any such tax, penalty, or sum, all statutes, rules, and regulations referring to the collector of internal revenue, the principal officer for the internal revenue district, or the Secretary, shall be deemed to refer to the officer whose act or acts referred to in the preceding sentence gave rise to such action."

It's a somewhat jaded notion that dates to the time North American colonies settled by English people were still British subjects, but the idea that the sovereign could not commit a crime against his subjects is preserved in our judicial lineage. When the People of the United States delegated powers to the United States via the Constitution, United States Government became a sovereign of sorts. The government, being a legal fiction, cannot transgress rights of the people. Therefore, the government, which cannot act of its own accord, cannot be sued except by consent. Congress has enacted consent statutes for certain situations, but where the Internal Revenue Code is concerned, Congress has specified that litigation for civil remedies must issue against the actual perpetrator, being the revenue officer or whoever else was involved in an erroneous or illegal assessment or collection action.

However, consider this: If a complaint against the erroneous or illegal assessment or collection action is filed with the district director, and subsequently with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, either or both are obligated first to correct erroneous or illegal assessment or collection actions, and if the actions were illegal, to file appropriate complaints. Of course, a cover letter might stipulate that the injured party will file an enclosed affidavit of criminal complaint with the stipulation that the district director, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or whatever other officer is implicated will be a witness to facts and law set out in the complaint. Approached properly, superior officers become witnesses in support of criminal prosecution, or they become accessories after the fact who might be prosecuted for misprision of felony, or where the Internal Revenue Service and other Federal agencies are de facto agents of a government foreign to the United States, misprision of treason. And there might be an excellent case for conspiracy to defraud the lawful government of the United States.

Finally, the last sentence has considerable merit: "The venue of any such action shall be the same as under existing law."

IRS and BATF are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, with jurisdiction in the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States. They have no lawful authority in the Union of several States. Therefore, if IRS officers and agents execute illegal assessments and collections in one of the several States party to the Constitution, venue is determined by the location of the criminal enterprise. It's my opinion that the injured party has a choice between prosecution under law of his home asylum State or Federal law. However, civil and criminal remedies must be prosecuted in the same forum, whether State or Federal.

In his analysis of the required levy-seizure process, Mr. Schlabach cites several decisions researchers will want to pursue: Brewer v. U.S., 764 F. Supp. 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Arfor v. United States, 934 F.2 229 (9th Cir. 1991); Freeman v. Meyer, 152 F. Supp. 383, Affd 253 F.2d 1295 (3rd Circuit 1968); United States v. O'Dell, 160 F. 2d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1947); Goodwin v. United States, 935 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1991); Kulway v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 735 (2nd Cir. 1990). O'Dell and Kulway decisions are relied on most.

Underlying Compromise of the U.S. Marshal

One of the cruelest hoaxes ever has been perpetrated against what are generally capable, loyal Americans now employed in capacities that used to exercise legitimate law enforcement authority of United States Government, United States marshals and their deputies. The position of United States Marshal was created in 1789; the U.S. marshal and his deputies had the same powers in the several States as the State or county sheriff, as applicable, when and if there was legitimate United States jurisdiction. However, the United States Marshal, as an independent office, was abolished, with the successor merged into the Department of Justice under direction of the Attorney General, by Public Law 89-554, § 4(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 619. This 1966 act was amended by Pub.L. 95-530, § 2, Oct. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 2028, which related to appointment, term, and residence of United States Marshals, the 1978 act repealed by Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7608(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4512. Pub. L. 100-690 governs most activity of what is now the United States Marshals Service in the Department of Justice. The United States Marshals Service, except within the narrow range of authority vested in the Department of Justice and/or the Attorney General, no longer has authority under laws of the United States as they might apply to the Union of several States in the framework of Congress' general legislative authority delegated primarily in Article I § 8 of the Constitution. Sections of the United States Code which reflect authority of the U.S. Marshals Service are at 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569. Space will be dedicated to analysis of these sections, as applicable in the framework of this effort, because the office of United States Marshal was the original civil enforcement authority of the United States, where today the United States Marshals Service has considerably different character and jurisdiction.

Basic authority, and chain of command, for the United States Marshals Service is at 28 U.S.C. § 561, reproduced in relative part below:

The old authority of the United States marshal appears to be conveyed to the United States marshals at 28 U.S.C. § 564, but this is an illusion that is dispelled by examination of underlying authorities: The term "State" in § 564 is all-important as the reference is to insular possessions of the United States, not to the Union of several States. This conclusion will be demonstrated in due course.

