Socialism: The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016
(OFFSITE LINK)-Sovereignty
Education and Defense Ministry (SEDM)
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, ISBN 0-87779-510-X, page 1118
socialism n (1839) 1: any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods 2 a: a system of society or group living in which there is no private property b: a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state 3: a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.
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NOTE: The definition of "socialism" is nowhere to be found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936):
"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another."
Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, in 1874
The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A. should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B.
Of all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be lawfully used and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the National defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal of the government.
The power to tax is therefore the strongest, the most pervading of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. state of Maryland, that the power to tax is the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten percent imposed by the United States on the circulation of all other banks than the national banks drove out of existence every [87 U.S. 664] state bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage. This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised.
To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.
Nor is it taxation. A "tax," says Webster's Dictionary, "is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or state." "Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes."
Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,7 says, very forcibly,I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations -- that they are imposed for a public purpose.
We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not.
It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of private interest instead of a public use, and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the [87 U.S. 665] reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.
But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the businessmen of the city or town.
[Footnote 7: 13 Pa.St. 104; see also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 id. 69; Matter of Mayor of New York, 11 Johnson 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutcher 398; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia. 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 188.]
[The following 34 Supreme Court case(s) cite this case:
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937)
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935)
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934)
State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931)
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930)
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919)
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917)
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911)
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905)
Aldrich v. Chemical National Bank, 176 U.S. 618 (1900)
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896)
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
Commercial Bank of Cleveland v. Iola, 154 U.S. 617 (1875)
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190 (1893)
Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U.S. 366 (1892)
Scotland County Court v. United States ex Rel. Hill, 140 U.S. 41(1891)
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)
Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885)
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883)
Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733 (1881)
County of Moultrie v. Fairfield, 105 U.S. 370 (1881)
Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881)
Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1880)
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878)
Otis v. Cullum, 92 U.S. 447 (1875)]
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232
Public use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, Mont., 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Ringe Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579, 586.
See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232]
[IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL NOTE: See "public office" and "trade or business", both of which are associated with "public use" as defined above]
Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,13 Pa.St. 104 (quoted in Loan Assoc.)
"I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations -- that they are imposed for a public purpose."
[Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,13 Pa.St. 104]
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900):
"So it was held in the oyster planting case (McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 , 24 L. ed. 248), that the right which the people of that state acquired to appropriate its tide waters and the beds therein for taking and cultivating fish was but a regulation of the use, by the people, of their common property, and the right thus acquired did not come from their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property combined. It was therefore a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship, and for that reason the citizen of one state was not invested by the Constitution of the United States with any interest in the common property of the citizen of another state."
[Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)]
Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892):
“Surely the matters in which the public has the most interest are the supplies of food and clothing; yet can it be that by reason of this interest the state may fix the price at which the butcher must sell his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods? Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;' and to 'secure,' not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor's injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor's benefit; second, that if the devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.
[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]
Senate
Document #43, Senate Resolution No. 62, p. 9, paragraph 2, 1933
"The ultimate ownership of all property is in the State; individual so-called "ownership" is only by virtue of Government, i.e., law, amounting to mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State."
[Senate Document #43, Senate Resolution No. 62, p. 9, paragraph 2, 1933]
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
"A statutory provision which is not a legitimate police regulation cannot be made such by being placed in the same act with a police regulation, or by being enacted under a title that declares a purpose which would be a proper object for the exercise of that power.
"It being self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.
"The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes "liberty" and "property" as coexistent human rights, and debars the states from any unwarranted interference with either.
"Since a state may not strike down the rights of liberty or property directly, it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of the exercise of those rights, and then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view.
"The Fourteenth Amendment debars the states from striking down personal liberty or property rights or materially restricting their normal exercise excepting so far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one that concerns the public welfare. The mere restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot, of itself, be denominated "public welfare" and treated as a legitimate object of the police power, for such restriction is the very thing that is inhibited by the Amendment. [236 U.S. 3]"