Legitimacy of Regulation

Through a series of cases, the Court reviewed the legitimacy of regulation associated with various statutory nuisances or "nuisances in law" claimed under the authority of the State's "police powers." Several guidelines were consequently developed through these decisions:

The question of legitimacy of regulation based on statutory or legislatively defined nuisance considered several factors:

  Whether the regulation had a legitimate substantial relationship to the protection of public peace, good order, health, safety and morals from noxious/dangerous/injurious use;

  Whether they served the interests of the general public and not some single class of interests; and

  Whether the regulation was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962):

..."The question, therefore, narrows to whether the prohibition of further excavation below the water table is a valid exercise of the town's police power. The term "police power" connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of "reasonableness," this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria. The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today:

"To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."

"The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. City of New Orleans, supra, pages 282, 283 (97 So. 444), also stated:

"If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago, supra, pages 530-531 (37 S. Ct. 190); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31, 25 S. Ct. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765."

The California Court recognized the concept of regulatory "burden" in In Ex parte Hayden (1905) 147 Cal. 649, 82 Pac. 315. There,  the California Court established that the Legislature can not, under the guise of police regulations, enact laws not pertaining to the public welfare, public health, or public morals in which impose onerous and unnecessary burdens upon business and property.