The first check on authority is to consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which begins on page 721 of the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1996 edition. If there were implementing regulations for 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569, they would be on page 768. However, these sections of the United States Code are not listed, so there are no applicable delegations of authority or implementing regulations for any of the sections. However, there are regulations applicable under two of the three Public Laws listed above, the first being Pub. L. 89-544 (1966): On page 818 of the 1996 CFR Index volume, it is found that sections of the 1966 law not repealed by subsequent acts are under the implementing regulation at 32 CFR § 716.

By referencing the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts, beginning on page 831 of the 1996 Index, it is found that Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations pertains to National Defense, and § 716 is in Chapter VI -- Department of the Navy (Parts 700-799); § 716 is in Subchapter C -- Personnel, and § 716 specifies a "Death gratuity."

Here we can demonstrate how the Code is convoluted as authority of the Attorney General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is also under Pub. L. 89-544, found at 28 U.S.C. § 535, part of which is reproduced elsewhere in this discourse. It is reproduced in its entirety below:

Obviously, Pub. L. 89-554 has intragovernmental application, it does not apply to the Union of several States and the population at large. This is verified by consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, at page 767 of the 1996 CFR Index volume: 28 U.S.C. § 535 is not listed. Therefore, the only general application for Pub.L. 89-554, whether at 28 U.S.C. §§ 535, 561, or any other section of the United States Code, is limited to 32 CFR § 716. The exception is that heads of departments of United States government may promulgate intradepartmental regulations as pertains to their respective departments under authority of 5 U.S.C. § 301.

Using this authority verification, we will consider authority of the United States Marshals Service for 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569 under the 1988 act, Pub.L. 100-690, found in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules in the 1996 CFR Index volume at page 822. In order to simplify matters, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules-cited regulations are listed to the left, then the regulation is described from the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts to the right. The authority to the right will be in that order: CFR title; subtitle, where applicable; chapter; subchapter, where applicable; and part.

Primary concern of the U.S. Marshals Service is governmentwide debarment and suspension, and governmentwide requirements for a drug-free workplace, as applicable. There is very little more of significance that can be applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and the general population. However, the U.S. Marshals Service has essentially the same authority as a state civil enforcement agency in the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States. This is generally the case for Federal civil enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, IRS, BATF, U.S. Customs Service, and in peacetime, the Coast Guard.

The question as to why the office of the U.S. Marshal was convoluted is reasonably easy to demonstrate, as the U.S. Marshals Service deals in "public money", per 28 U.S.C. § 567:

As used in § 567, the term "public money" is a word of art. It doesn't mean what it would appear to mean to the unschooled reader. Public money is predicated on obligations of the United States, not lawful coin of the United States. In other words, under provisions of § 567, the U.S. Marshals Service is one of the key agencies through which private assets outside lawful jurisdiction of the United States, as United States government now operates, are converted as though they belonged to the United States to begin with, which is hardly the case. The convoluted money system is beyond the scope of the present effort, but those who would like to pursue the matter further should read 31 CFR §§ 202-215 as these regulations, the first of which apply to National Banking Associations and other Federal Reserve-member financial institutions qualifying as Federal Tax and Loan Depositaries, have an excellent definitive statement concerning "public money" -- only officers and employees of the United States and United States political subdivisions are entitled to receive "public money". Public money is exclusive of the Federal Reserve Note -- the only law found to date which makes the Federal Reserve Note a lawful "currency" is the Uniform Commercial Code, "adopted" by legislatures of each of the several States by the time Pub. L. 89-554 was promulgated in 1966. By the early 1970s, the Federal Reserve Note was not acceptable for payment of taxes legitimately due the United States. The 31 CFR regulations cited above also provide reasonably complete listings of people subject to State and Federal "income" taxes, a/k/a "normal" tax.

The Constitution has never been amended, it still prescribes gold and silver coin as the lawful national currency. The key provisions are as follows: [Art. I § 8.5] "[The Congress shall have Power] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin [and, at § 8.6] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States..," then at § 10.1, the door is closed by the following: "No State shall ... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts..."

Therein is the crux of the matter: Congress may do as Congress pleases, within the framework of international law, with respect to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, territories and insular possessions of the United States deemed as territory or otherwise subject to sovereignty of the United States under Article IV § 3.2, and with rules and regulations pertaining to government of the United States. (see 5 U.S.C. § 301 pertaining to regulations for government departments; authority for presidential executive orders at 3 U.S.C. § 301; and the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., for publishing requirements and exemptions; 44 U.S.C. § 1510 as authority for the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, the CFR listing, etc.)

For a reality check, we'll examine powers and duties of U.S. Marshals who are now part of the U.S. Marshals Service rather than serving in their respective independent offices:

Compare authority of the U.S. Marshals Service to authority for appointing probation officers, at 18 U.S.C. § 3602: The chief responsibility of the United States Marshals Service is to attend orders of United States District Courts; the probation officer is appointed by [the judge or judges of] a district court of the United States. One does not have the same "venue" (territorial jurisdiction) as the other save as might be applicable to elected and appointed officers and employees of the United States. The United States Marshals Service, as opposed to the independent office of the United States Marshal prior to 1966, is basically territorial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Where what amount to regulations determining conduct and powers of the U.S. Marshal are now promulgated by the Director of the United States Marshals Service, regulations governing conduct of the probation officer are promulgated by the Director of the Administrative office of the United States Courts. Regulations governing conduct of both have effectively been hidden, but the fact that the United States Marshals Service carries out orders of United States District Courts rather than district courts of the United States is a determining factor.

Thanks to another researcher and friend, Paul Mitchell, who recently moved from Arizona to Texas, we have a revealing opinion by a United States District Court judge in Eastern Metals Corporation v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245 (1960):

The general jurisdiction of United States District Courts is set forth in Title 28 U.S.C. Chap. 85 (Secs. 1331 to 1360). Other statutes, not pertinent, confer jurisdiction on the District Courts in certain types of actions. On this motion we are concerned with Section 1332 of Title 28 U.S.C. -- the Diversity of Citizenship section, in particular subdivision (a)(1) of that section, relating to actions between citizens of different states.

To test the ruling, and establish the point at issue, we'll examine § 1332 in relative part:

The good judge in Eastern Metals Corporation v. Martin disclosed that the United States District Court is a legislative court, not an Article III judicial court; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) confirms that this section of Title 28 is applicable exclusively in the District of Columbia and insular possessions subject to sovereignty of the United States by virtue of the territorial clause. The United States District Court is not only a legislative court, it must of necessity be a territorial court. Therefore, while the ruling in Eastern Metals is accurate, it is incomplete by omission. By supplying what is missing from the decision, we are able to demonstrate that the United States Marshals Service now functions primarily in the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States. So far as the several States party to the Constitution are concerned, the U.S. Marshals Service operates on the Attorney General's coattails, per 28 U.S.C. § 535, and has authority relating only to officers and employees of United States government.

Per The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, the Director of the United States Marshals Service is or was Eduardo Gonzalez; headquarters of the Service is at 600 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4210, Phone (202) 307-9065. Intragovernmental regulations governing conduct of the Service have not yet been secured, but are presumed to be those listed above. Anyone wishing to independently secure rules and regulations promulgated by the Director should contact the Mr. Gonzalez or his successor.

Territorial Jurisdiction of Federal Law Enforcement Community

The United States Marshals Service was treated separately to demonstrate how the most basic institutions of United States Government have been perverted, and how some of the nation's most patriotic, competent people can be duped by Cooperative Federalism legalese and mumbo-jumbo. Some in each enforcement agency no doubt know limits of legitimate Federal enforcement powers, but I am convinced that the vast majority don't. The reason they don't is the same reason most Americans don't: We as a people simply don't know the fundamental law of the land, the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, it will be an advantage to go to the Constitution to document what enforcement authority Federal civil enforcement agencies would or should have if government of the United States was operating in the framework of what constitutionally enumerated powers.

First, we will concede that the United States has subject matter jurisdiction in the several States to enforce laws of the United States enacted under Article I general authority. The U.S. Marshal was the principal civil enforcement officer from the beginning. A few other agencies such as the Treasury of the United States, the customs service, etc., had legitimate enforcement authority relative to enumerated powers. But in general, most crimes in the several States, including counterfeiting and what would otherwise be considered Federal crimes, were enforced by the several States respectively. Each State still has mail fraud laws and the like, and authority to enforce them -- each has laws against treason. But in the convoluted maze that emerged in the 1930s and after, the Constitution was quietly and systematically pushed aside. Today the several States are overrun by Federal civil enforcement agencies of every kind and description.

In order to tackle this problem in the most expedient manner, we'll focus on emergencies where the United States may have general enforcement presence in one or more of the several States. This is addressed in two places. The first is at Article I, Sec. 8, clause 15:

The second is at Article IV Sec. 4: The Constitution vests Congress with authority to call out the militia (1) to execute the laws of the United States when there is general resistance to legitimate Federal law, (2) to suppress insurrection, which is rebellion, and (3) to repel invasion of a foreign power. Note that the Militia, not the standing army and not civil enforcement agencies, must be used for the purposes specified. In Article IV § 4, the Constitution stipulates that the legislature of a State, or the chief executive when the legislature cannot be convened, is responsible for asking for assistance in the event of civil uprising or rebellion. Congress may not unilaterally send the militia into one of the several States where the dispute is with State government and does not involve invasion of foreign forces. These constitutional provisions are specific with respect to where authority lies, and what force can be exercised. There has been no amendment.

With these provisions established, we will consider current regulations relating to "Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance". The assistance will be reviewed by way of 28 CFR, Part 65, "Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance", promulgated by the Attorney General, with listed authorities as follows: The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Title II, Chap. VI, Div. I, Subdiv. B, Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, Oct. 12, 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10501 et seq.); 8 U.S.C. 1101 note; Sec. 610, Pub. L. 102-140, 105 Stat. 832.

I've checked regulatory authorities in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, but won't go through the reproduction exercise in this section. For those who wish to consult regulations, they are as follows: Pub. L. 102-140, no general application regulations; Pub. L. 98-473, 13 CFR § 123, 14 CFR § 36, 24 CFR § 13, 25 CFR § 20 & 28 CFR § 32; 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note, 8 CFR §§ 245, 324 & 343a; 42 U.S.C. § 10501, 28 CFR § 65.

Subpart A of 28 CFR § 65 is as follows:

Available assistance is in Subpart B, § 65.12: Purpose, etc., are stated in Subpart C: Several flaws are immediately obvious: Authority the Constitution vests in Congress hasn't been delegated simply to the President, but to the Attorney General; the act vests responsibility for determining the need for Federal assistance in the governor of any given State without regard for whether or not the legislature can be convened; and a governor may request assistance not just in the event of actual rebellion or domestic violence, but merely on the possibility of disturbance State or local officials might not be able to cope with. The call for help may go out for assistance in enforcing criminal laws. The Attorney General is the head of a civil agency of United States government, the Department of Justice, who has little or no authority over the militia. The Attorney General is vested with authority to investigate crimes by officers and employees of government of the United States (28 U.S.C. § 535), and does not have general enforcement authority in the several States for any other purpose.

A clue to application of this act is revealed in Subpart G -- Repayment of Funds, § 65.60:

We will now consider the list of agencies in the Federal law enforcement community. The list is in definitions at § 65.70(c), with "State" defined at § 65.80(d): The definition of the term "state" at § 65.80(d) is the final and conclusive clue as to scope of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. It has legitimate application exclusively under Congress' plenary power in territory of the United States, Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. If there was any doubt, the mix of agencies above is ultimately condemning. Most have been already been treated: The FBI was created administratively within the Department of Justice in 1908; the DEA was created by a Presidential reorganization plan; the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has only authority vested in the Attorney General by statute; since 1966, the U.S. Marshals Service has been a Department of Justice agency with primary responsibility in insular possessions of the United States; the IRS and BATF, and possibly the Secret Service, are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico; and the Coast Guard is at all times a military department whether under administration of the Navy or the Department of Transportation. Not one of them have legitimate inland enforcement authority in the Union of several States save the possibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes by officers and employees of government of the United States.

We are intentionally ignoring the U.S. Postal Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service as they haven't been addressed in the context of this work, but rest assured that both of these entities have been convoluted and have no more legitimate authority in the several States than other Federal civil enforcement agencies.

Now we will turn to 28 CFR, Part 60 -- Authorization of Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Request the Issuance of a Search Warrant. Authority is listed as Rule 41(h), Fed.R.Crim.P. (18 U.S.C. appendix).

Rule 41 prescribes particulars relating to search and seizure, with 41(h) as follows:

We previously demonstrated that Congress delegated legislative authority to the Supreme Court when providing that promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court would repeal any law in conflict with rules the Supreme Court enacted (28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). Here we find that by way of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has delegated authority to the Attorney General that isn't delegated by Congress or the President. By now that shouldn't seem to be particularly inconsistent with the way government of the United States has operated the last sixty-plus years -- the President has authority to abolish and create agencies as he pleases, contrary to Article I § 8.18 of the Constitution -- so we shouldn't be surprised if the Supreme Court quietly assumes authority, which amounts to usurpation of power, belonging to both Congress and the President. Another case of, "Button, button, who has the button?"

Fortunately, we've already demonstrated that Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable only in territorial courts of the United States, the United States District Courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands, and that applications at F.R.Crim.P. 54(c) lock the matter down when it comes to territorial authority:

We don't want to get too carried away, but reproducing a portion of the purpose statement at 28 CFR § 60.1 will anchor the case: It would seem prudent on the part of the Supreme Court had this authority been vested in the President, and the President then delegated authority to the Attorney General, but maybe all three branches of Federal government at some point decided it's fine to be expedient when it serves whatever purpose is at hand. However, more than intent, I suspect the catch-as-catch-can mode of doing things is symptomatic of the extremely thin ice government of the United States has been on since supposing to rule unincorporated insular possessions. Distribution of responsibilities and determination powers has never really been resolved. However, demonstrating territorial limits to authority for issuing warrants is made easy by definitions in 28 CFR § 60.

For purposes here, we will consider only the first four categories listed in § 60.2:

The following categories of federal law enforcement officers are authorized to request the issuance of a search warrant: The list continues, but it isn't necessary to reproduce here. Next we'll consider agencies with authorized personnel, but will skip Federal agencies at § 60.3(a) as the list is approximately the same as the list comprising the Federal law enforcement community. We will reproduce only § 60.3((b), which identifies local law enforcement agencies: I like it when people are in agreement. Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General are of one accord. We should all feel better: Authority for Federal law enforcement officers to apply for and serve search warrants is limited to territory of the United States, including the District of Columbia and insular possessions, and the Federal law enforcement community has lawful authority to provide emergency Federal law enforcement assistance only in territory subject to sovereignty of the United States. When they venture into the Union of several States brandishing warrants and guns, save on Federal enclaves properly ceded to the United States, they are covered only by the color of law, not the cloak of law. This is the only conclusion consistent with powers enumerated in and distributed by the Constitution.

There are very few flaws or incongruities in the laws and regulations of the United States. The system was constructed with meticulous care, and is maintained to preserve the integrity of the legitimate constitutional system. If and when there is error, it lies with those who exceed constitutionally delegated authority supported by statutes and regulations of United States government. Those who usurp authority, whether knowingly or unknowingly, bear the burden of civil and criminal liability for injury to the sovereign American people.

End Game Alternatives

There is no question that the sovereign people of this nation have been victimized by a silent economic war through most of the twentieth century. In the last four decades, institutionalized aggression has become increasingly bolder. If the de facto system continues unabated, only a small political and financial privileged class will enjoy prosperity and liberty -- not liberty ordinary people seek, but what amounts to license for plunder.

If we look to history's record of Vandals, despots, and tyranny in general, we might be tempted to ask, "What's new?" The answer to that lies in the Declaration of Independence, where American founders justified severance from British rule by the "Laws of Nature, and of Nature's God," and the carefully crafted Constitution of the United States that established the rule of law rather than the capricious nature of man. Constitutional limitations and over eight centuries of English-American common law heritage provide the vehicles and means to peacefully restore constitutional rule.

When Article III courts of the United States were authorized by judiciary acts of 1789 & 1792, they were established as common law courts. Rather than adopt the divergent process that evolved in each of the several States, courts of the United States proceeded in the course of the common law as it was in England at the time, thereby preserving the purer form. Rights secured by the Bill of Rights, the first Ten Articles of Amendment, presumed preservation of what in many cases were ancient writs, and other remedies developed to address usurpation of power.

There are certain maxims of law to be understood. One of considerable import is that he who has no rights has no remedies. Conversely, he who has a right is presumed to have an appropriate remedy. This, then, is the force of the Bill of Rights -- it preserves and thereby prescribes the remedy assumed by the secured right.

In a very real sense, law is a dead letter. Once it is written, it thereafter means what it meant at the time it was written. It does not evolve of its own accord -- it must be amended or replaced before the law itself changes. The Bill of Rights has not been amended or repealed, so the presumed remedies are preserved.

Consider the word "casket". In old and middle English, a casket was a jewel box. Today we bury people in "caskets" -- family and others we have affection for are "precious," so are preserved in a box built to hold and protect precious things. The term "casket" has evolved in meaning so far as contemporary use is concerned, but works of old masters did not evolve with it. If Chaucer used the word "casket", he was talking about a jewel box regardless of what understanding a twentieth century reader might have of the term.

This has been and is one of the great difficulties where coming to grips with law is concerned. Both in rem and in personam are admiralty and maritime actions that proceed in the course of the civil law. The terms aren't generally understood and are frequently misused. Then there is the case of hiding secrets in plain view by use of familiar terms -- United States District Courts and the United States of America are examples. We are deceived and subdued by what we don't know, and by what we look at but don't see. Lack of knowledge and lack of vision have been crippling.

Documenting Cooperative Federalism tyranny is anything but complete. In fact, it has barely begun. But today enough essential foundation stones are in place, and the means for unraveling convoluted codes are known, so competent people can finish the task in reasonably short order. It is a task that must be engaged with deliberate speed.

What remedies are available? Probably the most powerful is public exposure. It is no longer necessary to make constructive and hypothetical arguments. Documentary evidence proves the case against Cooperative Federalism and its perpetrators and patrons.

The First Article of Amendment secures the right to petition for redress of grievance. The right includes judicial as well as political forums. The Fourth preserves an important legal weapon -- the affidavit of criminal complaint. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh preserve due process in the course of the common law for the aggrieved as well as the defendant. Administrative remedies galore are written into law, with implications of perjury of oath, accessory after the fact, misprision of felony, and misprision of treason when those who owe allegiance to the United States fail to carry out lawful mandates of office. We have barely scratched the surface.

Finally, the Second preserves the right to own and bear arms. It wasn't included in the Bill of Rights so those willing to usurp power for self-serving ends would sleep easy. It is there so the sovereign people have the means to correct public servants who follow in the path of John, Charles, and George III. Each of us has the absolute right to defend life, liberty, and property, and if need should arise, the common good.

Another maxim: When men take up arms, law is of no consequence or effect.

There is nothing wrong with the Constitution and laws of the United States. They are worth restoring and preserving. The danger of taking up arms is that to do so makes the Constitution and laws of the United States of no effect. To abandon the rule of law is to invite worse tyranny than we have.

Does this rationale stand the acid test? When American founders appealed to the Laws of Nature and Nature's God, they recognized a higher power, knowing man cannot author or amend natural and moral law. It is self-executing, physical law operating in the framework of cause and effect, moral in the framework of cause and consequence. Man may benefit from compliance, or suffer adverse effect and consequence from noncompliance. Truth will ultimately prevail -- it will destroy the destroyer.

Cooperative Federalism defies both physical and moral law. It is predicated on a mathematically impossible economic scheme, and relies on deception and fraud. The system is destined to collapse, very probably ushering in the worst depression in American history. And the names of those responsible will be anathema for generations to come.

Dialectical materialism is an underlying precept of Cooperative Federalism. Karl Marx invented the scheme to rationalize the march of global communism, which relies on perpetual revolution rather than relative stability anchored to time-proven principles. When the Berlin Wall came down, we saw the fall of one of the central icons of the diabolical scheme. It is more than possible for peaceful restoration of constitutional rule in this nation to manifest an even greater miracle realized in our time.

Dan Meador: 1108 N. 2nd. Street, Ponca City, Okla. 74601
E-mail: dmeador@poncacity.net

1 The Federal "States" are territories and insular possessions of the United States. Since Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union of several States, there are no territories of the United States as such. The remaining "insular possessions" large enough to be quasi-self-governing include Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands; the District of Columbia is also a possession of the United States, but falls in a different category as the Constitution authorizes establishing the seat of government at Article I § 8.17, where the other insular possessions have been acquired and are governed under the territorial clause at Article IV § 3.2, cited later in text. In the United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, etc., these insular possessions are defined as "States". The insular possessions are not incorporated in the constitutional scheme as territories of the United States were, so for many purposes are considered "foreign" to the several States of the Union. This was determined in four insular tax cases in the 1901-1904 period, Downes v. Bidwell (1901) being the first.

2 Downes v. Bidwell (1901) 21 S.Ct. 770, 182 U.S. 244, 45 L.Ed. 1088.

3 Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 89 S.Ct. 1322 at 1337, 394 U.S. 618.

4 What is referred to as the "key-question" survey in this text has been conducted periodically at least since the last decade, with the object being to track population discontent level. Both major political parties, Associated Press, and other enterprises conduct it, particularly prior to and during presidential election years. In November 1996, the "confidence" or trust level was estimated at 15%, in February 1997, at 22%. The more direct "anger" survey was initiated in 1995 by the Scripps Howard News Service. Since then, the peak in articulated "growing" or "increasing" anger with Federal government peaked at about 53%; in early July 1998, "increasing" anger was calculated at 35%, but as Al Gore and various congressional leaders articulated, much of the anger has simply turned to cynicism. The distrust level, which measures broader sentiment, has remained in the approximate 80% range. In spite of continuing efforts to register voters, no more than 40% of those eligible to vote have registered in the 1990s. Senior citizens and professionals are categories most likely to vote; working classes, the unemployed, transients of all descriptions, and younger generations are least likely.

5 Figures concerning incarceration numbers were published by the Department of Justice in 1990 and after. The Federal prison population, at 113,000 in December 1997, is approaching five times what it was in the 1970's. As the "get tough on crime" mania continues, with most who are prosecuted in State and Federal forums charged for "victimless" crime, prison populations will continue to double at eight to ten-year intervals. Figures in the text of this discourse are reconciled with December 1997 Department of Justice Figures, and figures provided by television newsman Ted Koppel in a special on the nation's prison systems. Many of these statistics conflict with 1990 facts and figures provided by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, supposedly from Department of Justice reports. In 1990, State and Federal systems supposedly incarcerated more people on a per-capita basis and in total numbers than any system in the world, South Africa and the old Soviet Union included. Current Department of Justice information very probably is limited to people actually incarcerated "behind the fence" or "behind the wall", without accounting for people on State and Federal supervised release, serving time either in halfway houses or county jails, or incarcerated while awaiting trial via State or Federal courts. The number actually subject to authority of State and Federal corrections systems could easily be three times published figures for imprisonment.

6 Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler, and what is called the rule of nations or law of empires: No nation or society has ever voluntarily changed unless or until internal degeneration reached a point economic collapse destroyed key social institutions, or unless or until defeated at war. Historical novelist Gore Vidal pointed out that the defeat must be on home ground. Nineteen of 21 known empires collapsed from within prior to 1935.

7 Psalm 10; II Timothy 3: 8 & 9.

8 28 U.S.C. § 132 allegedly establishes a "United States District Court" in each judicial district of the United States. However, by reading historical notes, it is found that this section merges sections from titles 28 & 48 of the United States Code, 1940 edition, with the latter pertaining to territory and insular possessions of the United States. Along with 18 U.S.C. § 7, which merely defines special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States but does not prescribe jurisdiction for any given section of the criminal code, 28 U.S.C. § 132 is among the more sinister decoys in the United States Code. Article III district courts of the United States, defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451, and legitimate territorial courts listed at 18 U.S.C. § 23, are defined as courts of the United States (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 610, 753, 1869(f), and elsewhere).

9 For economy of time and space, certain abbreviations are used in this text: U.S.C. = United States Code; "§" means "section" when reference is to the Constitution of the United States, the United States Code or the Statutes at Large, and "part" when reference is to the Code of Federal Regulations. Therefore, Section 451 of Title 28 of the United States Code = 28 U.S.C. § 451. When references are to the Constitution, Art. or Article IV § 3.2 = Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution. Other abbreviations will be clear from context or noted on first appearance.

10 See 18 U.S.C. § 23, which is 1994 legislation updating the list of three courts, and Rule 54(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for listing of legitimate "Article IV" territorial courts which have somewhat the character and authority of Article III district courts of the United States situated in the Union of several States.

11 Mookini v. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201, 82 L.Ed. 748, at p. 205.

12 Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922) 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298, 66 L.Ed. 627, at 258 U.S. 312.

13 The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 1994 edition, is as follows: "The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."

14 Congressional authority to created courts inferior to the Supreme Court is found in two clauses in the Constitution: Article I § 8.9 & Article III § 1; Congress' general authority to promulgate legislation for carrying out all powers enumerated in the Constitution is at Article I § 8.18. The Supreme Court has several times addressed the necessity of Congress creating departments and agencies of the United States, and has repeatedly declared that unless a department or agency is created by Congress, it has no legitimate authority. The leading decisions were made in the last century in Norton v. Shelby County (1866), 118 U.S. 425, 441, 6 S.Ct. 1121, and United States v. Germane (1879), 99 U.S. 508. More recent decisions affirming the necessity of legislative creation for an agency or department to have lawful authority include Pope v. Commissioner (6th Cir., 1943), and State v. Pinckney (Iowa, 1979), 276 N.W. 2d 433, 436.

15 Authority for the affidavit of bias and prejudice is evidenced at 28 U.S.C. § 144; individual judicial complaints may be filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 372(c). Obviously, all district judges, senior district judges, and United States magistrate judges who participate in the "private" United States District Court located in any of the several States party to the Constitution has bias and prejudice that would compromise him or her in the lawful Article III district court of the United States. Names of those who participate in the private United States District Courts are listed in the front of local rules of civil procedure, and usually in telephone directories.

16 The territorial clause at Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution is as follows: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States..."

17 Several court decisions have verified that the United States Code is not "law of the United States." See Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (1947); United States v. Mercur Corporation, 83 F. 2d 178, 180 (1936); Royer's Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 615, 618 (1959). The Royer's case was a decade after Titles 18 & 28 were allegedly enacted as "positive law" and became "legal evidence" of law of the United States.

18 Pub. Law. No. 13, Act of June 10, 1921, Ch. 18, § 301 et seq. See particularly § 305: "Sec. 305. Section 236 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows: 'Sec. 236. All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office.'" Refer to notes following 5 U.S.C. § 5512 to see that the "Solicitor of the Treasury" was merged with functions of the Attorney General via Executive Orders, etc. The necessity for initiating civil action, as well as criminal, is tacitly stated in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 7401.

19 See Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166 (1978), a Third Circuit case where John Cervase, an attorney, filed a writ of mandamus against the Office of the Federal Register to construct and publish finding aids required by the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1510). The case was originally dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Cervase appealed. The Third Circuit issued the writ of mandamus ordering the Office of the Federal Register to construct the finding aids and the Code of Federal Regulations Index. In the decision, the court noted the purpose of the Federal Register Act (p.p. 1170-71): "But such a construction would fly in the face of the fundamental purpose of the Federal Register Act -- to eliminate the problem of secret law." Regulations governing construction of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules are at 1 CFR § 8. Each department or agency, usually via the chief executive officer, is responsible for maintaining accuracy of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, so if there is error, liability falls to the department or agency responsible for administering and enforcing any given statute. The Federal Register Act itself was originally passed following the Supreme Court's decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).

20 See California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812, 94 S.Ct. 1494, United States v. Mersky (1959) 361 U.S. 431, 4 L.Ed.2d, 80 S.Ct. 459, and various other cases. The Supreme Court has likened regulations to "little statutes", and has clearly stated the necessity for implementing regulations before any given statute has the force and effect of law. A statute and its implementing regulation are for all practical purposes inseparable, and one doesn't have lawful effect for general application without the other.

21 Per The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, L. Ralph Mecham presently serves as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Inquiries should be sent to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, One Columbus Circle NE., Washington, DC 20544. The telephone number for the Congressional, External, and Public Affairs Office, which is not split, is (202) 273-1120. As of October 1, 1998, people in the Public Information Office have been difficult to move, but the problem should be resolved shortly.

22 Wayman v. Southard (1825) 23 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253

23 Where Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are concerned, the Supreme Court order of December 27, 1948 amended the rules to apply to the United States District Courts rather than district courts of the United States: "1. That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and it hereby is, amended to read as follows: Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts." The order of December 26, 1944 reads as follows: "It is ordered that Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States..." Where the rules of civil procedure are concerned, the following is found in the order of December 29, 1948: "1. That the title 'Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States' be amended to read 'Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts'." These orders are reproduced ahead of rules of procedure in West Publishing desktop editions of titles 18 & 28 of the United States Code, and the 1994 edition of the United States Code.

24 In the official historical report on the nation's revenue laws, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue admitted that Congress never created the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of IRS & BATF. See 36 F.R. 849-890 [C.B. 1971-1,698], 36 F.R. 11946 [C.B. 1971 -- 2,577], and section 1111.2 of the Internal Revenue Manual 1100. The best the Commissioner could do is allude to Congressional intent in 1862 even though there is no independent evidence of Congressional intent to create a new and separate tax collection agency. Revenue officers were independently appointed in their respective districts until implementation of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This is confirmed in the presidential letter following Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952, published following 26 U.S.C. § 7804.

25 United States v. Constantine (1935), 296 U.S. 233.

26 In September 1995, William Cooper and Bill Bentson of Arizona published evidence that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of IRS, is an agency of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico. Their research documented when and how BIR, Philippines was established, but the precise time BIR, Puerto Rico was established was lost in the shuffle. However, a major breakthrough in this search was recently made: In 1900, Congress created the Puerto Rico Special Fund (Internal Revenue), then in 1934, stipulated that all "funds" would be "trusts", i.e., Puerto Rico Trust #62 (Internal Revenue), which is now administered by the Secretary of the Treasury (see Title 31, U.S.C.). It is almost certain that the provisional government for Puerto Rico created the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico in 1900 or shortly thereafter. As researchers gain access to records of the Puerto Rican provisional government, which operated under directive of what is now the Department of Defense, they are almost certain to find authority which created BIR, Puerto Rico, thus nailing the last element in this search down. The recent finds were by J. Halsbrook.